Abstract
Hinge epistemology, a recent branch of epistemology inspired by Wittgenstein’s comments in On Certainty (1969, henceforth OC), maintains that rational evaluation in general is possible only because of certain commitments that are legitimately held though evidentially unsupported. The goal of this paper is to develop and motivate an under-explored option for hinge epistemology. This view, which I shall label ‘Radical Relativist Hinge Epistemology’ (or RR), combines epistemic relativism (following Ashton 2019a, b) with a radically non-evidentialist account of hinges role in epistemic evaluation. Whereas others have sought to weaken or avoid the apparent non-evidentialist and relativist leanings of hinge epistemology (Piedrahita 2021; Neta 2019), this approach fully embraces them, and argues that they are not as problematic as they might appear.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 652 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.