

PERCEPTUAL GUIDANCE

Sebastian Watzl

Abstract

Proponents of an intentionalist theory of perceptual experience have taken for granted that perceptual experience is an *informing* form of intentionality. Hence they often speak of the way an experience *represents* the environment to be, or *what there is*. In this respect perceptual experience is thus assumed to resemble a speech act like assertion or a mental state like belief. There is another important form of intentionality though that concerns not what there is, but *what to do*. I call this a *guiding* form of intentionality. In speech, there are – for example – imperatives and among intentional mental states there are desires and intentions. In this paper I argue that perceptual experience is at least sometimes characterized by such a guiding form of intentionality. Perception does not just inform, it is sometimes intrinsically action-guiding. I call this the perceptual guidance claim. I distinguish the perceptual guidance claim from related, but importantly distinct claims (such as claims concerning the perception of affordances or concerning whether perception is normative), and argue that perceptual action guidance occurs not just in an unconscious vision-for-action system, but also within conscious perceptual experience.¹

Introduction

Perceptual experience is widely held to be an intentional state. One general motivation for this ‘intentionalist theory’² is the idea that perceptual experience is not silent: like a speech act, a

¹ I have benefitted a lot from many discussions of the materials of this paper. Precursors, variants and extensions of this paper have been presented at the Harvard Philosophical Psychology lab, the CSMN colloquium in Oslo, a workshop on Imperative Aspects of Perceptual Experience at the University of Oslo (organized by Susanna Siegel and the author), and a workshop on Attention and Perceptual Activity at Warwick University (organized by Thomas Crowther). I especially would like to thank: Tim Bayne, Rosa Cao, Thomas Crowther, Anya Farennikova, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Olav Gjelsvik, Sean Kelly, Farid Masrour, James Stazicker. Most of all I would like to thank Susanna Siegel for many illuminating and exciting discussions of every aspect of the contents of this paper.

² Tim Crane, ‘The Problem of Perception’, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/perception-problem/>>.

perceptual act says something. Specifically, it says, tells, or conveys something to the subject of the experience.³ While many aspects of the intentionalist theory have been controversially discussed, it is mostly assumed that insofar as perceptual experience does say something, it conveys to the subject something *about what there is*.⁴ In other words, it is usually taken for granted that perceptual experience is – as I shall say – an *informing* form of intentionality. In this respect perceptual experience would resemble a speech act like assertion or a mental state like belief. Hence proponents of the intentional theory often speak of the way an experience *represents things to be*.

There is another important form of intentionality though that concerns not what there is, but what to do. In speech, there are – for example – imperatives: do this! Among intentional mental states there are desires and intentions in addition to beliefs, judgments, or suppositions. Call the intentionality that characterizes imperatives or desires a *guiding* form of intentionality. My goal in this paper is to discuss phenomena that suggest that perceptual experience at least sometimes is characterized by a guiding form of intentionality. I will call these *guiding experiences*, and the claim that there are such experiences *the perceptual guidance claim*. The goal of this paper is to argue for the perceptual guidance claim.

For the purposes of the discussion in this paper I will assume the intentionalist theory. I will argue that this theory needs to accommodate perceptual guidance. My argument for perceptual guidance, though, is fairly independent of the intentionalist theory: *any* theory of perception needs to accommodate perceptual guidance.

The existence of perceptual guidance raises a challenge: how – if at all – can guiding and informing aspects of perceptual experience be integrated? I will conclude by sharpening this integration challenge. Future investigation will need to show how the challenge may be met.

Here is how I will proceed. I will first introduce guiding experiences and their characteristics with some examples (Section 1);

³ Susanna Siegel, *The Contents of Visual Experience* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Consequently, one way to *deny* the intentional theory is to speak of the 'silence of the senses' (Charles Travis, 'The silence of the senses', *Mind* 113:449 (2004), pp. 57–94).

⁴ Among other things, the discussion has concerned: whether the intentional content of perception is conceptual or non-conceptual; whether it is propositional or not; which kind of properties are represented in perceptual experience; whether the intentional character of perception exhausts, fixes or explains its phenomenal character; etc.

then I will distinguish the claim that there are guiding experiences from some related claims with which it may be confused (Section 2); then I will argue for the perceptual guidance claim by arguing that the states that guide the agent's activities in my examples are conscious (Section 3) and perceptual (Section 4). Hence the guiding states are perceptual experiences, and the perceptual guidance claim holds. I will conclude by raising the integration challenge: how could experience be both informing and guiding?

1. Guiding Experiences

One motivation for the perceptual guidance claim might come from considering the evolutionary origins of the perceptual systems. In simple, non-perceptual, sensory systems there is often no clear distinction between motivational and representational aspects: a bacterium does not first represent the presence of light and then decide to swim towards it. In such tropisms registration of light is directly translated into a certain form of behaviour (reflex reactions in humans and other higher animals function in a similar way). One might suggest that it would be plausible if such input-output links find their way into full forms of perception as well and there get integrated as a guiding form of intentionality with an informational role.⁵

This evolutionary motivation by itself, though, is inconclusive: in contrast to non-intentional sensory systems, one might argue, full-blown intentionality is characterized by a decoupling of motivational and representational functions.⁶ And so intentional states are sometimes suggested to be exactly those that have either correctness conditions or satisfaction conditions, and not a mixture of both. For this reason, we have to go beyond abstract considerations and consider concrete examples in order to motivate the perceptual guidance claim.

Here then are three such examples.⁷

⁵ A motivation of somewhat this form can be found in Ruth Millikan's work on pushmi-pullyu representations. See Ruth G. Millikan 'Pushmi-pullyu representations', *Philosophical Perspectives* 9 (1995), pp. 185–200.

⁶ E.g. Kim Sterelny, *Thought in a hostile world: The evolution of human cognition* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), Tyler Burge, *Origins of Objectivity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

⁷ Since the correct interpretation of these cases will be one of the main questions for discussion, I here introduce them in an intuitive way. My descriptions are meant merely to give the reader a grip on the phenomenon.

THE CHOCOLATE CAKE On your counter is a piece of chocolate cake. You are not hungry, and indeed you have had too much cake last night already. But every time the cake enters your field of vision, it looks so appealing. It looks as if it wants to be eaten by you.

THE EXPLOSION Suddenly, there is an explosion right outside your window. The noise immediately draws or catches your attention. While you want to keep concentrated on your work, your experience seems to pull in a different direction. It seems to instruct you to focus all your attention on the explosion.

THE MUSIC It is summer; you are outside on a small town square. A band is playing. You hear the rhythm and your foot immediately starts tapping. You feel drawn to dance, even though you know that it would be socially inappropriate.⁸

In all of these cases, there is a vivid perceptual experience that is naturally described as feeling drawn to do something: to eat the cake, to focus attention on the explosion or to dance to the music. It seems that we would have left out an important part of the phenomenal character of the experience if we didn't mention that felt push or pull. Further, it seems that the experience would have 'done its job' only if the subject performed the relevant activity.

There are thus two aspects that invite us to think of these examples in terms of perceptual guidance. On the one hand, there is a particular phenomenal character. What it is like for the subject in the relevant cases seems to include a feeling of being drawn to do something. This phenomenal character seems to sharply contrast with the purely descriptive phenomenology that characterizes the experience of colours and shapes. We may say that the subject's experience in our examples includes a *felt motivational impact*. On the other hand, there is a particular functional role. It seems plausible that the function of the relevant perceptual experiences is not just to provide a representation of certain features, but to get the agent to engage in certain acts. It would be natural to think of these acts as being part of a satisfaction condition for the perceptual experience just like the act of eating some

⁸ An example of this form was first suggested to Susanna Siegel and me by Farid Masrouf. It is also discussed in Susanna Siegel, 'Affordances and the Contents of Perception' In Berit Brogaard (ed.), *Does Perception Have Content?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 51–75).

chocolate would be part of the satisfaction condition for the *desire* to eat some chocolate. We may speak of the *motivational role* of the relevant experiences.

In our examples straightforward sensory experience – here visual and auditory – appears to possess motivational features that have also been noticed in the experience of itches and pain. To have an experience as of an itch on your back seems not just to represent your back as being some way, but also to instruct you to scratch there.⁹ And the painfulness of a pain experience has been suggested to partially consist in the experience of an imperative to rid yourself of a certain bodily disturbance.¹⁰

Our three examples, arguably, are not isolated occurrences even within sensory perception. Some have argued that perceptual guidance pervades all of our perceptual lives. As a start, consider the following famous passage from Heidegger's *Being and Time*, where he says:

[I]nkstand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room . . . never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves . . . The hammering itself uncovers the specific 'manipulability' of the hammer. The kind of Being which equipment possesses . . . we call 'readiness-to-hand'. When we deal with them by using them and manipulating them, this activity is not a blind one; it has its own kind of sight by which our manipulation is guided . . .¹¹

We do not need to follow (or even understand) Heidegger's metaphysics of 'Being' and believe in his ontological categories like 'readiness-to-hand' to understand his claim that when we hammer our activity is guided by the way we are experiencing the hammer, and the same for the interaction with the other ordinary objects he mentions. According to Heidegger most – if not all – everyday activities such as hammering, turning on the light, or moving around the furniture are guided by the intrinsic character of perceptual experience.

⁹ Richard J. Hall, 'If it itches, scratch!', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 86:4 (2008), pp. 525–535

¹⁰ Colin Klein, 'An Imperative Theory of Pain', *Journal of Philosophy* 104:10 (2007), pp. 517–532; Manolo Martínez, 'Imperative content and the painfulness of pain', *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 10:1 (2011), pp. 67–90.

¹¹ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (New York, Harper Perennial Modern Classics, [1927] 2008, p. 98).

In a similar vein, it has been suggested that perceptual experience guides you to adjust the speed with which you are riding a motorcycle in accordance with the demands of the situation.¹² Or the way you immediately back away when you are getting too close to a painting (or person).¹³ In general, experience has been suggested to guide the activities of skilled agents who respond appropriately to their situation without having to think before they act. Here, for example, is what Hubert Dreyfus says about a skilled tennis player.

[C]onsider a tennis swing. . . . [I]f one is expert at the game, things are going well, and one is absorbed in the game, what one experiences is more like one's arm going up and its being drawn to the appropriate position, the racket forming the optimal angle with the court – an angle one need not even be aware of – all this so as to complete the gestalt made up of the court, one's running opponent, and the oncoming ball. One feels that one's comportment was caused by the perceived conditions in such a way as to reduce a sense of deviation from some satisfactory gestalt.¹⁴

Like Heidegger, Dreyfus has a philosophical agenda that goes far beyond the idea that activities like the expert tennis swing are intrinsically guided by a certain kind of perceptual experience: he wants, for example, to offer an account of expert skill. But – as in the case of Heidegger – the existence of the core phenomenon Dreyfus describes is independent of this further agenda. The phenomenon seems to be perceptual guidance. According to Dreyfus perceptual guidance pervades fluid everyday activities.

When Heidegger, Dreyfus and others talk about perceptual guidance they seem to suggest that the relevant experiences do not just provide the localized felt motivational impact that characterized my own examples, but that the experience guides or

¹² Adrian Cussins, 'Content, embodiment and objectivity: The theory of cognitive trails', *Mind* 101:404 (1992), pp. 651–688.

¹³ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (London: Routledge, [1945] 2013); Hubert L. Dreyfus and Sean D. Kelly, 'Heterophenomenology: Heavy-handed sleight-of-hand', *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 6:1–2 (2007), pp. 45–55; Michael Brownstein and Alex Madva, 'The Normativity of Automaticity', *Mind & Language*, 27(4) (2012), pp. 410–434.

¹⁴ Hubert L. Dreyfus, 'Intelligence without Representation: Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Mental Representation', *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 1 (2002), pp. 367–383, p. 378 f.

controls the relevant activity while it is already on the way. The tennis player does not just feel a push to move her arm up: her movement is online controlled by the relevant experience. The experiences they describe thus seem less like desires, and more like what Elizabeth Pacherie calls present-directed intentions or motor-intentions:¹⁵ the experience sustains the action to completion, and might be involved in monitoring its execution. Just like for other guiding states, there thus may be a number of fine-grained distinctions among perceptual guiding experiences. We can think of these as distinctions in their motivational role.

So far, I have discussed the *phenomenology* and the *explanatory* role of guiding experiences. There is a further – though related – role they are thought to have. When Dreyfus talks about perceptual guidance his interest in large part is driven by the idea that guiding experience *opens space between fully intentional action and mere behaviour*. He says:

It seems that, either one is pushed around like a thing by meaningless physical and psychological forces, or else one's reasons, explicit or implicit, motivate one's actions. . . . Merleau-Ponty faces this challenge by introducing a third way one can be led to cope – a way he calls motivation. This is not a psychological concept for him but a perceptual one. It names the way we are directly responsive to the other-than-rational demands of our situation. In short, it is a name for the way affordances solicit one to act.¹⁶

When an agent acts on the basis of perceptual guidance, her activity is not paradigmatically intentional, since she neither judges that she has reason to do this or that, nor is she trying or intending to act in a particular way. But the agent does not act like a mere automaton either. Her activity, we may say, *makes sense* from her own perspective. Whether we want to call the contribution of guiding experience to the so-guided action *rational* or not, the relevant experiences seem to make the activities they guide *intelligible* from the agent's point of view. We may speak of the *sense-making role* of guiding experiences.

¹⁵ Elizabeth Pacherie, 'Toward a dynamic theory of intentions', In S. Pockett, W.P. Banks & S. Gallagher (eds.) *Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? An Investigation of the Nature of Volition* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006, pp. 145–167).

¹⁶ Hubert L. Dreyfus, 'Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise', *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 79:2 (2005), pp. 47–65, p. 13.

We find this feature also in the examples I started with. Even though the agent might not identify with over-eating on cake in a scenario like the cake case, it is intelligible from her own point of view why she ate it, given her experience. She may feel pushed around by her own conscious experience. But while that feeling may be a sign of weak-willed action, it is also a sign that there is a first-personally intelligible connection between her own experience and her act. The same holds for the acts in the explosion case and the dance case. The agent is in a position to understand why she focuses attention on the explosion given the way she felt her attention drawn there; and she is in a position to understand why she started to move her body to the rhythm given the way she experienced the music.

Guiding experiences thus are characterized by three interconnected features: a type of phenomenal character, which I called felt motivational impact; a type of function, which I called their motivational role; and a type of rational role, which I called the sense-making role of guiding experiences. The claim that there are guiding experiences with these features can be detached from the philosophical aims with which other authors have approached those experiences.¹⁷

2. Distinctions

In order to further our grip on guiding experiences, it helps to distinguish the perceptual guidance claim from related, but distinct ideas.

First, consider the claim that perceptual experience represents features of the environment in *action-relevant formats*. An action-relevant format of the spatial content of perceptual experience might, for example, be a representation in an egocentric reference frame. Action-relevant formats make the content of a mental state especially appropriate for bodily action: the agent can

¹⁷ Aside from Heidegger's and Dreyfus' projects, there is also Adrian Cussins' project of grounding propositional content in the non-propositional guiding content of perceptual experience (Cussins 'Content') and Sean Kelly's project of arguing that shape perception and perceptual constancies depend on guiding experiences (see Sean D. Kelly, 'Seeing things in Merleau-Ponty', In C. Tarman (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 74–110; and Sean D. Kelly, 'The normative nature of perceptual experience', In B. Nanay (ed.), *Perceiving the World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 146–160).

directly exploit an egocentric spatial content in order to reach the object.¹⁸

Experiences with egocentric spatial content need not be guiding experiences. It is one thing for an experience to represent the environment in ways that are especially useful for bodily action and a different thing for an experience to motivate a certain action. Representing something as being on the left does not by itself motivate the agent to reach left.

Second, consider the claim that perceptual experience represents *opportunities for action* (sometimes, following Gibson, called 'affordances').¹⁹ Maybe perceptual experience represents such opportunities for action: objects might be visually represented as being reach-able, grasp-able, edible, etc.²⁰ It is easy to think that philosophers like Dreyfus, and his heroes Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, claim that experience represents such opportunities for action. Here is Dreyfus:

Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty hold, in effect, that embodied copers directly respond to what Gibson, who was influenced by Merleau-Ponty, calls affordances. Food affords eating, doors afford going in and out, floors afford walking on, etc.²¹

The perceptual representation of affordance properties, though, is not sufficient for perceptual guidance. For affordance properties are opportunities for action that could be represented *cold-heartedly*, i.e. without the agent being motivated to act in the way the affordance property specifies. An agent might experience an object as edible without being drawn to eat it, or as reachable without being drawn to reach it.²²

¹⁸ For variations on egocentric contents for perception see (among others): Gareth Evans, *Varieties of Reference* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), Christopher Peacocke, *A Study of Concepts* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), José L. Bermúdez, *The Paradox of Self-consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), Robert Briscoe, 'Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 79(2) (2008), pp. 423–460.

¹⁹ James J. Gibson, 'The concept of affordances', In Shaw R. and Bransford J. (eds.), *Perceiving, Acting, and Knowing* (Hoboken (NJ): Wiley), pp. 67–82.

²⁰ Anthony Chemero, 'An outline of a theory of affordances', *Ecological Psychology* 15(2) (2003), pp. 181–195; Bence Nanay, 'Do we see apples as edible?', *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 92:3 (2011), pp. 305–322.

²¹ Dreyfus 'Overcoming the Myth', p. 12.

²² Nanay ('Do we see') is careful to distinguish his claim that perception represents q-ability from views like the perceptual guidance claim. The opportunity for action idea concerns *possibilities* for action (what the agent *can* do); the perceptual guidance claim resembles a little more the idea of experiencing *necessities* for action (what the agent *must* do) (cf. Nanay 'Do we see' and Siegel 'Affordances'). On the face of it, though, guidance

Dreyfus himself (and, on his view, his heroes) distinguished his version of the perceptual guidance claim from the claim that perception represents or is awareness of affordances. Dreyfus says:

Facts about what affords what, however, are not what we are directly open to according to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. . . . [I]t is the affordance's solicitations – such as the attraction of an apple when I'm hungry – to which I am directly open.²³

So, it is one thing for perceptual experience to represent affordances, but quite a different thing for perceptual experience to be guiding.

Third, Dreyfus (in the quote just cited) speaks of *openness to an object's or the environment's solicitations*. Many may find this idea obscure since an apple or a tennis court is not an intentional agent that could ask questions, make demands, or solicit anything from us. We may experience a *person's* solicitation when she engages in a communicative act (consider a child who uses a gesture to solicit help), but what would it be to experience an *apple's* solicitations? Dreyfus' language suggests that the perceptual guidance claim commits us to a spiritistic world-view, where the non-animate world acts like an agent.

Nothing so obscure, though, is required for the perceptual guidance claim. According to the perceptual guidance claim some perceptual experiences intrinsically (without help from other motivational states) and in virtue of their phenomenal character motivate the agent to act. Only a number of further assumptions lead from this to the obscure claim that the environment literally makes demands. One needs, for example, the claim that there is nothing more to the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience than the properties that are experienced (a claim that is suggested by Dreyfus' talk of 'openness'). With that latter claim, one might get from the claim that perceptual experience is guiding to the idea that it is guiding purely in virtue of the properties experienced, and then – maybe – to the claim that such properties would have to be quasi-agential. A friend of the

is also distinct from the representation of necessities. Necessities like possibilities might be represented without felt motivational impact: I might *think* that I must do my taxes without any inclination to do them. Why couldn't I also experience that I must ϕ without any motivation to ϕ ?

²³ Hubert L. Dreyfus, 'Response to McDowell', *Inquiry* 50(4) (2007), pp. 371–377, p. 257 f.

intentional theory of perception who is a proponent of the perceptual guidance claim, though, need not explain perceptual guidance in terms of such 'queer' properties of apples and tennis courts. She could, for example, explain it in terms of the intentional mode of perception.

Fourth, the perceptual guidance claim is sometimes associated with the claim that experience is in some way normative. Sean Kelly, for example, writes:

[I]t is part of my visual experience that my body is drawn to move, or, at any rate, that the context should change, in a certain way. These are inherently normative, rather than descriptive, features of visual experience. They don't represent in some objective, determinate fashion the way the world is, they say something about how the world ought to be for me to see it better.²⁴

In a later paper, Kelly explicitly speaks of 'the normative nature of perceptual experience',²⁵ and says:

Merleau-Ponty's proposal is radical and strange: I experience the distance to the object normatively, in terms of how well it allows me to see the size; this distance requires me to get closer to see the size better, now I am required to back away. . . . The experience already involves a kind of normative self-referentiality: It is part of the very experience of the size of an object that I am drawn to improve the experience by changing my distance to the object.²⁶

Here it can seem that the claim that our perceptual experience guides us to get closer or further away from an object is the same claim – or at least directly connected to the claim – that perceptual experience represents *normative properties* concerning how I, the agent, *ought* to move, what I *should* do, or how the world *ought to be*.

The perceptual guidance claim, though, is not the same as the claim that perceptual experience represents such normative properties. To start: desires are paradigmatic guiding states,

²⁴ Kelly 'Seeing Things', p. 87.

²⁵ Kelly 'The Normative Nature', p. 146.

²⁶ Kelly 'The Normative Nature', p. 148 f.

but – without much further argument at least – they need not be construed as representations of what the agent should do. To hold that perceptual experience represents normative properties thus is not necessary for holding that it is guiding. The representation of normative properties arguably is also not sufficient for perceptual guidance: many hold that at least in judgment, normative contents can be represented without motivational force. A subject might judge that she should to dance to the music and yet feel no inclination to dance. If that is true, it is not obvious why she could not also experience the music as music she should dance to and yet not feel drawn to dance to it. Without further argument, the experience of normative properties thus seems neither necessary nor sufficient for perceptual guidance. While it may turn out that the best account of perceptual guidance appeals to the representation of normative properties,²⁷ one might also accept that there are guiding experiences without thinking of them in such normative terms. The argument for perceptual guidance can and should proceed independently of the claim that perceptual experience is sometimes intrinsically normative.

3. Some perceptual guidance is conscious

The perceptual guidance claim maintains that there are perceptual guiding experiences. The last section sharpened this claim by distinguishing it from other ideas with which it is easily confused. In the next two sections, I will defend the perceptual guidance claim.

In my examples, as well as in the ones discussed by others, the agent is motivated to perform some activity (and in some cases actually performs that activity): she is motivated to (and maybe actually does) eat the cake, attend to the explosion, dance to the music, hammer a nail into the wall, adjust the speed of her motorcycle, lift up her tennis racket, maintain an optimal distance from a painting, etc.

Call the state that motivates, guides or controls the relevant activity a *guiding state*.²⁸ According to the perceptual guidance

²⁷ See John McDowell, 'The Return of the Myth of the Mental', *Inquiry* 50:4 (2007), pp. 352–365; John McDowell, 'Response to Dreyfus', *Inquiry* 50(4) (2007), pp. 366–370; John Bengson, 'Practical Perception', *Manuscript*.

²⁸ In cases where the agent actually performs the activity, the guiding states are those of her mental states that – together with informational states that contain a representation of relevant features of her environment – explain that the agent performed the activity as well

claim some of the relevant guiding states are perceptual experiences. There are two routes for resisting this conclusion. A first route is to hold that the guiding state is not a conscious experience, but an *unconscious* state. A second route is to hold that the guiding state, while conscious, is *not a perceptual* experience. I will argue that both of these routes fail. The relevant guiding states – according to the conclusion of my argument – are perceptual and conscious.

Let me start with the first route for resistance: unconscious guidance. Some might be inclined to appeal to findings concerning unconscious vision-for-action to defend this idea.

Visual stimuli are known to be processed in two pathways, the dorsal stream and the ventral stream.²⁹ Vision through the ventral stream is often said to be vision-for-perception, while vision through the dorsal stream is vision-for-action. One famous result argued to support this interpretation was that visually guided grasp seems to escape the Ebbinghaus size illusion: while a central circle looks bigger when surrounded by smaller circles compared to when it is surrounded by bigger circles, there was found to be no difference in the size of the grip people use to pick up the central circle. In addition, brain damage seems to reveal a double dissociation. On the one hand, brain lesions in the dorsal stream exclusively impair visually guided action while leaving visual recognitional capacities intact (optic ataxia). On the other hand, lesions in the ventral stream exclusively impair visual recognitional capacities while leaving visually guided action unaffected (visual form agnosia). Milner and Goodale proposed that the vision-for-action system is unconscious. And hence the two visual streams hypothesis has been used by both psychologists and philosophers to argue that much of visually guided action is unconscious ‘Zombie action.’³⁰ Both the evidence for the two visual streams hypothesis and many aspects of its interpretation remain controversial.³¹ Overall though, it is widely accepted and scientifically plausible.

as how she performed it. In cases where the agent does not actually perform the activity (as in the cake case), presence of the guiding states explains why the agent would have performed the activity, had she not with mental effort resisted.

²⁹ David Milner and Melvyn Goodale, *The Visual Brain in Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

³⁰ Christof Koch and Francis Crick, ‘The zombie within’, *Nature*, 411:6840 (2001), pp. 893–893; Andy Clark, ‘Visual experience and motor action: Are the bonds too tight?’, *Philosophical Review* 110:4 (2001), pp. 495–519.

³¹ Volker H. Franz, Karl R. Gegenfurtner, Heinrich H. Bülthoff, & Manfred Fahlke, ‘Grasping visual illusions: No evidence for a dissociation between perception and action’,

Is vision-for-action an unconscious form of guiding perception in my sense? According to a *first* interpretation, it is not: vision-for-action just represents the size of the central circle in an egocentric action-relevant format. On this interpretation, vision-for-action directly feeds into motor control systems, but does not itself engage in motor control (it just says 'This [ego-centrally specified] is the size of the central circle'). According to a *second* interpretation, though, vision-for-action *is* guiding: the vision-for-action system itself directly controls the motor action; it does not just deliver an action-relevant representation of properties like size (the system also says 'Open the fingers like this [motor command]!'). On the second interpretation vision-for-action arguably traffics in hybrid representations or in what Millikan ('Pushmi-Pullyu') calls pushmi-pullyu representations.³²

If the second interpretation is true, then there are *unconscious* perceptual guiding states. Motor-control by the vision-for-action system arguably though is not just unconscious, but sub-personal, i.e. arguably the vision-for-action system is not a part of individual level intentional perception. But now a Millikan-style form of teleo-functional theory that is friendly to hybrid representations might be true of sub-personal mental representation, but not of personal level intentionality.³³ If decoupling of motivation and representation characterizes the personal but not the sub-personal level, then sub-personal states would not raise the same issues that are raised by personal level guiding experience (such as the looming integration challenge. See *Conclusion*).

The idea of unconscious visually controlled action might be appealed to in some of the cases I introduced. In particular, it is a plausible hypothesis that the way Heidegger grasped his hammer and moved it to pound in the nails is controlled by unconscious vision-for-action and not by conscious vision. The same might be said for moving around the furniture, or for how Dreyfus moves up his tennis racket toward the oncoming ball. One might also say that sometimes an unconscious representation

Psychological Science, 11:1 (2000), pp. 20–25; David Milner and Melvyn Goodale, 'Two visual systems re-viewed', *Neuropsychologia*, 46:3 (2008), pp. 774–785; Christopher Mole, 'Illusions, Demonstratives, and the Zombie Action Hypothesis', *Mind*, 118:472 (2009), pp. 995–1011; Wayne Wu, 'The Case for Zombie Agency', *Mind*, 122:485 (2013), pp. 217–230; Berit Brogaard, 'Vision for Action and the Contents of Perception', *Journal of Philosophy* 109:10 (2012), pp. 569–587.

³² Cf. Pierre Jacob and Marc Jeannerod, *Ways of seeing: The Scope and Limits of Visual Cognition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

³³ Burge, 'Origins' sometimes comes close to making this claim.

of stimulus salience controls involuntary attention in cases similar to the explosion example.

The appeal to unconscious vision-for-action, though, cannot explain my central examples. Consider the cake case. Here we have a vivid phenomenal experience. There is a *felt* motivational impact. The same holds for my other two examples. In the explosion case you feel a pull to attend to the explosion (you might resist that pull). It is not a case of control of attention by unconscious stimulus salience.

One way to bring out the phenomenal aspect of the relevant cases is in terms of a *phenomenal contrast*.³⁴ Compare the cake case to an *unappealing cake case* where the same subject sees the cake, its colour, shape, etc. but is not drawn to eat it. There is a clear difference between what it is like to be in one of these scenarios and what it is like to be in the other. It is this phenomenal contrast that needs an explanation that the unconscious vision-for-action hypothesis does not supply. A similar contrast can be constructed for variants of the explosion case. It is known that – at least in many cases – attention capture is contingent on the subject's task, her prior experience, her goals, rewards, interest, etc.³⁵ Now we can construct a phenomenal contrast as follows. Consider first a case where the subject performs task A, where a red circle captures her attention (think of task A as requiring a response to various colours). Here the phenomenal character of her experience includes a feeling of having her attention drawn to the circle. Second, consider a case that is otherwise the same as A where the subject now performs task B (think of task B as ignoring colour and responding only to shape). Because of the difference in task, her attention now is not drawn to the red circle, and she has no experience of having her attention drawn to the red circle. There is a phenomenal contrast between the two cases, naturally described in terms of felt motivational impact, that needs an explanation. Appeal to unconscious vision-for-action does not provide such an explanation.

³⁴ Siegel, 'The Contents'.

³⁵ E.g. Charles L. Folk, Roger W. Remington, & James C. Johnston, 'Involuntary covert orienting is contingent on attentional control settings', *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human perception and performance* 18:4 (1992), pp. 1030–1044 (there is scientific debate about whether *all* attention capture is task and experience dependent. We need not enter that debate. It is uncontroversial that there are *some* cases of so-called 'contingent capture').

Overall, while the appeal to unconscious vision-for-action might be able to explain some of the cases others have discussed it does not explain my central examples that are characterized by felt motivational impact. Some perceptual guidance might, if we follow the motor-control view of vision-for-action, occur on the unconscious level. This does not exclude that there is also conscious perceptual guidance. The perceptual guidance claim is needed in order to explain the cases of phenomenal contrast just discussed.³⁶

4. Conscious guidance is (sometimes) perceptual

Let me then move to the second option for a denial of perceptual guidance: appeal to non-perceptual guiding states.

A proponent of this option would agree that there is a felt motivational impact in the relevant cases. It really is the case that the subject feels consciously drawn to eat the cake. Yet, why should we think of this feeling as a part of the subject's *perceptual* experience? Consider the addict who feels an urge to smoke a cigarette. There is felt motivational impact, but there seems to be no reason to think that this impact belongs in the subject's *visual* experience. The state belongs to the rough category of what Early Modern philosophers called 'the passions' and not to the category of perception.³⁷ One might suggest that given that there are conscious passions like urges one can and should explain what is going on in the cake case by appeal to them. The subject has a perceptual experience as of a triangular, dark-brown piece of cake. In addition, she feels an urge to eat the cake. The phenomenal character of her overall experience is composed of those aspects that belong to her perceptual experience and those aspects that belong to her urge. Once we keep those aspects separate we see that there are no guiding perceptual experiences.

There are further variants of this type of response that deserve mentioning.

Consider opening a bottle of milk that has become sour. You smell it and are immediately pushed away. One interpretation

³⁶ Given scientific evidence since Milner and Goodale's first findings that the two visual streams strongly interact, and that there is more shared neural circuitry than initially thought, it would be no surprise if conscious guiding experience makes use of some of the same neural machinery that is also involved in unconscious vision-for-action.

³⁷ It is unclear whether the felt urge should itself be thought of as a desire or as a related but distinct motivational state.

would be as a form of olfactory guiding perception with a felt motivational impact. Yet there is an alternative: to think of the felt motivational impact as a feature of an *emotional disgust reaction*. Similarly, think of a child who looks into the cookie jar to find it empty. Her experience might have a strong motivational impact: she feels immediately drawn to shout out and stamp her feet. In this case the phenomenology seems to belong to her emotion of anger.

Consider also the case described by Tamar Gendler:³⁸ you step on a glass walkway built above the Grand Canyon. While you have every reason to trust the construction and believe it is perfectly safe to step on the glass surface, you might still feel a motivational push to back away and refrain from making that step. One way to describe the case is as a case of perceptual guidance. Your visual experience of the glass surface provides a felt motivational impact to back away from it. Gendler offers a different explanation, though: she classifies this case with cases that seem fairly clearly non-perceptual and suggests that we think of them in terms of a state she calls *alief*. These aliefs are supposed to be distinct from beliefs, and resist revision in light of belief changes. They are ‘automatic, associative and arational . . . [a]nd they are typically also affect-laden and action generating.’³⁹

A proponent of the present objection to the perceptual guidance claim thus has a number of options: appeal to urges, emotions or aliefs. Some cases that one might have classified as guiding experiences might be explained in one of these ways.

There is a serious question whether appeal to the passions really avoids commitment to perceptual guidance. That is because on several theories the passions *are* forms of perception. According to one popular view of the emotions, for example, these are to be understood as perceptions of values or value-laden features.⁴⁰ Similarly, some people think that desires (and urges) are often best thought of as tendencies to have one’s attention drawn to certain value-laden features or reasons.⁴¹ And indeed, it has

³⁸ Tamar S. Gendler, ‘Alief and belief’, *The Journal of Philosophy* 105:10 (2008), pp. 634–663.

³⁹ Gendler, ‘Alief’ p. 641.

⁴⁰ E.g. Sabine A. Döring, ‘Seeing what to do: Affective perception and rational motivation’, *Dialectica*, 61:3 (2007), pp. 363–394. For a review see Mikko Salmela, ‘Can Emotion be Modelled on Perception?’, *Dialectica* 65:1(2011), pp. 1–29.

⁴¹ Thomas Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).

been argued that desires generally are best viewed as kinds of perceptual experience.⁴² If a perceptual view of the passions is correct, then the perceptual guidance claim is not just not false, but finds much more wide-spread application than even its proponents might have thought.

Yet, while proponents of a perceptual view of the passions owe an account of how the passions can be both perceptual and motivational, they might plausibly hold that passionate perception is a *distinctive* kind of perception, i.e. distinct from sensory perception like vision or audition. By separating informing *sensory* perception from guiding *passionate* perception, even these perceptual passion accounts of perceptual guidance would still be opposed to the central thesis of the present paper, i.e. that sensory perception like visual and auditory perception is sometimes intrinsically guiding.

What makes passion accounts appealing vis-à-vis the looming integration challenge (i.e. the challenge for integrating informing and guiding aspects within sensory perception) is that they cleanly separate sensory aspects from motivational aspects of the subject's overall experience. Yet, this is also the feature that makes them unsatisfactory accounts of my central examples: they cannot explain the *sensory* character of those examples. The felt motivational impact in the cake case, the explosion case and the dance case is linked to a specific sensory situation in a way the urge for the cigarette is not.

As a preliminary consideration, consider that in the cake case and the dance case the motivational impact is directly tied to visual and auditory appearances. The cake would not have looked the same way, were it not so appealing. Similarly, the music would not have sounded the same way, had it not invited you to dance to it. The look of the cake and the sound of the music on this particular occasion seem to be partially constituted by the felt motivational impact. It is as if we perceptually encounter not just the object (like the cake) and its descriptive properties (like its shape or colour), but also its motivational characteristics (what it demands us to do) (this is, as I mentioned, what motivates Dreyfus to speak of openness to the object's 'solicitations'). All this is in clear contrast to the cigarette

⁴² Denis Stampe, 'The Authority of Desire', *Philosophical Review*, 96:3 (1987), pp. 335–381; Graham Oddie, *Value, Desire and Reality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

urge, where the motivational impact is not experienced as coming from the perceptually encountered situation. An account of the phenomenal character of the cake case and the dance case that assimilates these cases to cases of felt urges thus leaves unexplained the way the phenomenology is linked to the specific perceptual situation in these cases.

The perceptual nature of the explosion case is even more obvious. Your auditory attention is drawn to an auditory stimulus. A non-auditory explanation of the felt pull on your attention (a non-perceptual urge to focus on the explosion) seems to neglect the obvious auditory character of the relevant experience.

These preliminary considerations can be turned into an argument for a perceptual account of the phenomenology that characterizes the guiding states in our examples as follows.

Consider that the felt motivational impact in some cases is clearly associated with one sensory modality and not with another. A piece of cake might look visually appealing, but when you touch it with your fork it is so soft that you are repelled. Vision and touch seem to be in tension. There are two aspects to such a case: first, there is a phenomenology of felt motivational tension. Second, this tension is *immediately known to be between vision and touch*. A non-perceptual account has no problem explaining the phenomenology of felt tension. Different urges sometimes create such tension: you may feel an urge to sleep, and yet also feel an urge to eat.

What the non-perceptual account has a hard time explaining is the second aspect of the case: that the agent immediately knows the tension to result from vision and touch. On the non-perceptual account there are two urges: an urge to eat and an urge not to eat. These urges differ only in their causal source: the urge to eat is caused by a visual representation and the urge not to eat is caused by a tactile representation. It seems that the only way the subject could immediately know her urge to eat to be visual, on this account, is if central aspects of the relevant causal process that leads to her urge were consciously accessible or transparent. Suppose that her urge to eat was unconsciously caused by an unconscious visual representation. In this case, our subject would have no way of knowing that her urge has anything to do with the visual aspects of her situation. If the motivation to eat is a mental state separate from vision and yet immediately known to be based on vision, then the link between vision and that separate state must be transparent to the subject.

But the idea of such transparency is very implausible for the relevant cases.

First, there is no conscious inference in these cases. The causal process is quick and automatic. It is implausible that such automatic processes are consciously transparent.

Second, the subject might have no idea which (non-motivational) visual properties are responsible for her alleged felt urges or she might be completely mistaken about which they are: is it the shape or the colour, or some combination of both? If she knows her urge to be visually *caused*, it seems that she should know which properties make the cake visually appealing. But often subjects are in no position to have such knowledge. The non-motivational features that make objects visually appealing are often highly unobvious and are inaccessible to the subject.⁴³

Finally, the idea that conscious vision causes an urge gets the direction of the explanation wrong for many plausible cases of perceptual guidance: conscious perception of colour and shape, for example, is often slower than felt motivational impact.⁴⁴ But if the motivational impact to eat the cake was there before a conscious representation of the environmental layout, it cannot be known to be visual by the subject's access to its conscious visual cause (since it did not *have* a conscious visual cause).

Someone might reply that the subject knows the felt motivational impact to be visual since she knows it to be connected to the relevant sensory organs (the eyes in this case). Maybe she is in a position to know, for example, that her motivation goes away if she closes her eyes. Yet, this account fails. Consider a *hallucinating* subject. Such a subject, like one with veridical perception, might experience the felt motivational impact that characterizes guiding experiences. Yet her experience of feeling drawn to eat the cake or attend to the explosion does not go away when she closes her eyes (let us suppose). She may still know that her felt motivation was visual rather than tactile.

My objection to a non-perceptual explanation of the phenomenology of felt motivational impact thus is that such an

⁴³ A recent study, for example, shows that subjects tend to have a preference for curved over sharp-angled objects. See Moshe Bar and Maital Neta, 'Humans prefer curved visual objects', *Psychological Science* 17:8 (2006), pp. 645–648.

⁴⁴ See Robert B. Zajonc, 'Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences', *American Psychologist* 35 (1980), pp. 151–175.

explanation cannot explain what we may call *sensory transparency*: a subject's ability to immediately know, on the basis of her own experience, which sensory modality is responsible for the relevant phenomenology. If, by contrast, the motivational impact is a part of the subject's visual experience, we have a straightforward account of why she is in a position to know that her motivation derives from vision.

Sensory transparency is a general characteristic of perceptual experience. If a subject perceives a certain shape, she is – on the basis of her own experience – in a position to immediately know whether her perception was visual or tactile. While there is an important question concerning how to *explain* sensory transparency, its existence seems clear and applies to our examples just like it applies to informing perception.⁴⁵

With the sensory transparency claim at hand, let us return to the examples to which the non-perceptual explanation tried to assimilate my cases. Some of them seem to be characterized by sensory transparency and some not. Consider the smell of sour milk. In this case, like in the cake case, it is difficult to separate the olfactory part of the experience from the disgust. The agent's felt repulsion is immediately known to her to be olfactory. By contrast, it is not part of the visual experience of the empty cookie jar that its emptiness is enraging. The felt motivation to stamp is not transparently visual. Consider also Gendler's glass walkway. The alief description seems to leave out that the felt motivational impact is part of the way the glass looks: it looks not to be stepped on. The felt push away from the glass surface is knowably visual. While there may be a psychological category of alief, some of Gendler's central examples seem to be as least as well explained by perceptual guidance. Sensory transparency thus provides us with the tools for adjudicating how widespread perceptual guidance is. We find it in all

⁴⁵ One can envision several accounts of how sensory transparency is possible: first, one may suggest that a subject is in a position to know that her experience is visual, because vision represents distinctively visual properties (visual appearances of shape). Second, one may explain sensory transparency because vision represents objects and properties under a distinctively visual mode of presentation. Third, one might suggest that in the case of conscious visual experience subjects have some form of peripheral awareness of *visually* representing (drawing on higher order or self-representational views of consciousness. For an overview see Peter Carruthers, 'Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/consciousness-higher/>>).

cases where there is evidence for a relevant phenomenology that is characterized by sensory transparency.

I have now completed my argument for the perceptual guidance claim. In the last section I argued that there is a phenomenal contrast between guiding experiences and maximally similar cases without felt motivational impact. In this section I argued that this phenomenology is characterized by sensory transparency, which a non-perceptual account cannot explain. My example cases thus should indeed be described in terms of perceptual guidance.

Conclusion

I have argued that some perceptual experiences are characterized by a guiding form of intentionality. I have provided examples of cases where the agent's motivational state is both conscious and perceptual. This result fits well with recent developments in perceptual psychology and neuroscience that show deep overlap between processes related to affect and processes involved in conscious perception.⁴⁶ Both philosophical considerations and empirical ones thus lead away from the picture of conscious perception as purely informing and descriptive to a view of perceptual experience as intrinsically action-guiding.

Should we then give up the idea that perceptual experience is characterized by an informing form of intentionality? While some defenders of perceptual guidance seem to suggest this route,⁴⁷ in my view it is very implausible. Even in the central examples of this paper there is, for example, some way the cake, explosion or music appears (i.e. looks and sounds) to the subject. All the arguments that made it plausible to think of perceptual experience in terms of an informing form of intentionality are still in place.⁴⁸

The crucial question raised by the existence of perceptual guidance concerns rather how to *integrate* the informing and the guiding aspects of perceptual intentionality. This is the

⁴⁶ E.g. see Lisa F. Barrett and Moshe Bar, 'See it with feeling: affective predictions during object perception', *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 364:1521 (2009), pp. 1325–1334; or Sophie Lebrecht, Moshe Bar, Lisa F. Barrett & Michael J. Tarr, 'Micro-valences: perceiving affective valence in everyday objects', *Frontiers in Psychology*, 3:107 (2012), pp. 1–5 (the latter contains an up-to-date review and evidence suggesting that *all* perception is affect-laden).

⁴⁷ See Dreyfus 'Intelligence without Representation' and 'Overcoming the Myth'.

⁴⁸ See Siegel 'The Contents' and 'Affordances'.

integration challenge. I believe it is difficult and serious. In the remainder I will briefly sketch the shape of this challenge. It will be a matter for future investigation to resolve it.

Start by considering that intentional states are characterized by two aspects. On the one hand, there is the intentional content of the state.⁴⁹ This is, very roughly, what the intentional state is directed at. The content may, for example, be a Russellian or a Fregean proposition.⁵⁰ On the other hand, there is the intentional mode of the state, sometimes also called the *attitude* taken toward the relevant proposition. A desire that *p* obtain and a belief that *p* obtains, for example, are usually characterized as states that have the same intentional content but differ in intentional mode. If we think of intentional states as relations to their intentional contents, the mode is simply the relation.

Once the mode/content distinction is in place, it is extremely natural to think that whether an intentional state is informing or guiding is matter of its mode and not its content. Indeed, the distinction between informing and guiding forms of intentionality is often taken to be the most fundamental distinction among intentional modes. Informing modes are representational; they have correctness or accuracy conditions (a belief that *p* is accurate only if *p*); guiding modes – by contrast – are motivational; they have satisfaction conditions (a desire that *p* is satisfied only if *p*).⁵¹ The distinction between the two types of intentional modes is sometimes expressed in terms of differences in their *direction of fit*. Informing states have a mind-to-world direction of fit, while guiding states have a world-to-mind direction of fit.⁵² It is thus plausible and widely accepted that whether an intentional

⁴⁹ There might also be *objectual* attitudes that have an intentional object, but no intentional content – think, for example, of searching for something or loving someone (e.g. Michelle Montague ‘Against propositionalism’ *Noûs* 41:3 (2007), pp. 503–518). The integration challenge would be even more difficult if perceptual experience were objectual.

⁵⁰ The first specifies certain objects and their properties and relations, the second contains modes of presentation of these objects, properties and relations.

⁵¹ It is controversial what exactly accuracy and correctness as well as satisfaction require. It is fairly uncontroversial, though, that the fact that *p* obtains is at least a necessary condition for correctness of the belief that *p* and for satisfaction of the desire that *p*.

⁵² G.E.M. Anscombe, *Intention* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, [1957] 2000); Mark de Bretton Platts, *Ways of Meaning: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Language* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979); John R. Searle, *Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Michael Smith, ‘The Humean theory of motivation’, *Mind* 96:381 (1987), pp. 36–61; Lloyd Humberstone, ‘Direction of fit’, *Mind*, 101: 401 (1992), pp. 59–83.

state exhibits a guiding or an informing form of intentionality is determined by its intentional mode and not its intentional content.

Some intentional states may be composites of different modes. Some philosophers, for example, hold that intentions are composites of beliefs and desires (crudely: to intend that *p* just is to desire that *p* obtain and to believe that *p* will obtain).⁵³ Such composite states would be both informing and guiding because they have an informing part and a guiding part. But perceptual experience does not seem to be such a composite mode (at least when we restrict ourselves to a single sensory modality). Perceptual experience seems to be a fundamental building block of the intentional mind, not the mere fusion of other elements. Further, it seems that perceptual experience is a unified mode: it is not the case that some experiences have one intentional mode and others have a different intentional mode. Indeed, consider our examples again. The visual sensory experience in the cake case seems both informing and guiding, similarly for the auditory experiences in the music case and the explosion case. If there is perceptual guidance within conscious sensory experience such as vision or audition, then it seems that we cannot cleanly separate a guiding mode of visual (or auditory) experience from an informing mode of visual (or auditory) experience.

But if visual (or auditory) experience is a unified and non-composite state that is both informing and guiding, and if whether a mental state is informing or guiding is determined by its mode and not its content, then visual (or auditory) experience would have to be an intentional mode that has both an informing and a guiding nature. Perceptual experience would have to be a mode that is like a *besire*:⁵⁴ desire-like and belief-like at the same time. Some hold that such *besires* could not exist.⁵⁵ But even if *besires* could exist, and even if perceptual experience could be like them, how could we explain why some experiences seem *only* informing, and not guiding at all?

⁵³ Donald Davidson, 'Actions, reasons, and causes', *Journal of Philosophy* 60:23 (1963), pp. 685–700; Neil Sinhababu, 'The Desire-Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything', *Noûs* 47:4 (2013), pp. 680–696. See also Searle, 'Intentionality'.

⁵⁴ J. E. J. Altham, 'The Legacy of Emotivism', In G. Macdonald and C. Wright (eds.), *Fact, Science, and Morality: Essays on A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth, and Logic* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, pp. 275–288.

⁵⁵ See Smith 'The Humean Theory'.

These considerations suggest that we will be faced with a difficult challenge: either give up the view that the difference between guiding and informing forms of intentionality is a difference in mode, and not content. Or make plausible that *all* perceptual experiences have both a guiding and an informing face. The question is: which way to go?

University of Oslo

Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas

Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature

P. O. Box 1020

Blindern

0315 Oslo

Norway

sebaswat@csmn.uio.no