Hugo Ribeiro Mota

Image of Hugo Ribeiro Mota
Norwegian version of this page
Room 340
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Visiting address Blindernveien 31 Georg Morgenstiernes hus 0313 Oslo
Postal address Postboks 1020 Blindern 0315 Oslo

I am a PhD candidate in Philosophy at the University of Oslo under the supervision of Joey Pollock and co-supervision of Catarina Dutilh-Novaes.

My research project, Deep disagreements and power: communication under oppression, is part of the New Models of Knowledge Communication project, funded by the Research Council of Norway.

My CV is available here.

Research summary

Power is relevant to most communicative interactions, especially so when oppression is involved. Accounts of 'deep disagreement' should not overlook how power inequality and structural oppression affect the phenomenon. This is particularly important when considering political deep disagreements, which may lead to oppression or be a consequence of it. In my assessment, a reconceptualization of 'deep disagreement' is necessary in order to understand its complexity. Therefore, I propose an ameliorative analysis of 'deep disagreement' which allows for moving beyond epistemic attitudes and argumentative approaches mainly oriented towards rational resolution. This new model of deep disagreement recognizes the role of perspectives, structuring commitments, attention, salience, and forms of communicative exchange oriented to other outcomes. One of the main benefits of this revision is the ability to use the concept of deep disagreement more effectively to account for actual social and political conflicts, which in turn contributes to the extremely challenging task of understanding them without resorting to problematic oversimplifications.

Areas of research

Areas of Specialization:

Social & Political Epistemology • Philosophy of Language • Philosophy of Mind

Areas of Competence:

Social & Political Philosophy • Argumentation Theory • Philosophy of Education

Academic background

I have a BA and MA in Philosophy from the Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE, Brazil). My master's thesis investigated to what extent there was a defense of a type of foundationalism Wittgenstein's On Certainty. I argued for an anti-foundationalist reading through an analysis of the twelve key metaphors from the book.

Tags: Philosophy, Epistemology, Philosophy of language, Disagreement, Wittgenstein

Selected publications

Mejía, D.; Mota, H. R.; Baumtrog, M. D. (2022). Connecting the Americas Through Argumentation. Argumentation & Advocacy, 58 (3-4), 193-213. https://doi.org/10.1080/10511431.2022.2138182

Mota, H. R. (2021). Em que medida Wittgenstein seria fundacionista? [To what extent is Wittgenstein a foundationalist?]. Voluntas, 12 (2), e02. https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378666403

Mota, H. R. (2021). Paradoxo do Desacordo Profundo: uma abordagem relativista epistêmica [Deep Disagreement Paradox: an epistemic relativist approach]. Revista do Seminário dos Alunos do PPGLM/UFRJ; 11(1):11–28.

Silva, M.; Cavalcanti, I.; Mota, H. (2020). Linguagem e Enativismo: uma resposta normativa para a objeção de escopo e o problema difícil do conteúdo [Language and Enactivism: a normative answer to the scope objection and the hard problem of content]. Prometeus; 33:129–160. https://doi.org/10.52052/issn.2176-5960.pro.v12i33.13811

Cavalcanti, I.; Mota, H. (2019). Cognição e linguagem: seria a linguagem um desafio para abordagens enativistas? [Cognition and language: is language a challenge for enactivist approaches?]. In: A Mente Humana para Além do Cérebro - Perspectivas a partir dos 4Es da Cognição. Coimbra: Coimbra University Press. p. 139–156.

Published Sep. 20, 2021 1:50 PM - Last modified June 24, 2024 5:42 PM