CPS Lunch Forum: Matias Slavov (Tampere University)

This paper considers two seemingly incompatible theses: there are many directions of time, but they are all one-directional. It is argued that the direction of time is based on causation. The sequential theory of causation is defended against the simultaneous theory. There is a partial overlap of cause and effect, but the cause begins before its effect. It is argued that conservation laws do not exemplify causation. Although it might be that a fundamental physical description of the world lacks causation, paradigmatic instances of causation are temporally directed. It is pointed out that in many cases the distinction between physics and metaphysics is muddy. This weakens the anti-causal philosophy of physics stance. The paper ends by considering a reductio argument: If causation and time in perception are not unidirectional, we are left with absurdities. Eventually, it is explained how the one-directionality of time does not entail a unique direction of time.