Abstract:
In On the People’s Right to Revolution (1795), Johann B. Erhard draws on the categorical imperative to argue for a moral duty to revolution. However, we also find an increased focus on consequences, calling into question the deontological framework of his justification of revolution. I argue that Erhard’s consideration of foreseeable consequences should be positioned at the level of act descriptions. I show that Erhard makes use of ‘unspecific’ and ‘specific’ act descriptions. Unspecific act descriptions refer to a definitional core descriptor that is tested against the categorical imperative. Specific act descriptions include social facts and intended consequences when tested against the moral law. While Erhard uses unspecific act descriptions in his justification of human rights, we find him using specific maxim descriptions in his moral justification of revolutionary action. My interpretation allows for a more coherent and textually supported interpretation of Erhard’s theory of revolution than earlier interpretations.