Joanna Katharine Mary Pollock

• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary & Phillips, Kim Pedersen (2026). Science miscommunication. Inquiry (Oslo). ISSN 0020-174X. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2025). Radical Holism and Disagreement. In Bermúdez, José Luis; Valente, Matheus & Verdejo, Víctor M. (Ed.), Sharing Thoughts. Oxford University Press. ISSN 9780191955389. p. 312–332. doi: 10.1093/oso/9780192864925.003.0014. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Traditional accounts of disagreement require that different subjects can entertain the same propositional contents. For most views of mental content, this ‘shared content’ approach seems an obvious choice. However, for the radical holist, this framework is problematic: the holist claims that different subjects cannot, in practice, share thoughts. This paper has two aims. The first is to suggest an account of agreement and disagreement for the holist, which treats both agreement and disagreement as graded notions. The second aim is to show that the structure of this account should be attractive to all philosophers who work on disagreement, regardless of their metasemantic commitments. I argue that there is an important variety of disagreement (and agreement) between subjects that cannot be adequately characterized by appeal to shared content. Instead, all parties to the debate should endorse accounts of these phenomena that appeal to a holistic notion of linguistic and conceptual understanding.

• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2024). Epistemic Bubbles and Contextual Discordance. Philosophy. ISSN 0031-8191. 99(3), p. 437–459. doi: 10.1017/S0031819124000093. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Recent work in social epistemology has drawn attention to various problematic social epistemic phenomena that are common within online networks. Nguyen (2020) argues that it is important to distinguish epistemic bubbles from echo chambers. An epistemic bubble is an information structure that merely lacks information or sources that would be relevant or important to the user. An echo chamber is a structure in which dissenting opinions are, not necessarily absent, but actively undermined, for example by instilling attitudes of distrust towards their adherents. Because of this, echo chambers are thought to be especially difficult to escape. In contrast, according to Nguyen, it is relatively easy to shatter an epistemic bubble: one simply introduces the missing information. In this paper, I argue that it is more difficult to shatter an epistemic bubble than has been recognised in the literature. The reason for this is the relationship between epistemic bubbles and interpretative resources. Despite their epistemic drawbacks, it is comparatively easy to gain knowledge from sources inside one's epistemic bubble because agents within a bubble share common ground. In contrast, it can be very difficult to gain knowledge from sources outside of one's bubble because interlocutors on the outside are less likely to have the shared context needed to facilitate communicative success. I argue that this problem suggests a different way to understand the nature of epistemic bubbles and our prospects for escaping them.

• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2023). Testimonial knowledge and content preservation. Philosophical Studies. ISSN 0031-8116. 180, p. 3073–3097. doi: 10.1007/s11098-023-02030-5. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Abstract Most work in the epistemology of testimony is built upon a simple model of communication according to which, when the speaker asserts that p, the hearer must recover this very content, p. In this paper, I argue that this ‘Content Preservation Model’ of communication cannot bear the weight placed on it by contemporary work on testimony. It is popularly thought that testimonial exchanges are often successful such that we gain a great deal of knowledge through testimony. In addition, the testimonial knowledge so gained is thought to be informative: it closes off epistemic possibilities for the agent. However, in the literature on truth-conditional content, there is no theory of content that can underpin both of these commitments simultaneously if the Content Preservation Model is true. There is a minimal notion of content, which is commonly preserved in communication, but which is typically uninformative; there is a maximal notion of content, which is often informative, but which is not often preserved in communication; and, although there are moderate positions between these two extremes, these views cannot strike the right balance between informativeness and shareability. Thus, an epistemology of testimony that endorses the Content Preservation Model faces a dilemma: on the first horn, testimonial exchanges are rarely successful; on the second horn, testimonial content is rarely informative. I suggest that this dilemma motivates further exploration of alternative communicative foundations for the epistemology of testimony.

• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2021). Linguistic understanding and testimonial warrant. Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy. ISSN 0165-0106. doi: 10.1007/s10670-020-00362-w. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  How much linguistic understanding is required for testimonial knowledge acquisition? One answer is that, so long as we grasp the content expressed by the speaker, it does not matter if our understanding of it is poor. Call this the ‘Liberal View’ of testimony. This approach looks especially promising when combined with the thesis that we share a public language that makes it easy to grasp the right content. In this paper, I argue that this picture is epistemically problematic. Poor linguistic understanding undermines our ability to recognise evidence and counterevidence for the testimonial content. Because of this, in many cases in which a hearer’s understanding is poor, her resultant testimonial belief will lack sufficient warrant to qualify as knowledge. Given that we often do not possess a sufficiently good understanding of the testimony we consume, I argue that we acquire far less knowledge through testimony than the Liberal View suggests.

• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2021). Content internalism and testimonial knowledge. INQUIRY (INQ). ISSN 0046-9580. p. 1–22. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2021.1977691. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  It is commonly assumed that content preservation is required for success in testimonial exchanges. Many content internalists, however, cannot endorse this assumption. They must claim instead that testimonial exchanges can often succeed when the content grasped by the hearer is not the content of the speaker’s testimony, p, but some merely similar content, p*. Goldberg (2007. Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) argues that this internalist approach is epistemically problematic: it cannot maintain certain features thought to be characteristic of testimonial exchanges. I argue that, contrary to appearances, the internalist’s account is just as epistemically respectable as the traditional ‘same content’ approach favoured by externalists.

• Pollock, Joanna (2020). Holism, conceptual role, and conceptual similarity. Philosophical Psychology. ISSN 0951-5089. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2020.1729973. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Holistic views of content claim that we each speak and think in distinct and idiosyncratic idiolects: although we may often entertain thoughts with similar contents, the content of our thoughts can never be type-identical. Many authors find this feature of holism problematic. Denying that two subjects can share thought content seems to lead to difficulties when it comes to providing accounts of various intersubjective phenomena, such as communication and disagreement. A common holist response is to claim that explanations of these phenomena should appeal to conceptual similarity rather than shared content. To make this approach plausible, holists must provide an account of what it is for two concepts to be similar. Fodor and Leporeargue that this cannot be done: accounts of conceptual similarity (across non-identical networks) must presuppose a robust notion of conceptual identity, and this is inconsistent with the holist’s view. In this paper, I provide an account of conceptual similarity for theories of content that are both fully holistic and purely internalist. I argue that similarities between the perceptual representations that are connected to holistic networks can be used to ground comparisons of conceptual similarity without appeal to either robust conceptual identity or the external world.

• Pollock, Joanna (2020). Context and communicative success. In Ciecierski, Tadeusz & Grabarczyk, Paweł (Ed.), The Architecture of Context and Context-Sensitivity. Springer. ISSN 9783030344856. doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-34485-6_13. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Traditional accounts of the conditions on communicative success are invariantist. For example, some authors claim that, for communication to succeed, a hearer must always grasp the very content that the speaker expressed with her utterance; others claim that success is always proportional to the degree to which the hearer understands this content. In this paper, I argue that these invariantist approaches cannot offer a comprehensive account of communicative success. When we attempt to communicate, it is usually with the intention to secure some perlocutionary effect beyond the communicative exchange itself (for example, to get our interlocutor to pass the salt, or to convince her to form a particular belief). I argue that, relative to these intentions, it may not matter whether a hearer perfectly understands the speaker; it may not even matter if the hearer’s understanding is quite poor overall. In place of invariantist conditions (or perhaps, in addition), I propose an approach that is context-dependent in the following sense: holding fixed the content expressed by the speaker, differences in features of the broad context of the speech exchange can determine differences in the standards for communicative success. On this approach, success requires that the hearer understand the content expressed by the speaker in ways that are relevant to the speaker’s perlocutionary intentions.

• Pollock, Joanna (2020). Content internalism and conceptual engineering. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857. 198(12), p. 11587–11605. doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02815-9. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Cappelen (Fixing language, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018) proposes a radically externalist framework (the ‘Austerity Framework’) for conceptual engineering. This approach embraces the following two theses. Firstly, the mechanisms that underlie conceptual engineering are inscrutable: they are too complex, unstable and non-systematic for us to grasp. Secondly, the process of conceptual engineering is largely beyond our control. One might think that these two theses are peculiar to the Austerity Framework, or to metasemantic externalism more generally. However, Cappelen argues that there is no reason to think that internalism avoids either commitment. Cappelen argues that to do so she must provide arguments for 3 claims: (a) there are inner states that are scrutable and within our control; (b) concepts supervene on these inner states; and (c) the determination relation from supervenience base to content is itself scrutable and within our control. In this paper, I argue that internalist conceptual role theories of content can meet Cappelen’s challenge.

• Pollock, Joanna (2019). Conceptual Engineering and Semantic Deference. Studia Philosophica Estonica. ISSN 2228-110X. 12, p. 81–98. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Many ameliorative projects aim at moral goods such as social equality. For example, the amelioration of the concept MARRIAGE forms part of efforts to achieve equal rights for the LGBT+ community. What does implementation of such an ameliorated concept consist in? In this paper, I argue that, for some ameliorated concepts, successful implementation requires that individuals eschew semantic deference, at least with respect to relevant dimensions of the concept. My argument appeals to consideration of the aims of conceptual engineers engaged in this type of ameliorative project: they seek conceptual change in order to contribute to the dismantling of oppressive social structures, institutions, and systems of belief. I argue that, for such aims to be achieved, it must be the case that individuals who come to endorse the concept do so for the right reasons – because they have gained an understanding of why the ameliorated concept is morally preferable to its ancestor. Once they have acquired such reasons, however, they are no longer correctly described as semantically deferential; they will treat moral reasons to employ the concept as overriding of semantic considerations.

• Pollock, Joanna (2015). Social externalism and the problem of communication. Philosophical Studies. ISSN 0031-8116. Full text in Research Archive

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• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary & Sandve, Geir Kjetil Ferkingstad (2026). Diskusjon om kunstig intelligens i forskning. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2026). LLMs in education. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary & Strand, Anders (2026). Transdisciplinary Studies of AI in Professional Conduct. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary & Strand, Anders (2026). Transdisciplinary Studies of AI in Professional Conduct. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2026). Algorithmic Bias. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2026). Epistemic bubbles and contextual discordance. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary & Phillips, Kim Pedersen (2026). Science Miscommunication. Full text in Research Archive
• Torgersen, Eivind & Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2026). - Vi må forstå andres verden for å tilegne oss ny kunnskap. [Internet]. https://www.uio.no/forskning/forskningsnytt/. doi: https:/www.uio.no/forskning/forskningsnytt/artikler/2026/vi-ma-forsta-andres-verden.html. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary & Mallory, Fintan Declan (2026). INTERVIEW: Fintan Mallory on 'Fictionalism about chatbots'. doi: https:/www.joeykpollock.net/blog/interview-fintan-mallory-on-fictionalism-about-chatbots. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2025). Global testimonial pessimism and the division of epistemic labour. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2025). Miscommunication and the limits of testimonial knowledge. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2025). Testimonial Pessimism. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary & Phillips, Kim Pedersen (2025). Science Miscommunication. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary & Phillips, Kim Pedersen (2025). Science Miscommunication. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary & Phillips, Kim Pedersen (2025). Science Miscommunication. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2025). Science Miscommunication. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary; Drożdżowicz, Anna & Peled, Yael (2025). INTERVIEW: Anna Drożdżowicz and Yael Peled on ‘The complexities of linguistic discrimination’. doi: https:/www.joeykpollock.net/blog/interview-anna-drozdzowicz-and-yael-peled-on-the-complexities-of-linguistic-discrimination. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2024). Miscommunication and the limits of testimonial knowledge. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2024). Testimonial Pessimism. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2024). Testimonial pessimism. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2024). Testimonial pessimism. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2023). Testimonial pessimism. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2023). Testimonial pessimism. Full text in Research Archive
• Phillips, Kim Pedersen & Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2023). Science Miscommunication. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2022). Testimonial pessimism. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2022). Testimonial scepticism. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2022). Testimony and Content Preservation. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2022). Do testimonial exchanges preserve content? Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2022). Epistemic bubbles and contextual discordance. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2022). Response to Samuel's 'Telling, indirection, and joint action'. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary & Podosky, Paul-Mikhail Catapang (2022). INTERVIEW: Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky on 'Agency, Power, and Injustice in Metalinguistic Disagreement'. doi: https:/www.joeykpollock.net/blog/interview-paul-mikhail-catapang-podosky-on-agency-power-and-injustice-in-metalinguistic-disagreement. Full text in Research Archive
• Phillips, Kim Pedersen & Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2022). Scientific Communication and Misinterpretation. Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2021). Do testimonial exchanges preserve content? Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2021). Do testimonial exchanges preserve content? Full text in Research Archive
• Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2021). Do testimonial exchanges preserve content? Full text in Research Archive
• Mota, Hugo Ribeiro; Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary & Dutilh-Novaes, Catarina (2025). Deep Disagreements and Power: Communication Under Oppression. Universitetet i Oslo. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Theories of deep disagreement have highlighted its epistemic significance, characterizing the phenomenon as a disagreement over important epistemic attitudes where the parties do not share the procedures to establish a dialogue that would lead to a rational resolution. I argue that these theories fail in accounting for the full complexity of the phenomenon. I claim that this problem primarily stems from two issues: an overemphasis on the epistemic aspects of deep disagreement, and an overfocus on the idea that the outcome of the dispute has to be a rational resolution. As a result of these issues, existing theories fall short when trying to explain examples of deep disagreement. In order to address this shortcoming, I propose a shift which highlights the significance of further aspects of the disagreement beyond the epistemic, specifically those relating to political, social, and psychological matters. This shift is motivated by the recognition of the fact that power dynamics are relevant to most communicative interactions, especially those which involve oppression. Thus, accounts of deep disagreement should not overlook how social, political, cultural, and material factors affect the phenomenon. This is particularly important when considering political deep disagreements, but I claim that it is relevant to cases that are not overtly political. In my assessment, an ameliorative analysis of the concept of deep disagreement is necessary in order to capture the complexity of the phenomenon and accommodate these factors that go beyond the epistemic. This ameliorative analysis is presented through a new model of deep disagreement which recognizes the central role of personal and social perspectives in characterizing the phenomenon. In turn, this recognition shows how a broader approach to communication is warranted. On my proposed view, we should no longer solely be concerned with how we exchange reasons for beliefs, but also with how we are shaped by ideological values, attention patterns, salience perspectives, and social emotions. This is especially important given that it is at the stage of engagement where power dynamics are more easily identified and (potentially) disrupted. The reconceptualized notion of deep disagreement improves our understanding of the phenomenon by taking into account the fact that power structures may undermine much of the basis for establishing dialogue. It is only because of this reconceptualization that we may consider how alternative forms of communicative exchange oriented to other outcomes beyond rational resolution may occur in deep disagreements. The main benefit of this general revision is the possibility to use the concept of deep disagreement more effectively to account for actual social and political conflicts, which in turn contributes to the extremely challenging task of understanding them without resorting to problematic oversimplifications.

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