Philosophy of Psychology

How does psychology work? What does it tell us about who we are? We discuss the psychology of humans and other animals.

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Course Description

This course focuses on core topics in the philosophy of psychology and cognitive science. On the one hand, we will deal with philosophical questions about psychology. We will, for example, look at the nature and the reach of psychological explanations: what do we explain in psychology and how? Are there differences between explaining human behaviour and that of animals (or plants)? What is the relationship between psychological, sociological or neuroscientific explanations? What can brain imaging tell us about the mind? On the other hand – and this will be the bigger part of the course – we will look at how, if at all, psychological research can help to answer traditional philosophical questions, and at areas that lie between psychology and philosophy. Here we will look at questions like the following: Do chimpanzees, birds, or lobsters feel pain? How can we study consciousness scientifically? What does the theory of evolution tell us about the way we think and act? Is the mind made up out of separate modules like thinking, seeing, and hearing, and if so, what are their boundaries? Does thinking happen in a kind of language? Does cognition happen only in the brain, or might it be "extended" to include the body and environment? What is the relationship between our cognitive and our social capacities? How are communication and cognition related and do animals communicate like humans? What are the psychological bases of social cooperation and morality? What is the psychological basis of bias and prejudice? A special focus of the version of the course this year will be the psychology of humans and other animals.

Readings

The course has obligatory readings assigned for every week. Almost all of them are from the following two textbooks:

  • Weiskopf, D., & Adams, F. (2015). An introduction to the philosophy of psychology. Cambridge University Press. (reference to this book as ‘WA’)
  • Andrews, K. (2020). The animal mind: An introduction to the philosophy of animal cognition. Routledge. (reference to this book as ‘A’)

Every student must have those two textbooks. They are available through Academika as well as any other book store (I personally don’t care whether you own a physical copy of the books or an electronic one, though there is some evidence (1, 2) that you’ll get more out of the physical copies)

In addition, some other readings will be made available through Canvas. These are mostly optional (though for the last two weeks of the course, see below).

Please note that readings may change to some degree as the semester continues. Students are responsible for checking Canvas and their email regularly.

Course format

Fall 2020, this course will be held online (at least mostly, see below). The course will happen on Canvas. All the relevant information can be found there. The course will take the following form (adjustments may happen as the course progresses through the semester, so keep yourself updated!)

  1. The course will be organized in Modules. You can find these modules on Canvas. One module corresponds, roughly, to one course week (though in the last two weeks, students can choose 2 out of 5 modules).
  2. A module will normally consist of the following parts (though, again, some of this might change through the semester):
    • Reading 1-2 Chapters in the textbooks (or readings posted on Canvas)
      • I will post short questions and/or quizzes to help you by guiding you through your reading.
    • A lecture by me:
      • This lecture will consist in a mix of video recordings of myself and a powerpoint and text, with links to other videos or websites. This lecture will have a website on Canvas.
      • The lecture for each week will normally be posted on Monday.
    • A quiz to test your understanding of the lecture and readings. Alternatively, other activities. Sometimes I might ask you, for example to do some little writing exercise (see obligatory activities below)
    • A discussion forum where I post a question which you should answer and discuss with your peers. (see obligatory activities below)
    • A 45 min zoom meeting (Thursday, 13-13:45). The focus of this zoom meeting will be classroom discussion, and so you will often be divided into groups of 5-6 to discuss some aspects of the material
  3. If you have questions about the lectures or the material, you can ask me either by email, by using the chat function on Canvas (I will not always be online, though!) or during my office hours (see above) on zoom.
  4. I am considering two physical meetings later in the semester (though whether this makes sense depends a bit on the coronavirus situation). I will announce soon when they will happen, if they do. The time would be Thursday 12:15-14:00

As you can see, the course is distributed throughout the week, and doesn’t necessarily happen in exactly one two-hour slot. When you will listen to my lectures, do the quizzes, or be active in the discussion forum is up to you. The only thing whose time is set is the weekly Zoom meeting.

I am curious and excited about this new course format. I think it offers opportunities as well as challenges. Together we can make this an exciting semester!

 

Modules and Detailed Course Content

Module 0: Background: What is a mind and who has one? (A 1+2)

This is not an official module of the course. But those who want to refresh their philosophy of mind, get thinking about whether animals have mind, or watch some fun videos, can do so in this preparatory module

Module 1: Explanation in psychology: laws and mechanisms

In this module, we learn about how psychology explains: what is explained, and how is it explained? Are there psychological laws? Or does psychological explanation work in a different way?

Obligatory Reading: WA, Ch 1

Optional Readings:

  • Cummins, R. (2000). How does it work?" versus" what are the laws?": Two conceptions of psychological explanation. Explanation and cognition, 117-144.
  • Marr, D. (1982). Vision. A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and Processing of Visual Information (Ch 1). The MIT Press

Module 2: Explaining animal behaviour (and plants?)

In this module, we will ask about the reach of psychological explanations. Should we use psychology to explain the behaviour of animals (or plants)? Should we try to explain animal behaviour without attributing to them ‘higher’ mental capacities?

Obligatory Reading: A, Ch 3

Optional Readings:

Module 3: Reductivism and Anti-Reductivism

In this module, we will look at how psychology is related to other sciences, especially neuroscience. Can psychology be ‘reduced’ to neuroscience? Or does it have a certain level of autonomy. We will also look at how those questions are connected to issues about the mind-body problem.

Obligatory Reading: WA, Ch 2

Optional Readings:

  • Fodor, J. A. (1974). Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis). Synthese, 97-115.
  • Craver, C. F., & Bechtel, W. (2007). Top-down causation without top-down causes. Biology & philosophy, 22(4), 547-563.
  • Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative materialism and propositional attitudes. The Journal of Philosophy, 78(2), 67-90.

Module 4: Modularity

This module is about how the mind is organized. We will look at the idea that the mind is organized into a series of separate parts, so-called modules. We will look at whether perception is such a separate module (or whether, by contrast, what you think and want influences what you see and hear). We will also look at whether the mind is massively modular, consisting of many distinct specialized capacities – a kind of cognitive toolbox.

Obligatory Reading: WA, Ch 3.

Optional Readings:

  • Fodor, J.A. (1983) The modularity of mind. MIT press (excerpts)
  • Deroy, O. (2015). Modularity of Perception, in: Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception
  • Drayson, Z. (2017). Modularity and the Predictive Mind, In T. Metzinger and W. Weise, (Eds), Philosophy and Predictive Processing
  • Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2016). Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects. Behavioral and brain sciences, 39, 1-72

Video

Module 5: Innateness

This module is about innate mental capacities. Is the mind a blank slate at birth or are we born already with some specific mental capacities, some knowledge, or some concepts? We will learn that there is also an important question about what it actually means to say that something is ‘innate’.

Obligatory Reading: WA, Ch 4.

Optional Readings and Materials:

  • Carey, S., & Spelke, E. (1994). Domain-specific knowledge and conceptual change. Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture, 169, 200.
  • Watzl, S. (2019). Culture or biology? If this sounds interesting, you might be confused. In Social Philosophy of Science for the Social Sciences (pp. 45-71). Springer, Cham.
  • Griffiths, Paul, "The Distinction Between Innate and Acquired Characteristics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/innate-acquired/>.

Module 6: Consciousness

This module is about consciousness. How, if at all, can we study consciousness scientifically? We will learn about different forms of consciousness and different scientific theories about consciousness. We will also look at how we might find out whether other animals are conscious: what about fish or the octopus? This module is also about attention, insofar as it is connected to consciousness, and helps to explain consciousness. Does it?

Obligatory Reading: WA, Ch 7 + A, Ch 4.

Optional Readings:

  • Shea, N., & Frith, C. D. (2019). The global workspace needs metacognition. Trends in cognitive sciences, 23(7), 560-571.
  • Bayne, T. (2018). On the axiomatic foundations of the integrated information theory of consciousness. Neuroscience of consciousness, 2018(1), niy007.
  • Oizumi, M., Albantakis, L., & Tononi, G. (2014). From the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: integrated information theory 3.0. PLoS Comput Biol, 10(5), e1003588.
  • Block, N. (2007). Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and brain sciences, 30(5-6), 481.

Videos

Module 7: Perception

In this module, we will learn about perception. We look at the idea that perception is the beginning of a real mind. We will also learn about the nature of perception and what it is for: does perception function to put us in direct contact with the environment, does it deliver a model of world around us, or is its point to serve action?

Obligatory Reading: WA, Ch 6.

Optional Readings:

  • Clark, A. (2013). Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science. Behavioral and brain sciences, 36(3), 181-204.
  • Mole, C. (2009). Illusions, demonstratives, and the zombie action hypothesis. Mind, 118(472), 995-1011.
  • Wu, W. (2013). The case for zombie agency. Mind, 122(485), 217-230.
  • Burge, T. (2014). Perception: Where mind begins. Philosophy, 89(349), 385-403.
  • Nes, A. Sundberg, K. and Watzl, S. (forthcoming). The Perception-Cognition Distinction, Inquiry.
  • Neander, K. (2006). Content for cognitive science. Teleosemantics, 167-194.
  • Shea, N. (2018). Representation in cognitive science. Oxford University Press. (excerpts)

Module 8: Embodied and Extended

This module is about where the mind is. Is your mind exclusively housed in your brain, or is your mind embodied – so that the mind of a dancer might, for example, literally be in her moving body? Or might the mind be even more extended – is some of your knowledge, or maybe are some of your feelings, literally in your smartphone, distributed in social media networks, or on a Google server?

Obligatory Readings: WA, Ch 5

Optional Readings:

  • Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. analysis, 58(1), 7-19.
  • Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (2016). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. MIT press. (excerpts)
  • Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic bulletin & review, 9(4), 625-636.

Videos

Module 9: Thinking

In this module, we will look more at thinking. How is thinking different from seeing, for example? We will look at the question whether animals can think. Through that lens, we will look at the question of how thinking works. Do we think in a kind of language, in images, or with mental maps?

Obligatory Reading: A, Ch 5

Optional Readings:

  • Davidson, D. (1982). Rational animals. dialectica, 36(4), 317-327.
  • Barsalou, L. W. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and brain sciences, 22(4), 577-660.
  • Rescorla, M (2019). The Language of Thought Hypothesis, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/language-thought/>.
  • Camp, E. (2007). Thinking with maps. Philosophical perspectives, 21, 145-182.
  • Menzel, R., Greggers, U.,…... & Watzl, S. (2005). Honey bees navigate according to a map-like spatial memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102(8), 3040-3045.

Module 10: Communicating

This module is about thought and language, and, more generally, communication. What comes first: thinking or talking? Or maybe some form of communication is prior to both thinking and language proper? We will have a special focus on how to interpret animal communication and on whether human communication is in some way special.

Obligatory Reading: A, Ch 6 + WA, Ch 9

Optional Readings:

  • Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011). Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(2), 57-74.
  • Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. (1986). Relevance: communication and Cognition (Ch 1), Blackwell Publishing
  • Moore, R. (2018). Gricean communication, language development, and animal minds. Philosophy Compass, 13(12), e12550.
  • Lewis, D. (1969). Convention: A philosophical study. John Wiley & Sons (excerpts)

Module 11: Social Cognition

This module is about the social aspect of cognition. Long before we start learning about scientific psychology, we all believe that other people have minds too. Many of us think that other animals also have minds. How do we attribute a mind and specific mental states to others? We will specifically look at whether we can literally see the mindedness of others, and at how mentalizing and moralizing are connected.

Obligatory readings: A 7 + WA 8

Optional Readings and Resources:

  • Dennett, D. C. (1989). The intentional stance. MIT press (excerpts)
  • Knobe, J. (2010). Person as scientist, person as moralist. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315-329
  • McGeer, V. (2015). Mind-making practices: The social infrastructure of self-knowing agency and responsibility. Philosophical Explorations, 18(2), 259-281.
  • Gergely, G., Nádasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Bíró, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56(2), 165-193.
  • Apperly, I. A., & Butterfill, S. A. (2009). Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states?. Psychological review, 116(4), 953-970
  • Gao, T., McCarthy, G., & Scholl, B. J. (2010). The wolfpack effect: Perception of animacy irresistibly influences interactive behavior. Psychological science, 21(12), 1845-1853.

Module 12: Culture and Cooperation

This module is about the cognitive basis for culture. We will look at how social norms that regulate what is socially appropriate and what socially inappropriate behaviour emerge. And we will look at how we, and possibly other animals, are able cooperate and engage in shared projects.

Obligatory Readings: A, Ch 8

Optional Readings and Resources:

  • Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005). Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral and brain sciences, 28(5), 675-691.
  • Bicchieri, C. (2005). The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of social norms. Cambridge University Press.
  • Whiten, A., Goodall, J., McGrew, W. C., Nishida, T., Reynolds, V., Sugiyama, Y., ... & Boesch, C. (1999). Cultures in chimpanzees. Nature, 399(6737), 682-685.

Module 13: Moral Minds

This module is about cognition and morality. We will look at how morality emerges, and at the mental capacities that underly moral thought and moral discourse. Do animals think or feel that some behaviours are morally right and others morally wrong? If not, why not? Do moral feelings and moral thought require special capacities? If so, which ones?

Obligatory Reading: A, Ch 9

Optional Readings and Resources:

  • Take The Moral Sense Test
  • Mark Rowlands “The Kindness of Beasts”
  • See also: Rowlands “Can Animals be Moral?”
  • Korsgaard, C.M. (2006). Morality and the Distinctiveness of Human Action. In: Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved (F. de Waal, eds. S.Macedo and J. Oben), Princeton University Press: 98-119.
  • Flack, J.C. and de Waal, F.B.M. (2000). Any Animal Whatever: Darwinian Building Blocks of Morality in Monkeys and Apes. In. Evolutionary Origins of Morality: 1- 30.
  • See also: de Waal, F. “Moral Behavior in animals” (video)
  • Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological review, 108(4), 814.
  • Doris, J. M. (1998). Persons, situations, and virtue ethics. Nous, 32(4), 504-530.
  • Gruen, L. (2015). Entangled Empathy, Lantern Books

Module 14: Bias, Prejudice, and Implicit Attitudes

This module is about is about the cognitive basis of bias and prejudice. All of us harbor biases and prejudices against other (groups of) people: men are such and such. Germans are thus and so. And the X’s can’t be trusted. Sometimes we know that those stereotypes aren’t true. But the biases still influence our behavior. How does that work? Is prejudice a matter of how we think, how we perceive the world, or is it explained by our imagination? (or all of it)

Obligatory Reading:

  • Holroy, Scaife and Staffford (2017) + Madva and Brownstein (2018)

Optional Readings:

  • Holroyd, Jules ; Scaife, Robin & Stafford, Tom (2017). What is implicit bias? Philosophy Compass 12 (10):e12437.
  • Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2008). Alief and Belief. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
  • Madva, A., & Brownstein, M. (2018). Stereotypes, prejudice, and the taxonomy of the implicit social mind1. Noûs, 52(3), 611-644.

 

 

Published Nov. 8, 2021 7:06 PM - Last modified Nov. 8, 2021 7:06 PM
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