Abstract:
May I assert that Gettier was right: that ‘knowledge is not justified true belief’? On the one hand, it seems like I’m prohibited from asserting it, because it’s a philosophical claim and we might think that philosophical claims are not in the market for unqualified assertion. On the other hand, it’s hard to see why not: don’t we know or at least justifiably believe that knowledge is not justified true belief? If so, then why not assert what is known or justified? In general, what norms constrain assertion in philosophy?
Some say that assertion in philosophy is problematic because we shouldn’t believe our philosophical positions (owing to disagreement, for example), and we should only assert what we (at least) believe. This attack on philosophical assertion targets its propagation. Others attack its transmission: assertion doesn’t make philosophical knowledge available because of the standards for philosophical knowledge—like understanding why the view is correct—which is not recoverable from bare assertion. In either case, the thought is that there’s something epistemically problematic with philosophical assertion.
However, what if the problem with philosophical assertion is not epistemic but grounded in non-epistemic facts about one’s role as a philosopher and the ‘rules’ of doing philosophy? I argue that although assertion can make knowledge and justified belief available in philosophy—and thus is not a kind of misleading assertion, in line with the Gricean maxim of quality—giving and taking assertion in philosophy may nevertheless be prohibited because of non-epistemic facts about one’s role as a philosopher.
Relying on assertions in philosophy is akin to the kinds of wrongs committed in games. It’s like benefiting from a foul in football. Leaning on assertion sidesteps professional practice for unfair epistemic benefits; it is a philosophical ‘foul’. One feigns having learned the view first-hand, through more epistemically laborious means. This leads to the question of what grounds such a norm. We might think it seems like an epistemic norm: that one should learn first-hand why their philosophical position is correct. I argue, however, that it’s a social, practical norm on our conduct qua philosophers. In the ‘game of philosophy’, we owe to each other and to ourselves to believe our positions (to the extent that we do) for reasons we can appreciate, much like how sport players owe it to themselves and to each other to train and practice rather than by cheating or using performance-enhancing drugs.