Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Valen Simpson, Loar Cases, Communication, and Luck

The existence of Loar cases has traditionally been taken to vindicate a broadly Fregean approach to communicative success. As subjects in the case are miscommunicating, while in fact talking about the same object, sameness of reference is shown to be insufficient as a condition for understanding. Conclusively, appeal to senses, modes of presentation, or ways of thinking is deemed necessary in order to explain the misunderstanding at the heart of the puzzle. Recently, however, the idea that Loar cases entails the triumph of Fregeanism has met resistance. As some Russellians have pointed out, they too have a stake in the discussion. More problematically for the Fregean, however, would be the possibility of Loar cases being turned against the account itself. Onofri (2019) undertakes a discussion of Loar’s puzzle, and variations thereof, to argue that the Fregean’s (matches in) ways of thinking about the referent are not necessary when accounting neither for the misunderstandings involved in Loar cases in particular, nor communicative success in general. Onofri instead provides an epistemic approach to definitively triumph over the Fregean’s in explaining the relevant desiderata surrounding Loar puzzles and communication. I aim to do two things: first, I will provide the Fregean camp with a defence against Onofri's challenge; next, I plan on presenting my own challenge to this new wave of epistemic, or knowledge-based accounts of Loar cases and communication, with their particular focus on the component of luck at the heart of it. The challenge, put succinctly, is that we have reasons to think that communication can occur with a fair share of luck and a fair lack of knowledge.