This lecture deals with the topic of epistemic injustice. This topic links issues about the exchange of knowledge (which was the topic of the first few modules) with issues in ethics and political philosophy (which the following modules focused on).
Epistemic Injustice
The discussion of epistemic injustice goes back to Miranda Fricker's book on the topic. In this first part of the lecture I introduce the topic by linking it to the topic of last week's module: epistemic dependence and which experts we should trust.
For reflection
- Think about your own examples of testimonial injustice: either from your own experience, from others's you know or people in today's societies. You get a virtual sticker from me, if you come up with an example that isn't found on the internet!
- Think about your own examples of hermeneutic injustice, either from your own experience, from others's you know or people in today's societies. You get a virtual sticker from me, if you come up with an example that isn't found on the internet! Note that it need not be the words that are lacking, some aspects of the world might be systematically overlooked, misinterpreted, distorted, not studied academically, …
The Complexities of Epistemic Trust
In this next part of the lecture we discuss an article by Gloria Origgi, where she describes some of the complexities of how we actually assign trustworthiness to something we hear, see, or read about. These complexities show how the exchange of knowledge in science and everyday life is deeply intertwined with issues of political authority, social norms, but also language interpretation and heuristics we have developed for our communal living. Learn about some of these complexities here:
For reflection
- Think about the mechanisms for assigning trust described by Origgi might bring in new forms of epistemic injustice beyond the ones due to prejudice described by Fricker.