Science and Democracy

• Clifford, W. K. (1877). The ethics of belief. First Published.
• James, W. (1979). The will to believe, In: The will to believe, and other essays in popular philosophy (Vol. 6). Harvard University Press.

Module 2: Science and Pseudoscience

Scientific evidence is often thought to be the best evidence. But what distinguishes a scientific method from other methods of belief formation? Is science operating with proof while everything else is a matter of faith? It is sometimes hard to distinguish science from pseudoscience, and specific examples can be highly controversial. What about Freudian psychoanalysis, creationist science, homeopathy, or acupuncture (also think of your own examples!)? In this module you will learn about the so-called demarcation problem.

• Kitcher, P. (1983). Believing where we cannot prove. Abusing science: the case against creationism. Cambridge, MIT Press, MA, 30-54.
• Lakatos, I. (1974). Science and Pseudoscience. I M. C. J. A. Cover & G. N. A. Vesey (Red.), Philosophy of Science: the Central Issues (s. 20–26). Open University Press.

Module 3: The Scientific Method

This module continues some of the discussion regarding the demarcation problem. It is about what is distinctive of the scientific method – especially in the natural sciences. Is there any specific method that science uses? Or is scientific just “anything goes”? This chapter introduces this topic and discusses specifically a recent idea that, on the level of the individual scientist at least, science is in a certain sense irrational – by restricting itself to only one form of evidence and one type of explanation.

• Strevens, M. (2020a). Keep Science Irrational. Is hard data the only path to scientific truth? That’s an absurd, illogical and profoundly useful fiction. Aeon Magazine, https://aeon.co/essays/an-irrational-constraint-is-the-motivating-force-in-modern-science
• Strevens, M. (2020b). The Iron Rule of Explanation. in M. Strevens, The Knowledge Machine: How Irrationality Created Modern Science, Liveright, pp. 89–105.
• Strevens, M. (2020c). Science’s Strategic Irrationality. In M. Strevens, The Knowledge Machine: How Irrationality Created Modern Science, Liverright, pp. 201–209.


Optional further readings:

• Chapters 3 + 12 + 13 in “The Knowledge Machine”: Ch. 3 “The essential subjectivity of science”, ch 12 “Building the Scientific Mind”, and Ch 13 “Science and Humanism”

Module 4: Science and Values

Sometimes ‘science’ is opposed to ‘value’. But is science really ever value free? This module is about the role values play in science. Is science in fact value free? Should it be value free? Is possible to distinguish specifically scientific values from other, moral or political values?  In our discussion of these issues, we will focus specifically on the contributions by feminist philosophers of science.

Readings:

• Anderson, E. (1995). Knowledge, Human Interests, and Objectivity in Feminist Epistemology. Philosophical topics, 23(2), 27–58.
• Douglas, H. (2016). Values in Science. in P. Humphreys, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press, Incorporated

Module 5: The Social Contract

Now we switch gears. The last modules were about science.  The next modules are about the foundations of society. The present module is about the justification of state authority and the question of political legitimacy. The state has power to implement and enforce restrictions on our lives. It forces you to pay taxes. If you commit a crime, the state can put you in prison. If you are a child, the state can require you to go to school. What gives the state the authority to do those things with you? This module is about what justifies such authority: why should the state have the power to impose (sometimes with coercive force) restrictions on us? Why do we have duties to comply with political obligations? This module introduces the so-called social contract idea to justify state authority.

Readings:

• Chapter 1 “The State of Nature”. In I J. Wolff (2016), An introduction to political philosophy (Third edition, s. 6–33). Oxford University Press.
• Chapter 2 “Justifying the State”. In I J. Wolff (2016), An introduction to political philosophy (Third edition, s. 34–61). Oxford University Press.

Module 6: Coordination Problems

Some actions, like the coronavirus situation or the climate crisis, require that many people, around the globe, work together. Sometimes, though, what is good for each individual may not be what is good for everyone. Coordination problems can arise. This module introduce the basic structure of such coordination problems and discusses specifically how they arise in the case of climate change, the current pandemic, and the destruction of the wild life and the environment.

Readings:

• Hardin, G. (2009). The Tragedy of the Commons. Journal of natural resources policy research, 1(3), 243–253

Module 8: Democracy

The focus of this module is on democracy. We discuss  philosophical arguments in favour and against democracy. The module is about questions like the following: What is the point of democracy? Should we take it to serve an instrumental role or is its value intrinsic? What is the purpose of voting? Do you think one has good reason to vote? Our discussion will be centered around a challenge to democracy going back to Platon: wouldn’t it be better if the state is led by experts rather than the people?

Readings:

• Chapter 3 “Who should rule?” in I J. Wolff (2016), An introduction to political philosophy (Third edition, s. 62–103). Oxford University Press.

Module 9: Experts

This module takes up the discussion of experts from the last modules. Each of us believe many things for which we ourselves don’t have any evidence. That global temperatures are rising or that smoking causes cancer. We believe this often because we trust the experts on this. What, though, justifies relying on experts? Is relying on experts incompatible with democracy? How, given that we ourselves cannot understand the evidence, should we find the experts we should trust?

Readings:

• Hardwig, J. (1985). Epistemic Dependence. The Journal of philosophy, 82(7), 335–349.
• Goldman, A. I. (2001). Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust? Philosophy and phenomenological research, 63(1), 85-110.

Module 10: Epistemic Injustice

This module is about epistemic injustice – an injustice related to knowledge, understanding and access to public discourse. Some people are regularly silenced. Their voices are never heard. Some people are regularly distrusted. Some other people, by contrast, are given more authority than they deserve. In this module you learn about what epistemic injustice is. We focus specifically at how the issue of epistemic injustice intersects with the issue of relying on experts.

Readings:

• Miranda Fricker. (2008). Précis of «Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing», Theoria, 23(1 (61), 69–71.

• Origgi, G. (2012). Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust. Social epistemology, 26(2), 221–235

Module 11: Science and democracy

Most people do not participate actively in science. At the same time scientific findings are used to make decisions that drastically affect our lives. Should lay people be more involved in science. Should they need to certify scientific knowledge. Or should they at least give guidelines for what scientists should do research on? Or how else can and should lay people be involved in science in a democratic society? This week is directly on how science and society interact.

Readings:

• Kitcher, Philip (2011): excerpts from "Science in a Democratic Society, In: Wenceslao J. Gonzalez (ed.), Scientific Realism and Democratic Society: The Philosophy of Philip Kitcher (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 101), pp. 95-112. Amsterdam/New York, NY: Rodopi, 2011. 
• Christensen, J., & Holst, C. (2017). Advisory commissions, academic expertise and democratic legitimacy: the case of Norway, Science and Public Policy, 44(6), 821-833.

Optional Further Readings:

• Anderson, E. (2012). Democracy, Public Policy, and Lay Assessments of Scientific Testimony. Episteme, 8(2), 144–164
• Lane, M. (2014). WHEN THE EXPERTS ARE UNCERTAIN: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE ETHICS OF DEMOCRATIC JUDGMENT. Episteme, 11(1), 97–118.

Module 12: Conspiracy theories

Climate change is a hoax. Bill Gates uses the coronavirus vaccine to implant microchips in us. George Soros is a puppet master attempting to gain world control. This module is on the topic of such conspiracy theories. Why do they spread? What makes them bad?  Why are they dangerous? In this module, we discuss such conspiracy theories. We focus specifically on the idea that the point of such theories is to undermine the established systems for expertise and knowledge exchange.

Readings:

• Cassam, Q. (2019a). The (real) point of conspiracy theories. In: Quassim Cassam. Conspiracy Theories. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019, 134 p (s. 1–31). Peeters Publishers.
• Cassam, Q (2019b), The problem with conspiracy theories. In Quassim Cassam. Conspiracy Theories. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019, 134 p (s. 63–91). Peeters Publishers.

Module 13: Propaganda and Ideology

This module is on the topic of propaganda. In the last week we have learned about how conspiracy theories are often used as propaganda and function to spread propaganda. In this week we take up the notion of propaganda directly. What is propaganda? We focus specifically on the kind of propaganda that tends to operate in democratic and liberal societies

Readings:

• Stanley (2015a), Propaganda Defined. In I J. Stanley, How propaganda works (s. 39–80). Princeton University Press.
• Stanley (2015b) The Ideology of Elites: a case study. In I J. Stanley, How propaganda works (s. 269–291). Princeton University Press.

Module 14: Fake news, the attention economy and social media

This module is about the social and epistemic dynamics of social media. Do fake news spread particularly well on social media? Is so why? Do social media lead to problematic attention patterns. Is there something specifically problematic about how our attention is treated by social media companies? Are there operations a threat to democracy? These are some of the questions this module is about.

Readings:

• Wiliams J. (2018), Chapters 1-5. (2018). in J. Williams, Stand out of our light : freedom and resistance in the attention economy (s. 1–40). Cambridge University Press.
• Williams, J. 2018b), Chapters 10-13. (2018). in J. Williams, Stand out of our light : freedom and resistance in the attention economy (s. 85–128). Cambridge University Press.
• Starbird, K. (2019). Disinformation’s spread: bots, trolls and all of us. Nature, 571(7766), 449–449.
• Johnson, N. F., Velasquez, N., Restrepo, N. J., Leahy, R., Gabriel, N., El Oud, S., & Zheng, M. (2020). The online competition between pro- and anti-vaccination views. Nature, 582(7811), 230–233.