2022
Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Pål Antonsen, Second-person Narration
Talk by Pål Antonsen, Second-person Narration
Time and place: Dec. 1, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 652 and Zoom
Abstract
This paper is about an underexplored mode of expression called second person narration. As a way of storytelling, the second person pronoun primarily picks out a fictional protagonist, although the speech acts themselves are de te (`to you') and directed at the audience. The paper argues that second person narration is a viewpoint ``shifty'' phenomenon, akin to free indirect discourse and protagonist projection. We start with the assumption that when authors make fictional speech acts they only pretend to perform their genuine illocutionary counterparts. As an additional speech act, however, the audience are also invited to engage in a first-personal make-belief from the protagonist's point of view. Within the confines of this make-belief, `you' successfully picks out out the central fictional character by referential transmission.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 652 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.
Organizer
Fintan Declan Mallory and Hugo Ribeiro Mota
Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Austin Baker, The Prioritization of Social Stereotypes
Talk by Austin Baker, The Prioritization of Social Stereotypes
Time and place: Nov. 10, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 467 and Zoom
Abstract
Reflecting on the pervasiveness of discrimination throughout human history, it’s clear that stereotypes have a strong hold on us. But why? In this paper I argue that stereotypes occupy a privileged position in our cognitive architecture. Unlike other types of information, stereotypes are prioritized in judgment and decision-making. I present empirical work with Jorge Morales and Chaz Firestone in which we demonstrate how prioritized stereotype information can disrupt even basic perceptual judgments about stereotype-incongruent people (Baker, Morales, & Firestone 2019). This disruption causes interactions with stereotype-incongruent people to be experienced as disfluent, subtly motivating us to discriminate against them in virtue of their incongruent social identities.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 467 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.
Organizer
Fintan Declan Mallory and Hugo Ribeiro Mota
Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Victor Lange, Decentering
Talk by Victor Lange, Decentering
Time and place: Oct. 27, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 652 and Zoom
Abstract
Clinical psychologists describe decentering as the mental operation in which a patient ‘moves out’ of immersion in a mental state. This paper argues that decentering poses serious problems for a prominent group of philosophical theories of attention. This group takes attention and attention control to be the upregulation of a phenomenon’s influence on an agent’s cognitive processing. The selection for action theory is a prominent representative of this group. The present paper argues that the theory cannot account for the dynamics of detachment involved in decentering. To accommodate the phenomenon of decentering, the selection for action must be significantly altered. The paper formulates the needed revisions the theory must make. These revisions put pressure on the idea of the ‘many-many problem’ and the definition of attention control fundamental to the theory. The paper further argues that another prominent representative of the target group of theories of attention, namely the structure theory, faces problems. Decentering shows that the theory’s foundational idea of priority structures is implausible.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 652 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.
Organizer
Fintan Declan Mallory and Hugo Ribeiro Mota
Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Hugo Mota, Towards a social epistemology of attention
Talk by Hugo Mota, Towards a social epistemology of attention
Time: Oct. 13, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM
Abstract
There is no clear consensus on how we should understand deep disagreements, much less so on how they ought to be resolved. Intending to further advance this discussion, I gather resources from the philosophy of attention, thus developing the beginnings of a social epistemology of attention. My proposal is to establish a distinction between two cognitive dimensions of deep disagreements, i.e., the argumentative and the perspectival dimensions. The first is a propositional disagreement over structural commitments, while the second is a non-propositional disagreement regarding a clash in salience perspectives (Whiteley 2022), salience structures (Munton 2021), and specific characterizations (Camp, 2019). Even though this distinction applies to all kinds of deep disagreement, my focus is only on social deep disagreements, which are genuine, persistent, and collective disagreements over structural social issues. Relevant to this kind is Yumusak’s (2022) description of perspectival clashes. Her idea is that our being perspectival generates social contestations over matters of fact, judgments of value, and especially over what’s salient to each of us. To flesh out this concept, I present a current perspectival clash set at the Brazilian social, cultural, and political context.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 652 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.
Organizer
Fintan Declan Mallory and Hugo Ribeiro Mota
Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Fintan Mallory, Erotetic Injustice
Talk by Fintan Mallory, Erotetic Injustice
Time and place: Sep. 29, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 652 and Zoom
Abstract
Discursive activity, as a social practice, is subject to the influence of social power. While previous research on this issue has focussed primarily on the ability of speakers to have their knowledge claims taken seriously by their listeners, more recent work has concentrated on discourse structure itself. This has coincided with a theoretical shift from the level of the propositional and the doxastic to the pragmatic and subdoxastic. This paper continues this trend with the introduction and analysis of the category of erotetic injustice. Whereas testimonial injustice concerns the role prejudice plays in preventing a speaker from having their assertions accepted by listeners, erotetic injustice concerns speakers’ ability to have their questions taken up and used to guide discussion. ‘Question’, in this sense, denotes a particular information structure which can be added to the common ground and which constrains the immediate goals of the discussion, determining the relevance of speakers’ contributions. Questions structure our conversations, they fix what we are talking about and what our lines of inquiry might be, and as a result, whoever controls the question-under-discussion, controls the discourse.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 652 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.
Organizer
Fintan Declan Mallory and Hugo Ribeiro Mota
Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Joey Pollock, Epistemic bubbles and contextual discordance
Talk by Joey Pollock, Epistemic bubbles and contextual discordance
Time and place: Sep. 15, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 367 and Zoom
Abstract
Recent work in social epistemology has drawn attention to various problematic social epistemic phenomena that are common within online networks. Nguyen (2020) argues that it is important to distinguish epistemic bubbles from echo chambers. An epistemic bubble is an information structure that merely lacks information or sources that would be relevant or important to the user. An echo chamber is a structure in which dissenting opinions are, not necessarily absent, but actively undermined, for example by instilling attitudes of distrust towards their adherents. Because of this, echo chambers are thought to be especially difficult to escape. In contrast, according to Nguyen, it is supposed to be relatively easy to shatter an epistemic bubble: one simply introduces the missing information. In this paper, I argue that it is more difficult to shatter an epistemic bubble than has been recognised in the literature. The reason for this is the relationship between epistemic bubbles and interpretative resources. Despite their epistemic drawbacks, it is relatively easy to gain knowledge from sources inside one’s epistemic bubble; this is because agents within a bubble typically share many contextual assumptions. In contrast, it can be very difficult to gain knowledge from sources outside of one’s bubble because interlocutors on the outside are less likely to have the shared background beliefs and interpretative dispositions needed to facilitate communicative success. I argue that strategies for escaping epistemic bubbles that do not address this semantic challenge will be ineffective, and I end with some thoughts regarding how this should inform our understanding of the phenomenon of knowledge resistance.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 367 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.
Organizer
Fintan Declan Mallory and Hugo Ribeiro Mota
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Andrew Lee, The Structure of Iconic Representation
Talk by Andrew Lee, The Structure of Iconic Representation
Time and place: June 16, 2022 11:45 AM – 1:15 PM, GM 652 and Zoom
Abstract
This paper develops a theory of iconic representation. We begin by examining prior proposals that appeal to the parts principle, according to which iconic representations are those where parts of the vehicle represent parts of the content. Then we develop our positive theory, according to which iconic representations are “locatively structured” collections of analog representations. We also explain how our theory identifies the relationship between the iconic and the analog, precisifies the notions of a functional space and functional part, and generates an interesting taxonomy of representational systems.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have an hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 652 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.
Organizer
Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Anna Drożdżowicz , Auditory illusions in speech sound and voice perception
Talk by Anna Drożdżowicz , Auditory illusions in speech sound and voice perception
Time and place: May 19, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 652 and Zoom
Abstract
Hearing speech in a particular voice is one of the most common auditory experiences that humans have. What can we learn about the nature of auditory experiences of listening to speech sounds in a voice from auditory illusions? The paper addresses this question by looking at four cases of such illusions: (1) the temporal induction illusion in speech, (2) the phantom words illusion, (3) the McGurk illusion, and (4) the voice-over translation experience/illusion. A unified interpretation of evidence concerning (1)-(4) will be proposed. I will also discuss selected consequences for the epistemology of spoken language understanding.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have an hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 652 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.
Organizer
Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Fintan Mallory, Semantic competence and social justice
Talk by Fintan Mallory, Semantic competence and social justice
Time and place: Apr. 21, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 206 and Zoom
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have an hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 206 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.
Organizer
Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Mirela Fus, Disjunctivism Approach to Objects of Engineering in Philosophy
Talk by Mirela Fus, Disjunctivism Approach to Objects of Engineering in Philosophy
Time and place: Apr. 7, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 213 and Zoom
Abstract
Recent discussion about the subject matter of the method of engineering in philosophy, that most prominently goes by the name of Conceptual Engineering, has produced a plethora of theories about different objects that this method targets or operates on. However, within the method of engineering in philosophy, these objects are, more often than not, seen as competitors rather than co-workers. In this paper, I work towards the most plausible subject matter approach to the engineering in philosophy. I argue that we should embrace Disjunctivism Approach to objects of engineering in philosophy over its two competitors: Singularism Approach and Pluralism Approach. Disjunctivism Approach accommodates two core assumptions about the objects of engineering in philosophy: (i) they count as philosophical objects, and (ii) what counts as a philosophical object can change. Finally, I outline some benefits of Disjunctivism Approach for the method of engineering in philosophy and beyond.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have an hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 213 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.
Organizer
Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Francesca Secco, What are we doing when we are reading words?
Talk by Francesca Secco, What are we doing when we are reading words?
Time and place: Feb. 10, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM652 and Zoom
Abstract
When we read a list of words, are we doing it or is it something that just happens to us? On the one hand, according to what I call intention for actions theories, reading is something we can do intentionally and, hence, can be considered an action done by an agent. That is the case, for instance, when you are reading a novel, a newspaper’s article, or studying a chapter. On the other hand, reading seems to passively happen to us. It is sufficient that a word appears in front of us to make us read it. There is, in fact, extensive scientific evidence that reading takes place no matter of the agent’s intention. For instance, numerous studies on the Stroop task are the proof that reading is unavoidable. I will capture this tension between activity and passivity in reading by presenting the reading puzzle. In this puzzle, I will consider cases of simple reading, meaning those instances of reading in which the agent is dealing with single words and she isn’t required to involve further hermeneutic efforts. The way I take to solve the reading puzzle is challenging intention for action theories. I will argue that if intention is necessary for a process to be active, then intention for action theories fail to account for such an important human activity as reading. This outcome leaves only two options: either we need to accept that simple reading is passive, or we can take this as an invite to investigate other ways in which a process can be active independently of the agent’s intention.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have an hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 652 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.
Organizer
Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Yvonne Huetter, Subjectivity as Tool – Philosophy’s Interest in Strong Notions of Individual Subjectivity.
Talk by Yvonne Huetter, Subjectivity as Tool – Philosophy’s Interest in Strong Notions of Individual Subjectivity.
Time and place: Jan. 13, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, Zoom
Abstract
There is a well known tension in Rorty when it comes to our linguistic agency. Famously, Rorty follows Wittgenstein, Quine, Davidson and others in that there are no private languages. However, the innovator of our language in Rorty is an individual, the “strong poet”, who Brandom calls Rorty’s “genius self”. This tension in Rorty is well described and has been problematized many times and from various angles. Against the common compulsion to mitigate Rorty’s commitment to individuality and normative detachment, this article provides a rationale for what I will call Rorty’s “vocabulary of rupture” which follows a) from fully implementing Rorty’s particular version of antirepresentationalism and b) from taking temporality into account. As for a) once we embrace that words and theories do not represent the world as it is in itself but function to serve particular aims, there are contexts in which insisting on the possibility of normative detachment becomes interesting and worth pursuing. This is the case when the aim of writing is to motivate people to get engaged in democratic practices and to embark on creative endeavors. As for b) once we bring temporality into the game, we can switch between the Davidsonian perspectives of triangulation and radical interpretation and choose freely which perspective to favor for the moment of emergence of new vocabularies – the first or the third-person account of meaning.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar. This meeting will take place on Zoom (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.
Organizer
Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Keith Wilson, Meeting Travis’s Challenge: How We Recognize the Contents of Experience.
Talk by Keith Wilson, Meeting Travis’s Challenge: How We Recognize the Contents of Experience.
Time and place: Oct. 28, 2021 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, Room GM 652 and Zoom
Abstract
In ‘The Silence of the Senses’, Charles Travis sets out an argument against the philosophical and scientific orthodoxy that perceptual experiences have representational content. Though widely discussed, few representationalists have directly engaged with the substance of Travis’s arguments, which concern the availability of perceptual content for first-personal thought and reasoning, rather than its individuation or structure. In this paper, I set out a novel response to Travis’s Challenge that posits the existence of recognitional capacities that are distinct from, though systematically linked to, perceptual representation and the conceptual capacities that are operative in judgement. Crucially, such capacities are themselves shaped by successive exposure to perceptual stimuli over time, which in turn explains why perception and judgement share common or systematically related contents without overly constraining the kinds of properties that can be represented in perception. This fills an important lacuna in existing representationalist accounts, offering a philosophically and empirically plausible response to Travis’s Challenge.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have an hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 652 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.
Organizer
Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco
2021
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Sebastian Watzl, What attention is. An identifying account.
Talk by Sebastian Watzl, What attention is. An identifying account.
Time and place: Dec. 2, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Room GM 652 and Zoom
Abstract
In this paper, I will draw a distinction between explanatory accounts of attention and identifying accounts. I will then use that distinction in order to (a) diagnose a common confusion in the science and philosophy of attention, (b) criticise some extant philosophical theories of attention, and (c) propose and defend an identifying account of attention. This account is not meant to be explanatory. And I believe it is uncontroversial, and – in a sense – hopefully everyone’s account of attention. I show why it is nevertheless important to articulate this account. It carves out an important topic of research and helps to coordinate between different fields of study. It also addresses a persistent worry in the science of attention regarding whether we really know what attention is. The upshot of this paper is that we have a unifying and uncontroversial identifying account of attention. With this account in clear sight we can connect the variety of fields that study attention, and indeed we can extend them. Let’s continue trying to understand how attention works and why it matters. We know what it is.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have an hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 652 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.
Organizer
Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Joey Pollock, Do testimonial exchanges preserve content?
Talk by Joey Pollock, Do testimonial exchanges preserve content?
Time and place: Nov. 11, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Room GM 452 and Zoom
Abstract
The dominant view of the semantic dimension of testimony maintains both that (a) successful testimonial exchanges (either always or typically) preserve content and (b) the contents so preserved are rich enough to serve as appropriate objects of testimonial knowledge. In this talk, I draw on considerations from the debate between minimalists and Relevance Theorists in philosophy of language to argue that no notion of content can play both of these roles simultaneously. Thus, we must accept that testimonial exchanges are not often content preserving: the content that the hearer recovers is not (often) the same as the content that the speaker expressed.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have an hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 452 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.
Organizer
Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco
Talk by Andrew Y. Lee, Degrees of Consciousness
Time and place: Sep. 17, 2021 2:00 PM–4:00 PM, Zoom
We are pleased to announce the following talk, jointly organised by the Forum for Consciousness Studies, the CBC project, and the Oslo Mind Group (OMG). Everyone is welcome!
Presenter: Andrew Lee (postdoc, UiO, website)
Title: Degrees of Consciousness
Time: 17. September 2021, 14:00-16:00
(40 min talk + Q&A)
Venue: Zoom
Presenter Bio
Andrew Lee is a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Oslo, affiliated with the ConsciousBrainConcepts project. His research is on philosophical questions about conscious experiences. He’s particularly interested in questions about (1) how conscious experiences are structured and how to formally model that structure, and (2) the ethical significance of consciousness. In addition to philosophizing about consciousness, Andrew sometimes even has some conscious experiences of his own.
Abstract
Does consciousness come in degrees? If the answer is ‘yes’, then some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. If the answer is ‘no’, then such claims are either false or incoherent. In this talk, I'll (1) argue that the most prominent philosophical objection to degrees of consciousness doesn’t work, (2) develop an analysis of what it is for consciousness to come in degrees, and (3) apply the analysis to various theories of consciousness. I’ll argue that most theories yield the result that consciousness comes in degrees, though what exactly degrees of consciousness are varies across different theories. This means that claims about degrees of consciousness should be treated as substantive hypotheses open to confirmation and falsification, rather than as obvious truths or conceptual confusions.
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Kaisa Kärki, Autonomy of Attention
We will be discussing a draft of "Autonomy of Attention" by Kaisa Kärki.
Time and place: Sep. 16, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Room GM 207 and Zoom
Abstract
What precisely does a distraction threaten? An agent who spends an inordinate amount of time attending to her smartphone even though this behavior is against her own goals – what precisely is she lacking? In this paper I develop conceptual resources to answer these questions. I suggest that whereas agency of attention is an agent’s non-automatic decision-making on what she currently pays attention to, autonomy of attention is an agent, through her second-order desires, effectively interfering with her non-automatic decision-making on what she currently pays attention to. Freedom of attention is an agent’s possibility to hold or switch her focus of attention without fixating on any specific focus against her will or without forced or manipulated distraction from chosen foci. I will further argue that autonomy of attention requires some degree of attention capital, namely the agent’s understanding of how attention works, appreciation of the value of various attention-requiring tasks, her attention skills supported by her environment and her ability and motivation to develop and regulate them. This is because especially when attention is treated as a commodity, to regulate one’s attention according to one’s own values, what is in jeopardy and commodified has to be noticed, known, and valued. The conceptual work done helps detect attention-related freedom-deficits, which in turn provide conceptual resources to track various manipulations and coercions that diminish a person’s freedom of attention. This framework is useful when developing the moral and legal attention rights of citizens to protect them from various manipulations of attention when this kind of protection is perceived to be of value.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have an hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 207 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.
Organizer
Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Andrew Y. Lee, Degrees of Consciousness
We will be discussing a draft of ‘Degrees of Consciousness’ by Andrew Y. Lee.
Time and place: Sep. 2, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, GM 452 and Zoom
Abstract
Does consciousness come in degrees? If the answer is ‘yes’, then it makes sense to say that some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. If the answer is ‘no’, then such claims are either false or incoherent. This paper (1) argues that the principal objection to the idea of degrees of consciousness conflates questions about degrees with questions about indeterminacy, (2) examines the semantics of ‘more conscious than’ expressions, (3) develops a general analysis of what it is for a degreed property to count as degrees of consciousness, and (4) applies the analysis to various theories of consciousness. I argue that most theories entail that consciousness comes in degrees, though what exactly degrees of consciousness are varies across different theories. This means that claims about degrees of consciousness should be treated as substantive hypotheses open to confirmation and falsification, rather than as obvious truths or conceptual confusions.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have an hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 452 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.
Organizer
Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Mirela Fus, Evolutionary Debunking of Genericity
We will be discussing a draft of ‘Evolutionary Debunking of Genericity’ by Mirela Fus.
Time and place: June 4, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Zoom
Abstract
In her paper called ‘A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value’, Sharon Street (2006) argues against realist theories of value. In this paper, I consider the prospects of applying an analogous Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of genericity by offering a debunking argument against genericity drawing on a direct analogy with Street’s (2006) paper. In particular, I focus on generic statements such as “A tiger is striped” or “Muslims are terrorists” and look at the relation between generic judgments and independent generic truths expressed by generic statements posited by the realist about genericity. This paper makes a broader methodological point about the connection between realist theories about genericity and speakers’ judgments about generic propositions, based on the assumption that generic judgments have been indirectly yet significantly influenced by evolutionary forces.
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Erlend Owesen, ‘What-It’s-Like’ Talk is Technical Talk
We will be discussing a draft of ‘What-It’s-Like Talk is Technical Talk’ by Erlend Owesen.
Time and place: May 7, 2021 12:15 PM–1:30 PM, Zoom
Abstract
It is common to define or explain ‘phenomenal consciousness’ and its cognates as what it is like to be in a mental state. But philosophers disagree whether the ‘what-it’s-like’ phrase in this context should be understood as a technical phrase, i.e. a phrase the meaning of which is peculiar to a theoretical discipline or community. This paper argues that it is a technical phrase and thus that it does not mean what is meant by the phrase in ‘ordinary’ non-philosophical contexts. This has two important consequences. The first is that theorists should stop defining or explaining phenomenal consciousness in terms of what-it’s-like-ness. The second is that theorists owe us an explanation of what they mean by ‘phenomenal consciousness’ that does not appeal to what-it’s-like-ness.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar and will take place via Zoom. All are welcome to attend (Zoom login required).
Note: This seminar will start at the earlier than usual time of 12.15.
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the Oslo Mind Group Team, which is open to all University of Oslo members, or upon request from the organizer for non-UiO users (see below).
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Max Johannes Kippersund, Experiencing Ensembles: On the Limits of Perceptual Particularity
We will be discussing a draft of ‘Experiencing Ensembles: On the Limits of Perceptual Particularity’ by Max Johannes Kippersund.
Time and place: Apr. 23, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Zoom
Abstract
One very widespread assumption about visual experience, is what I call “Particularism”. Put roughly, this is the assumption that the only properties we experience in cases of veridical perception are properties of particular things located in the perceived scene, and the only relations we experience are relations between particular things in the visual field. In this paper I develop a novel argument against Particularism. Building on recent empirical results from perceptual psychology, I will argue that we can experience what the average property is for groups of similar objects in a range of different feature dimensions. For instance, we can experience which orientation is the average orientation for a group of tilted lines.
Importantly, this claim is in conflict with Particularism. The reason for this is that when we experience that a group of lines has a certain average orientation, the orientation in question is not the property of any particular thing located in the visual field. This should be clear when reflecting on the fact that a certain orientation can be the average orientation for a group of lines even if no particular member of the group, or the group itself for that matter, actually instantiates that orientation. Hence, when we experience what the average property is for members in a perceived group, we are sensitive to a relation between the group members and a property which is not the property of any particular in the visual field. And this is in conflict with Particularism.
The argument presented in this paper is significant at two different levels. At a first level, it addresses an inherently interesting question in itself about whether we are sensitive to average orientation, size, emotional expression and the like in experience or only in post perceptual judgment. At a second level, the argument has major repercussions for one of the central theoretical debates in the philosophy of perception, between Naïve Realism and Representationalism. Naïve Realism, unlike Representationalism, implies Particularism. Hence, the argument presented in this paper provides a new reason to adopt Representationalism, and constitutes a direct challenge to Naïve Realism.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar and will take place via Zoom. All are welcome to attend (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the Oslo Mind Group Team, which is open to all University of Oslo members, or upon request from the organizer for non-UiO users (see below).
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Andrew Lee, Knowing What It’s Like
We will be discussing a draft of ‘Knowing What It’s Like’ by Andrew Lee.
Time and place: Apr. 9, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Zoom
Abstract
This paper develops a degree-theoretic account of knowledge of what it’s like to have an experience. I argue that knowledge of phenomenal character varies along a spectrum from the more exact to the more approximate, and
that phenomenal concepts vary along a spectrum in how precisely they characterize what it’s like to undergo their target experiences. I motivate this degreed picture by appeal to limits in epistemic abilities such as recognition, imagination, and inference.
I argue that approximate knowledge of phenomenal character cannot be explained merely by appeal to determinable or vague phenomenal concepts. I discuss how phenomenal concepts that yield more exact knowledge of what it’s like to undergo their target experience are those that eliminate more “phenomenal possibilities”. And I explain how the resulting view challenges some common assumptions about the acquisition conditions, requirements for mastery, and referential mechanisms of phenomenal concepts.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar and will take place via Zoom. All are welcome to attend (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the Oslo Mind Group Team, which is open to all University of Oslo members, or upon request from the organizer for non-UiO users (see below).
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Erlend Owesen, Does the Brain Think?
We will be discussing a draft of ‘Does the Brain Think?’ by Erlend Owesen.
Time and place: Mar. 26, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Zoom
Abstract
It is commonplace in cognitive science to ascribe psychological predicates to the brain, i.e. to assert that the brain sees, feels, thinks, etc. This has prompted philosophical debate. On one view, the relevant locutions of cognitive scientists are nonsensical (Bennett and Hacker 2003, 2007). On a different view, they make perfect sense and report empirical truths about brains (Dennett 2007; Crane 2015; Figdor 2017, 2018). In this paper, I propose a novel view on which cognitive scientists’ locutions are figurative, with ‘brain’ referring to the human being. I compare it to other views and argue that it is a plausible alternative.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar and will take place via Zoom. All are welcome to attend (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the Oslo Mind Group Team, which is open to all University of Oslo members, or upon request from the organizer for non-UiO users (see below).
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Francesca Secco, Why is Creative Thinking Praiseworthy?
We will be discussing a draft of ‘Why is Creative Thinking Praiseworthy?’ by Francesca Secco.
Time and place: Mar. 5, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Zoom
Abstract
Creative thinking and its outcomes are widely appreciated in our society. Not only do we value novel ideas and intuitions, but we also praise the agents for their creative thinking. This practice is in tension with other traits of this activity. Creative thinking is open-ended and highly spontaneous. Indeed, many instances of creative thinking seems just to happen to the agent. If having new ideas is just a lucky circumstance, why should we praise the agent for having them?
I draw a parallel with moral theories to discuss what we need to justify the attribution of praise to an agent for her creative thinking. I consider the approach presented in deep self theories, and I suggest that agents can be held responsible for creative thinking in virtue of its connection with what they care about. With this idea in mind, I state the commitment principle. According to it, an agent should be held responsible for her creative thinking and praised for it, because she has the commitment necessary to gain the knowledge and the experiences needed to obtain that novel insight.
The commitment principle has the merit of accounting for the whole spectrum of creative thinking, independently of how much the agent is intentionally doing something, or how much she can control it. Accepting this principle means to acknowledge that there are spontaneous instances of creative thinking that depend on the agent’s character, interests, and past experiences, which set the conditions for them to happen in certain ways.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead seminar and will take place via Zoom. All are welcome to attend (Zoom account required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the Oslo Mind Group Team, which is open to all University of Oslo members, or upon request from the organizer for non-UiO users (see below).
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Filippos Stamatiou, The Worry about Mental Luck
We will be discussing a draft of ‘The Worry about Mental Luck’ by Filippos Stamatiou of the University of Copenhagen.
Time and place: Feb. 12, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Zoom
Abstract
I argue for an epistemic, metaphysically independent, and generalisable version of Alfred Mele’s “worry about present luck”. Mele introduces present luck as a challenge for libertarian theories of free will. Present luck suggests that it is possible for an indeterministically free decision to be a matter of luck. Several philosophers have attempted to provide replies to the challenge posed by present luck, or to generalise the worry beyond libertarianism and into compatibilism.
Here, I take a different route. I present a version of the worry about present luck that focuses on the perspective of the agent. In this version, the physical world may differ, but the epistemic perspective of the agent remains unaffected. I call this the worry about mental luck. I argue that in cases of mental luck, agents are susceptible to a degree of epistemic luck about their own mental states, such that decisions are the outcome of a lottery from their perspective. Mental states that lay outside the perspective of consciousness, such as implicit biases, may be responsible for cases of mental luck. Importantly, the worry about mental luck does not depend on the metaphysical structure of the world, but rather, on the epistemic constraints of human psychology.
I finish the paper with a discussion about the importance of the worry about mental luck. The probability that any decision is subject to mental luck is low. However, its existence has alarming implications that undermine prominent theories of free will and moral responsibility.
How to attend
This ‘read-ahead’ seminar will take place via Zoom. All are welcome to attend.
A copy of the paper for discussion will be made available in advance via the Oslo Mind Group Team, which is open to all University of Oslo members, or upon request from the organizer for non-UiO users (see below).
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Keith Wilson, Perspectival Realism
We will be discussing a draft of ‘Perspectival Realism: The Perspectival Character of Perceptual Experience’ by Keith Wilson.
Time and place: Jan. 15, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Zoom
Abstract
Perception is characteristically an experience of how the world is here and now, from our particular embodied perspective. Consequently, when our perspective upon the world varies, it affects the qualitative or phenomenal character of experience. How are we to explain such variations? In this paper I examine how two leading views of the metaphysics of experience—intentionalism and Naïve Realism—account for the perception of perspectival features, such as relative spatial location, perspectival shape, lighting and other environmental conditions. In both cases, I argue, the resulting explanation fails to capture the distinctive contribution of perspectival features to the phenomenal character of experience. I then sketch an alternative view—perspectival realism, or perspectivalism for short—that develops some of Naïve Realism’s key insights to provide an intuitive and explanatorily adequate account of perceptual perspective and variation.
How to attend
This ‘read-ahead’ seminar will take place via Zoom. All are welcome to attend.
A copy of the paper for discussion will be made available in advance via the Oslo Mind Group Team, which is open to all University of Oslo members, or upon request from the organizer for non-UiO users (see below).
Organizer
Keith Wilson
2020
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Davide Zappulli, A Meta-Metasemantic Defence of the Kripke–Putnam Theory of Natural Kind Terms
We will be discussing a draft of ‘A Meta-Metasemantic Defence of the Kripke–Putnam Theory of Natural Kind Terms’ by Davide Zappulli.
Time and place: Dec. 11, 2020 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Oslo Mind Group Team
Abstract
I identify two central claims in the theory of natural kind terms proposed by Kripke and Putnam. The first is what I call ‘metasemantic externalism’, the idea that the meaning of natural kind terms is largely determined by mind-external and mind-independent factors. The second is the claim that the world is full of objective essences, which successful introductions of natural kind terms pick out and constitute sufficient and necessary conditions for kind-membership.
While the theory of Kripke and Putnam is a very popular one, it has been subjected to strong criticisms, especially coming from the philosophy of biology and chemistry in recent years. One central criticism of its opponents is that the theory is incompatible with how natural kind terms are treated in science. In this paper, focusing on biology, I argue that Kripke and Putnam’s theory can successfully respond to this objection.
My defense is based on a distinction between three distinct levels: the semantic level, the metasemantic level, and the meta-metasemantic one. I will start by defining these notions. Then, I will present the theory of Kripke and Putnam and the arguments moved against it. Having put all the pieces on the table, I will argue that the theory of Kripke and Putnam can respond to those objections. Finally, I will consider some objections to the proposed solution.
Note
This is a ‘read-ahead’ seminar and will take place via Microsoft Teams.
A copy of the paper for discussion will be made available in advance via the ‘Seminar’ channel of the Oslo Mind Group team, which is open to all University of Oslo members, or is available upon request from the organizer for non-UiO users (see below). All are welcome to attend.
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Anna Drożdżowicz, What About Reading?
We will be discussing a draft of ‘What About Reading?’ by Anna Drożdżowicz.
Time and place: Dec. 4, 2020 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Oslo Mind Group Team
Abstract
It has been argued that competent language users can have experiences of understanding linguistic utterances (e.g. Hunter 1998; Fricker 2003; Brogaard 2018; Longworth 2018). In recent years, the nature of such experiences has been the subject of heated discussions. Many of these philosophical debates have proceeded largely in abstraction from issues of the specific sensory modality (auditory or visual) to which linguistic utterances are presented, with some notable exceptions where the focus has been on experiences of understanding in spoken linguistic comprehension (e.g. O’Callaghan 2011).
Reading, despite being a pervasive and important form of linguistic comprehension, has not been systematically considered in this debate. Do sensory modalities involved in linguistic comprehension lead to experiences of understanding of a different or a similar kind? Is abstracting away from the import of sensory modalities a methodologically sound approach? The goal of this paper is to make progress on these questions by investigating differences and similarities between the cases of comprehending spoken and written linguistic utterances, with a special focus on reading. The results will be somewhat surprising.
After discussing some systematic differences between the two cases, I will present some evidence which could suggest that linguistic comprehension in both cases might result in experiences of understanding of (roughly) the same kind. I will explain what consequences these observations might have for the existing views in the debate about states of understanding.
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Sebastian Watzl, The Ethics of Attention
We will be discussing a draft of ‘The Ethics of Attention?’ by Sebastian Watzl.
Time and place: Nov. 6, 2020 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Oslo Mind Group Team
Abstract
Discussions regarding which norms, if any, govern our practices of forming, maintaining and relinquishing beliefs have come to be collected under the label “The ethics of belief”. Included in the ethics of belief are debates about how those normative issues relate to the nature of belief, whether belief formation is, for example, ever voluntary. The present talk concerns an analogous set of questions regarding our practices of attention. “The ethics of attention” thus concerns the discussion of which norms, if any, govern our practices of attention: what norms govern what we should attend to, how we should engage our capacity for attention, when we should begin and when we should stop to pay attention to something? Like the ethics of belief, the ethics of attention will connect those normative questions to issues regarding the nature of attention, what may or may not be subject to such normative pressures. Compared with rich, complex, and systematic investigation of the ethics of belief, the study of the ethics of attention is more or less undeveloped. This paper aims to begin to change that. Specifically, it shows that attention is an appropriate target for serious normative investigation and then classifies potential norms of attention along three dimensions: whether they are manner or object based, instrumental or non-instrumental, and whether its source is moral, prudential or epistemic.
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Andrew Lee, Is Consciousness Continuous?
We will be discussing a draft of ‘Is Consciousness Continuous?’ by Andrew Yuan Lee.
Time and place: Oct. 23, 2020 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Oslo Mind Group Team
Abstract
Consider your visual experience of a blue sky, your auditory experience of a rising pitch, or your temporal experience of an interval of time. A number of philosophers have contended that these kinds of conscious experiences have continuous (rather than discrete) structures. This paper first explains what it means to say that conscious experiences have continuous (versus discrete) structures. Then I argue that a better diagnosis of the aforementioned kinds of experiences is that they are contiguous, where this means roughly that adjacent values from one experiential domain map to adjacent values in another experiential domain. I explain why every experience that is contiguous must be discrete, and I argue that our introspective evidence favors the discrete theory rather than the continuous theory. Along the way, I use formal tools to precisify the notions of continuity, discreteness, and other relevant structural properties.
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Erlend Owesen, Eliminativism About Phenomenal Consciousness
We will be discussing a draft paper by Erlend Owesen on eliminativism about phenomenal consciousness.
Time and place: Oct. 9, 2020 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Oslo Mind Group Team
Abstract
This paper explores and defends eliminativism about phenomenal consciousness. First, I discuss what definition of consciousness both non-reductive and reductive realists can agree about in order to avoid verbal dispute, which identifies the target for eliminativism. Then I clarify the eliminativist position by addressing potential objections.
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Yvonne Hütter-Almerigi, The Moral Philosophy of Philosophy
Yvonne Hütter-Almerigi will be giving a talk on ‘Do You Value Topic-Continuity? The Moral Philosophy of Philosophy’.
Time and place: Sep. 25, 2020 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Oslo Mind Group Team
Abstract
The main argument of the paper is that Cappelen’s insistence on the category of “topics” and, more importantly, the insistence on topic-continuity, is motivated morally and strategically not semantically or theoretically more in general. When investigating what accounts for samesaying, topics, just as meaning, are not defined by content (Cappelen 141). Further, topics are metaphysically lightweight (Cappelen 138). topics (and topics), are defined pragmatically and as we go: Speakers talk about the same topic when we (and they) attribute they do. But why should we do that? Why should we aim for continuity and why should we think it is possible in general?
On a political and societal level, the answer Sally Haslanger gives, is that by insisting on continuity of concepts like marriage inferential uptake is smoothened and, therewith, we guarantee (political) power to our word. On the other hand, Rachel Sterken has argued that rupture and friction can have just as fruitful effects. Cappelen’s argument operates on a higher level of abstraction, yet, I think, the same strategic choice between continuity and rupture applies at the theoretic level. This is especially the case, if one assumes, as Cappelen does, that there is no limit to (his version) of conceptual engineering (Cappelen 194), and that, following Williamson, linguistic practices can hold together even in absence of a common creed that all participants endorse (Cappelen 63, 142). Why, then, invent the category “topics” which’s only job-description is to account for continuity in revision, if, on a theoretical level, we could perfectly do without it?
My answer is that topics serve the same pragmatic role at the theoretical level that they serve at the practical/political/societal level: Cappelen’s engineering of “conceptual engineering” aims for uptake and Cappelen chooses the road of continuity which I will try to contrast with rupture. Strategically, I will argue, Cappelen exploits the lexical effects of “continuity”, “unity of inquiry”, and “exchange of ideas” in order to click with the group of people in the theoretical departments that he wants to be and remain friends with. Morally, when taking Cappelen’s commitment to continuity at face-value, I will argue, that it all hinges on what you think communication is, how you constrain “ideas”, and how high you value novelty. Sometimes rupture might (morally) be the better choice, also at the level of abstraction Cappelen is working on.
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Jonathan Knowles, Relationalism, Berkeley’s Puzzle, and Phenomenological Externalism
We will be discussing Jonathan Knowles’ paper on ‘Relationalism, Berkeley’s Puzzle, and Phenomenological Externalism’ (OUP, 2019).
Time and place: Sep. 11, 2020 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Oslo Mind Group Team
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar (Online)
We will be discussing a draft of ‘Engineering Generic Judgements’ by Mirela Fus.
Time and place: July 10, 2020 2:00 PM–3:30 PM, Zoom
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar (Online)
We will be discussing a draft of ‘The Perception/Cognition Distinction’ by Anders Nes, Sebastian Watzl, and Kristoffer Sundberg.
Time and place: June 19, 2020 2:00 PM–3:30 PM, Zoom
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar (Online)
We will be discussing a draft of ‘The Bodily Theory of Pain’, by Erlend Owesen of the University of Cambridge.
Time and place: June 5, 2020 2:00 PM–3:30 PM, Zoom
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar (Online)
We will be discussing a draft of Max Kippersund’s paper on ‘Illusory Conjunctions, a New Puzzle for Naïve Realism’.
Time and place: May 22, 2020 2:00 PM–3:30 PM, Zoom
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar (Online)
We will be discussing a draft of Joey Pollock’s paper ‘Content Internalism and Conceptual Engineering’.
Time and place: May 8, 2020 2:00 PM–3:30 PM, Zoom
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar (Online)
We will be discussing a draft of Keith Wilson’s paper ‘Individuating the Sense(s) of Smell: Orthonasal and Retronasal Olfaction’.
Time and place: Apr. 24, 2020 2:00 PM–3:30 PM, Zoom
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar (Online)
We will be discussing a draft of Simon Høffding, Carlos Vara Sanchez and Tone Roald’s paper ‘Dufrenne and Dewey on Being Moved’.
Time and place: Apr. 3, 2020 2:00 PM–3:15 PM, Zoom
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar
We will be discussing a draft of Solveig Aasen’s paper on ‘Pictorial Content Structure in Drawings Coming to Life’.
Time and place: Mar. 6, 2020 1:00 PM–2:15 PM, GM 652
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar
We will be discussing the paper ‘How to Think About the Representational Content of Visual Experience’ by Michael Tye (2019).
Time and place: Feb. 28, 2020 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, GM 652
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar
We will be discussing the paper ‘The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling’ by Uriah Kriegel.
Time and place: Feb. 14, 2020 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, GM 452
Organizer
Keith Wilson
Oslo Mind Group Seminar
We will be discussing the paper ‘Debate on Unconscious Perception’ by Ian Phillips and Ned Block.
Time and place: Jan. 31, 2020 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, GM 652
Organizer
Oslo Mind Group
2019
Oslo Mind Group Seminar
Simon Høffding is presenting his paper ‘Not Being There: An Analysis of Expertise-Induced Amnesia’.
Time and place: Dec. 13, 2019 12:15 PM–2:00 PM, GM 652
Organizer
Oslo Mind Group
Oslo Mind Group Seminar
Max Kippersund is presenting his paper ‘On Seeing States of Affairs, and Why it is Explanatorily Prior to Seeing Objects’.
Time and place: Nov. 15, 2019 2:15 PM–4:00 PM, GM 652
Organizer
Oslo Mind Group