2020
Louis deRosset - 'The Social Determinants of Reference'
Time and place: Mar. 10, 2020 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652
Louis deRosset will give a talk titled 'The Social Determinants of Reference'. It is based on this paper.
Abstract
The causal-historical theory of reference offers a plausible answer to the question of what it is in virtue of which a particular use of a name refers to a particular thing. A famous problem for causal-historical views involves accounting for reference switch. In this paper, I propose a solution to this problem. Briefly, the solution is to recognize an element of deference even in original uses of a name. We are accustomed to recognizing deference in derived uses of a name: my use of `Peter', for instance, refers to a particular apostle partly in virtue of the referential successes of other members of my community. The extension of this idea to the case of original uses is less familiar. Despite its unfamiliarity, I will urge the view that an original use of a name may, and sometimes does, refer to a particular individual in virtue of the linguistic conventions governing the originator's linguistic community together with the referential successes of other members of that community. This may seem a somewhat incredible view. But it emerges naturally from a consideration of certain other puzzles that have not, I think, gotten the discussion they deserve.
Herman Cappelen - ‘Making AI Interpretable’
Time and place: Feb. 11, 2020 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652
Abstract:
This is an overview of a book project I’m working on with Josh Dever. The central goal is to explore what contemporary metasemantic theories tell us about the content of neural net AI systems. Can they 'contain information'? Can they represent? Can they refer? Can they predicate? Can they perform speech acts? Our answers are 'yes', and in developing those answers, we have to significantly revise our metasemantics. So reflection on AI helps us improve metasemantics and that again helps make AI intelligible and explainable - as such, this work is also a contribution to the Explainable AI movement.
2019
Pre-read session with Rachel Sterken: "Generics and the Metaphysics of Kinds"
Time and place: Dec. 12, 2019 1:00 PM–2:00 PM, GM 652, University of Oslo
A pre-read session with Rachel Sterken on a draft titled 'Generics and the Metaphysics of Kinds.' Abstract TBA. Based on joint work with David Liebesman.
Please send an email if you plan to attend and want access to the draft.
Ingo Brigandt: Beware of metaphilosophy? Reflections on the connection between experimental philosophy and conceptual engineering
Ingo Brigandt, University of Alberta
Abstract:
Conceptual engineering and experimental philosophy are related in that they have the same critical target: traditional conceptual analysis. At the same time, although metaphilosophical discussions and developments are needed, I argue that this is often overshadowed by debates centering on conceptual analysis and the method of cases. Whereas experimental philosophy is merely a method, which needs some philosophical aim to be legitimate, conceptual engineering is in fact a significant philosophical aim. Conceptual engineering also includes important normative considerations, which experimental philosophy lacks. While conceptual engineering does need the involvement of empirical methods, I contend that these need not be the standards methods of experimental philosophy, which I illustrate with examples that call for empirical considerations about broader social effects.
Nick Hughes - Epistemology Without Guidance
Time and place: Oct. 29, 2019 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652
Abstract:
Philosophers often appeal to the idea that a normative theory must provide useful, usable guidance to argue for one normative epistemology over another. In this talk I show that this is a mistake. Guidance considerations have no role to play in theory choice in epistemology whatsoever.
Matthieu Queloz - "The Point of Pragmatic Genealogy
Time and place: Sep. 19, 2019 10:30 AM–12:15 PM, GM 652
Abstract: Assuming that one is interested in the points our concepts now serve, why would one bother with genealogy? Is it not more expedient to go directly to paradigm cases of our actual conceptual practices? In this talk, I offer two rationales for pragmatic genealogy. The first is that some conceptual practices exhibit what I call self-effacing functionality. The second is that some conceptual practices are so historically influenced that they lack a paradigm case or an obvious connection to generic human needs. In light of these two types of complication, I argue, pragmatic genealogy earns its place in our methodological repertoire.
Talk by Agustín Rayo: "Fragmentation"
Time and place: Aug. 27, 2019 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652, University of Oslo
Abstract:
In joint work with Adam Elga, I argue for a fragmented conception of mental states.
Talk by Josh Dever: ‘This Talk Might Change Your Mind’
Time and place: May 28, 2019 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652
Based on joint work with Henry Schiller.
Abstract:
Standard probabilistic decision theory models the impact of new information on our preferences for action by having that information shrink our space of doxastically possible worlds and thus alter our probability and value functions. But coupling this model with a semantics of epistemic modals on which epistemic modals never rule out worlds makes it mysterious how certain kinds of modal information, such as “That wine might be poisoned”, could influence our actions. By integrating some semantic ideas from inquisitive semantics with some thoughts from generics on the structure of value functions in probabilistic decision theory, we provide tools that will make sense of the action-influencing nature of such modal information.
Talk by Kim Pedersen: "Immediate Justification For Beliefs About What Is Said?"
Time and place: Apr. 9, 2019 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652, University of Oslo
Abstract:
When we hear people speak in a familiar language, we typically form beliefs about what they say. We are justified in holding these beliefs on many occasions. Where does this justification come from? A common answer is that it comes from experience. The claim is that we enjoy perceptual or perception-like experiences as of the speaker saying that P, and that these provide justification for believing that the speaker said that P (Brogaard 2018, Fricker 2003, Hunter 1998). On this view, beliefs about what is said can be immediately justified: they can enjoy a sort of justification that isn't constituted by the subject's justification for believing any other proposition. I'll argue that this claim is false. Our justification for beliefs about what is said is always purely mediate, that is, it's always constituted by our justification to believe other propositions. I'll offer a few cases that the immediate justification view has trouble explaining, and then argue that since the mediate justification view can explain these and all other relevant cases, we should prefer the latter.
Sigurd Jorem - "Conceptual Engineering and The Implementation Problem"
Time and place: Apr. 2, 2019 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652, University of Oslo
Abstract:
It is widely believed that what our words mean is partly determined by factors beyond our control, such as what experts believe, what the actual world is like, what the most natural meaning candidate is, and causal chains initiated by past baptisms. If conceptual engineers want to change what our words mean, they face the problem that we are not in control over these factors. However, changing the meaning of an expression is always changing the meaning an expression has in a language, and different languages have different properties. Some of those properties, including the number of speakers, make a metasemantic difference. This has peculiar consequences when we consider ways of spelling out the significance of succeeding in implementation. In addition, it is not obvious that the aforementioned factors determine any meaning we could use words to express when speaking a language, or only something like the standing meaning of expressions. In this talk, I argue that it is not necessary for conceptual engineers to change the standing meaning of a natural language expression, such as what 'cause' means in English, in order to succeed in implementing the products of their work. I suggest other ways of having a desirable impact on the way people speak that seem metasemantically feasible.
Talk by Olav Gjelsvik - "Approaching the Self in Action"
Time and place: Mar. 26, 2019 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652, University of Oslo
Pre-read session on a chapter from Olav's book manuscript. Contact Sigurd for material.
Abstract (excerpt of a synopsis for the book):
Chapter 6. The Self in Action
This chapter leaves, at least to some extent, the fundamental epistemological questions relating to radical doubt and skepticism behind, and moves on to a positive account of ‘I’-thoughts as a ground for understanding and grasping the meanings of indexical terms.
Fred Dretske has argued that we should count three fundamental types of awareness, object-awareness, property-awareness and fact-awareness, and that they may be independent of each other, as one may have fact-awareness without having object awareness or property-awareness of the object and the property that make up the fact one is aware of. This will be further defended, and it will be shown that fact-awareness of this sort is exactly the sort of awareness one has when one has non-observational knowledge of what one is doing. This means that in intentionally ø-ing, one is aware that ‘I am ø-ing’ without having object-awareness of oneself.
This, it will be argued, is a decisive clue for making progress in understanding I-thoughts, and understanding them as involving an ‘Idea’ of oneself that can be adequate and satisfy what Gareth Evans calls the Generality constraint without that I-idea in itself needing to be of the information-invoking sort. There is standardly a distinction between rigid terms that are information-invoking and those whose reference are fixed descriptively. In the present case, we see a rigid term whose reference may be fixed in a way that differs both from that of demonstratives (which depend on awareness of the object referred to) and that of descriptive names. The suggestion is that the ‘I’’s role is grounded in non-observational knowledge of action, i.e. in fact-awareness of oneself doing something, and that this is both necessary and sufficient for the fixing of the referent. The cost, if it is a cost, is that only the intentional agent can fully grasp the meaning of the ‘I’, since only the agent has such non-observational awareness, even if the meaning of the ‘I’ has features that may be shared.
This opens for a non-reductive approach to how to think about the ‘I’ that has been largely closed since Hume argued that the ‘I’ was at best nothing but a bundle of perceptions. Of course, Kant tried to remedy the situation, but without full success, as argued by Strawson and others. When we broaden the perspective to agentive knowledge in general (non-observational knowledge of what we do), we see that having available the ‘I’ as a referring expression is essential for all the functions involved in agentive guidance as we know it. We can thus understand how we can have ‘I’ thoughts, ‘here’-thoughts and ‘now’-thoughts without having object-awareness of the subject who is doing the acting and the thinking. We recover our pre-Humean innocence about the self, and the ‘I’ as a referring expression, by getting intentional action right.
This result clearly has further implications for the philosophy of language, for the semantics of indexicals, for the issues about whether they are essential for the expression of types of thought etc. The upshot is that one can defend the essentiality of indexicals directly out of (the account of) intentional action.
Talk by David Liebesman - "Meaning Transfer Revisited"
Time and place: Mar. 19, 2019 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652, University of Oslo
Based on joint work with Ofra Magidor.
Abstract:
With some context, we can transfer the meaning of various linguistic items. For example, ‘The ham sandwich left without paying’ can be used to communicate that the person who ordered the sandwich (rather than the sandwich itself) left without paying, and ‘Jill is a ham sandwich’ can be used to communicate that Jill ordered a ham sandwich (rather than that she is literally a sandwich).
Although the phenomenon of meaning transfer is widely recognised in both philosophy of language and linguistics, it remains substantially under-theorised with many key questions left unanswered. This paper attempts to fill-in some of this gap. After introducing the topic in §1, in §2 we review a range of properties of meaning transfer, which can also serve as diagnostic criteria for its occurrence. In §3, we argue that meaning transfer is a distinctive form of speech, which cannot be reduced to other linguistic phenomena such as loose-speech, metaphor, or conversational implicature. In §4, we argue for a more specific hypothesis regarding the structure of how meaning transfer is linguistically represented. Finally, in §5, we discuss what meaning transfer can teach us about the semantics/pragmatics distinction.
Stewart Shapiro: "Open Texture and Mathematics"
Time and place: Mar. 12, 2019 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652
"Open Texture and Mathematics", by Stewart Shapiro and Craige Roberts.
Abstract:
The purpose of this paper is to explore the extent to which the notion of open texture, as characterized by Friedrich Waismann, applies to the languages of mathematics. Open texture, we argue, is a design feature of natural languages, allowing the flexibility needed to adapt to new situations and new cases and new discoveries. We show that the informal or pre-formal languages of mathematics are indeed subject to open texture, but the ideal of rigor demands that it be eliminated.
Joost Vecht: Concept Attributivism
Time and place: Feb. 12, 2019 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652
Joost will be talking about his freshly submitted thesis and the topics it addresses: When we may attribute a concept to someone, conceptual change and open texture.
2018
Talk by Stephan Krämer: "Difference-Making in Truthmaker Semantics".
Time and place: Nov. 13, 2018 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652
Abstract
"It is a familiar idea that some contributions to an outcome seem to be difference-making whereas others may not. The distinction has been put to theoretical uses especially in the debate on causation, and it has typically been explicated in terms of counterfactuals. In it simplest form, the idea is that an event c made a difference to an event e just in case if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't have occurred. The relevance counterfactuals are in turn usually given an interpretation in terms of possible worlds, namely as concerning what happens in the nearest alternative possible worlds where the putative difference-maker does not exist. The talk will explore some natural ways to understand the idea of difference-making in terms of possible (or indeed impossible) truthmakers, and discuss both what distinctive benefits such an approach may offer, and what distinctive challenges it may face."
Talk by Per-Erik Milam “Non-Moral Blame”
Time and place: Oct. 23, 2018 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, Gm 652, University of Oslo
Blame is a familiar part of life. We blame organisations for being exploitative, politicians for being callous, strangers for being rude, friends and romantic partners for being unsupportive. We even (or especially) blame ourselves, perhaps for being thoughtless, inattentive, or unkind. These are examples of moral blame. It manifests in attitudes like anger, frustration, and guilt.
However, we also engage in non-moral blame (NMB). We blame athletes and teams for their poor performance, artists for their bad art, craftspeople for their poor products, chefs and restaurants for their bland or timid dishes, and epistemic agents for their poor reasoning. Indeed, NMB appears to be both widespread and widely accepted—tolerated at least, but often enthusiastically embraced.
The widespread acceptance of NMB should be of interest to philosophers for a few reasons. First, it is a widespread practice the moral status of which seems to have received little attention. Second, it is, prima facie, harder to justify than moral blame, which has itself received significant criticism over the last two decades. Third, it is unclear whether justifications of moral blame also support NMB. In short, we are in the awkward—but sadly not unusual—position of frequently engaging in a practice that may be causing unwarranted harm.
The aim of this paper is to show that NMB is unjustified. First, we will show that many purported instances of NMB are actually cases of moral blame. Second, we will show that many cases of genuine NMB are either unfitting or inappropriate. Agents may fail to meet a non-moral standard through no fault of their own, held to illegitimate standards, or subjected to excessive blame. Third, we argue that even cases of NMB that avoid these objections cannot be justified on any of the usual grounds for blaming. Finally, we argue that, even if NMB is sometimes justified, particular cases are still subject to a number of constraints, including effectiveness, necessity, fairness, proportionality, and standing. We conclude that, at best, the vast majority of NMB is unfitting, unjustified, or inappropriate in its particulars.
Talk by Massimo Renzo: Two Kinds of Consent
Time and place: Oct. 16, 2018 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652, University of Oslo
Abstract
What does it take to give morally valid consent? Is it enough that the consenter forms a particular mental state or does she also need to communicate the presence of that mental state? I defend a version of the first view. However, the main goal of the paper is methodological.
I suggest that in addressing the question of consent, it’s a mistake to focus primarily on the consenter, as most philosophical theories do. More attention needs to be paid to the consentee. Once we do that, we’ll see that two important revisions to the mainstream understanding of consent are called for: First, we should accept that a crucial function of consent is to guide people’s behaviour, and not simply to control the normative status of certain interactions. Second, we should acknowledge that there are two types of consent, grounded in different autonomy-related interests that underlie the justification of this power.
Talk by Andreas Brekke Carlsson: Responsibility, Response-dependence and Revision
Time and place: Oct. 9, 2018 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652, University of Oslo
Abstract:
The concept of blameworthiness is typically understood in terms of appropriate blame: An agent is blameworthy for a wrongdoing if and only if it is appropriate to blame her for that wrongdoing. Which way should we read this biconditional? According to response-independent views it is appropriate to blame a wrongdoer in virtue of the fact that she is blameworthy. According to response-dependent views a wrongdoer is blameworthy in virtue of the fact that it is appropriate to blame her. In this talk I will raise some worries for recent versions of both response-independence and response-dependence about blameworthiness. I will then argue that these problems can be avoided if we understand blameworthiness not in terms of appropriately blaming others, but rather in terms of appropriately blaming oneself. On this, broadly response-dependent view, an agent is blameworthy in virtue of the fact that the she deserves to feel guilty.
Sam Roberts – ‘The iterative conception of properties’
Time and place: Sep. 25, 2018 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652
Abstract:
The iterative conception of sets is well-known. According to it, the sets are ``built up" in a well-ordered series of stages: any sets from one stage form a set at the very next stage. This conception supports a rich and successful theory of sets.In this talk, I’ll present the less well-known iterative conception of properties. According to this conception, the relation of application that properties bear to other objects is ``built up" in a well-ordered series of stages: any condition definable using the application relation at one stage determines a property at the very next stage. As I will show, once formalised with the right principles, this conception is remarkably strong, providing enough properties for significant applications in semantics, metaphysics, and set theory itself.
Talk by Michael Henry Tessler: "The Language of Generalization: Probability, vagueness, and context”
Time and place: Aug. 21, 2018 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652
Michael Henry Tessler (MIT) will give the talk "The Language of Generalization: Probability, vagueness, and context”
Abstract: Knowledge that extends beyond the present context is crucial to thrive in our open-ended, dynamic world, and generic language (or generics, e.g., “Birds fly”, “Boys are good at math”, “Bill smokes”) is a simple way to communicate such generalizations to and from each other. Though found in every language and emerging early in development, generic language is philosophically puzzling and has resisted precise formalization. In my dissertation, I propose the first formal account of generic language that makes quantitative predictions about human behavioral data. This formalism is both general enough to explain behavior in multiple dependent measures across diverse domains and precise enough to capture fine-grained, context-sensitive differences in understanding. Having such a unified, computational framework sheds light on the mechanisms by which conceptual knowledge can influence judgments about generics. It also allows us to quantitatively compare the context-sensitivity of interpretation vs. production, clarifying the role of generics in stereotype propagation.
Talk by Crispin Wright, "Logical knowledge"
Time and place: Aug. 14, 2018 2:15 PM–4:00 PM, GM652
Talk by Harvey Lederman: 'Some Fregean Theories of Quantifying In'
Time and place: June 28, 2018 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652
Abstract
In this talk I'll present some compositional semantic theories for quantifying in given a Fregean treatment of attitude reports. The semantics are developed in a (somewhat) novel setting where Fregean senses are (somewhat) structured.
Talks by Wendy Salkin and David Plunkett
Time and place: June 19, 2018 10:00 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652, University of Oslo
Wendy Salkin: "The Conscription of Political Representatives"
Abstract: Informal political representation, the phenomenon of speaking or acting on behalf of others outside of formal political contexts, has long played a crucial role in advancing the interests of groups, particularly the interests of marginalized and oppressed groups. Sometimes, those who emerge into the role of informal representative do so willingly (voluntary representatives). But often, people end up in the position of informal representative, either in their private lives or in more public political fora, over their own protests (unwilling representatives) or even without their knowledge (unwitting representatives). Few theories of informal political representation have been advanced, and none accommodates either unwitting or unwilling representatives, making these theories both underinclusive and distortive. The theory developed here, conscriptionism, accounts for both voluntary and conscripted representatives. The characteristic feature of representative conscription is that one is taken by an audience to be a representative, regardless of one’s desire to be or knowledge that one is so taken—call this "audience uptake". The phenomenon of being taken by an audience to represent a group is so common among the members of minoritized groups that it has become fodder for satirical news sites, including Reductress (“Aïsha Unceremoniously Elected Spokesperson for All Black Women”) and The Betoota Advocate (“Aboriginal Friend Asked to Speak on Behalf of 700,000 People in Passing Conversation”). Objecting to his conscription as an informal representative for black Americans, Ta-Nehisi Coates recently lamented, “I didn’t ask for a crown.” What makes it the case that one is a representative for a group is only that one is taken to be a representative for that group by an audience (audience uptake), regardless of whether one takes oneself to be so. This means that one can be a representative even if one is unaware one is so taken (unwitting) or loath to be so taken (unwilling). Conscriptionism better captures the phenomenon of informal representation than alternatives because it ranges over all cases in which an audience ascribes the statements or actions of one party (the representative) to another (the represented), and audience ascription is what makes political representation cohere as a concept. As such, conscriptionism provides more fertile conceptual grounds for building a coherent and comprehensive normative theory of informal representation—one that applies to all the representatives there are, not just all the representatives who see themselves as representatives.
David Plunkett: “Conceptual Truths, Evolution, and Authoritative Normativity”
Talk by Eliot Michaelson and Garbiel Rabin
Time and place: June 12, 2018 10:00 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652
Eliot Michaelson, ‘Meaning Restrictions’
Abstract: Rarely do we utter 'every F' to talk about absolutely every F, or 'some G' to talk about any G whatsoever. Yet it hardly seems plausible that we typically have in mind the sorts of ultra-specific restrictions that linguists and philosophers have posited are to be found in the logical form of quantifier phrases. The present essay will explore whether there is some viable way of explaining how we can mean restricted quantifiers when we utter sentences containing quantifier phrases like these. I will argue that the most viable option is to accept that quantified thoughts are very often vague, and that it is such vague thoughts that we typically express by means of sentences containing quantifier phrases.
Talk by Vera Flocke and Patrick Greenough
Time and place: June 5, 2018 10:00 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652
Vera Flocke, 'The Metasemantics of Indefinite Extensibility'
Indefinite extensibility is the thesis that any domain of quantification can always be expanded. A number of philosophers (including Fine (2006), Linnebo (2013) and Studd (forthc.)) appeal to a modality in order to formally state this thesis. The basic idea is simple: a domain is extensible if and only it is possible to extend it. So, appeal to a modality is needed when talking about indefinite extensibility. However, the modal approach raises important metasemantic questions. How is the possibility of expanding domains of quantification reflected in the semantics of quantified sentences? I argue for the most straightforward implementation of the modal strategy: indefinite extensibility is a genuine and primitive kind of modality, and it is possible for there to be more sets if and only if there is a possible world in which there are more sets. Assuming that the concept of a set is indefinitely extensible, at least some sentences that quantify over sets therefore express contingent propositions, whose truth-values vary when assessed relative to different possible worlds. However, the meaning of quantifiers stays the same, and only standard index parameters are appealed to. This view is of interest beyond problems surrounding absolute generality since it provides the contours for a metasemantics that explains the standpoint-dependence of a subject matter in general as a modal contingency.
Patrick Greenough, 'Strengthened Sceptical Paradoxes'
It’s a familiar thought that there are various strengthened liar paradoxes in addition to the basic liar paradox. Are there various strengthened sceptical paradoxes in addition to the basic forms of scepticism? There are. In this talk, I do four things: (1) I set out a range of strengthened sceptical paradoxes, (2) I show how knowledge-first approaches do well with respect to these paradoxes, (3) I show how certain Neutralist approaches also do well, (4) I assess how these approaches can be combined.
Talk by Sarah Sawyer: "Talk and Thought"
Time and place: May 25, 2018 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, University of Oslo, GM 652
Abstract
It is commonplace, although not uniform, to talk of linguistic meanings and concepts as if they were either identical or at least so closely related as not to warrant explicit separation. I will outline a view of language and thought that clearly distinguishes the two. I suggest that they track different phenomena and have different explanatory roles. This has implications for a proper understanding of meaning change, conceptual engineering, normativity and truth.
Talk by Michael Beaney: ‘Interpretive Analysis and Conceptual Creativity’
Time and place: May 15, 2018 10:00 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652, University of Oslo
Talk by Nick Jones: Propositions and kinds of unity
Time and place: May 11, 2018 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, Gm 652
Abstract
I will discuss two topics. (1) The relationship between ourselves (or our minds) and a certain aspect of the external world: complexes of objects and properties, as described by, e.g., “Tibbles is purring”. (2) The nature of these complexes. One popular account of (1) appeals to propositions. According to this view, to believe that Tibbles is purring is to bear the belief-relation to the proposition that Tibbles is purring. I will begin by presenting a problem for this view, and arguing that the only extant solutions to this problem either (a) make propositions theoretically idle, or (b) fail for independent reasons. I will instead offer an alternative account of topic (1) inspired by a proposal of Prior’s in Objects of Thought. I will then discuss topic (2). In particular, I will argue that reality’s metaphysical bedrock contains two operations that combine objects and properties into complexes, and that neither operation can be explicated in other, more fundamental terms. One operation is closely related to the unity of propositions. The other is closely related to the unity of facts.
Talk by Dan López de Sa: "On So-Called Metalinguistic Negotiations"
Time and place: May 8, 2018 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, University of Oslo, GM 652
Dan López de Sa (Universitat de Barcelona) will give the talk: "On So-Called Metalinguistic Negotiations"
Recently, many philosophers, including David Chalmers (2011), David Plunket (2015), and Amie Thomasson (2017), have argued that there are many significant verbal disputes to be had in metaphysics (and philosophy)—as well as elsewhere. And this is because disputes about ‘art’, ‘person’, ‘consciousness’, ‘freedom’, ‘good’, or ‘knowledge’ as well as ‘torture’, ‘democracy’, ‘marriage’, or ‘woman’ can be significant. These words do matter, in the appropriate sense. This is a very important insight into the nature of the disagreement that these significant verbal disputes manifest.
In this paper, we want to distinguish this insight from a common related claim concerning the expression of such disagreement in language. To wit: that many of the disputes in question are to be seen as so-called “metalinguistic negotiations” (Plunkett & Sundell 2013). Not every negotiation about words—not every verbal dispute that expresses a disagreement about how a word should be used—qualifies as a metalinguistic negotiation in their sense. Whether there exist cases of metalinguistic negotiation proper is, however, an interesting claim in itself, but also something linguistically controversial. This controversy one can simply avoid when vindicating the significance of verbal disputes.
- Chalmers, David (2011): “Verbal Disputes”, Philosophical Review 120: 515-566
- Plunkett, David (2015): ‘Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy’, Inquiry 58, 828-874
- Plunkett, David & Tim Sundell (2013): ‘Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms’, Philosophers’ Imprint 13/23, 1-37
- Thomasson, A. L. (2017). Metaphysical disputes and metalinguistic negotiation. Analytic Philosophy, 57(3), 1–28
Talk by Annalisa Coliva: Is numerical cognition cognition of natural numbers?
Time and place: Apr. 24, 2018 10:15 AM, GM 652
Abstract
In this paper we take issue with what we call the "Standard View" in cognitive studies on numerical cognition. According to the standard view, there is no distinction in kind between what we call "adult putatively-arithmetical resources" and the system of intellectual resources actually involved in mathematical theories. Moreover, adult putatively-arithmetical resources are considered continuous with what we call "basic putatively-arithmetical resources". We first criticize this latter thesis, by claiming that these resources aren't based on numerical representations. We then criticize the former thesis by showing how counting and even more complex abilities, characteristically possessed by most adult human beings, do not suffice for having the concept of a natural number. We close by expounding on the significance of these findings in the context of conceptual engineering and with some recommendations for future empirical research in this area.
Talk by Hannes Leitgeb "Philosophy as Rational Reconstruction"
Time and place: Mar. 7, 2018 3:15 PM–5:00 PM, GM 652
Hannes Leitgeb (Munich) will give the talk "Philosophy as Rational Reconstruction"
Talk by Stephen Finlay: Defining Normativity
Time and place: Feb. 13, 2018 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652, University of Oslo
Abstract
This talk seeks to clarify debate over the nature, existence, extension, and analyzability of normativity, by investigating whether different philosophers’ claims are about the same subject or (as argued by Derek Parfit) they are using the terms ‘normative’ and ‘normativity’ with different meanings. While I suggest the term may be multiply ambiguous, I also find reasons for optimism about a common subject-matter for metanormative theory. This is supported by sketching a special hybrid view of normative judgment, perspectivism, that occupies a position between cognitivism and noncognitivism, naturalism and nonnaturalism, objectivism and subjectivism. I explore three main fissures: between (i) the “normativity” of language/thought versus that of facts and properties, (ii) abstract versus substantive, and (iii) formal versus robust normativity.
Talk by Shaun Nichols: Referential ambiguity and discretion
Time and place: Jan. 30, 2018 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, GM 652
Abstract
Eliminativist debates exhibit a familiar pattern in the history of philosophy. Eliminativists maintain that K doesn’t exist (where K might be morality, race, belief, etc.) because K is given its content by a false theory. This position is opposed by preservationists who say, in effect, Ks aren’t what we thought they were. Some philosophers maintain that the theory of reference will settle the issue between eliminativists and preservationists. In this talk, I’ll argue that (at least) two conventions regarding reference are available to speakers. This affords an interpretive flexibility which allows us to make sense of the apparent disagreement between eliminativists and preservationists by charitably interpreting them as assuming different reference conventions. In addition, once we allow that there are different reference conventions available, I suggest that we can take advantage of this in deciding which reference convention to use in a conversation.
Talk by Manuel Gustavo Isaac
Time and place: Jan. 16, 2018 10:15 AM–12:00 PM, Universitetet i Oslo
2017
Talk by Dragana Bozin:"Can conceptual engineering learn something from conceptual change in science?"
Time and place: Nov. 28, 2017 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM 652, University of Oslo
Abstract
Conceptual engineering is currently confined (mostly) to philosophy of language and ethics. Sally Haslanger’s work on gender and race concepts (1995 – 2016) or Kevin Scharp’s work on the concept of truth (2013) are often put forward as a notable examples.
Philosophy of science has been only marginally involved despite the fact that in science concepts are regularly revised or replaced by new ones. Brigandt & Rosario (2018) offer an example of how investigation of concept change in biology can give guidance on how conceptual engineering can be done. Brigandt & Rosario (2018) suggest that conceptual engineering can benefit from the practice (with the examples from biology) of viewing concepts as being used to pursue specific scientific aims where these aims set standards for comparison (and thus choice) between competing concepts.
Conceptual change in science is not always as orderly and as well behaved as in the instance above. Neither is it as well understood as the instance might suggest especially when the change is radical and runs counter everyday experiences (case of Minkowski spacetime for example). Still, scientific practice (past and present) is abundant with conceptual change and mining for clues might be worthwhile. I examine if conceptual change in exact sciences can give useful insight into the practice of conceptual engineering in other fields.
Talk by Andrew Peet: "Contrastive Communicative Intentions"
Time and place: Nov. 21, 2017 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM 652, University of Oslo
Abstract
I am sympathetic to the following rough picture of communication: In typical cases, a speaker has a proposition in mind which they intend to communicate to an audience. They perform an utterance with the intention that the audience recognise that, in performing the utterance, they intend the audience to entertain said proposition. The audience understands the speaker when they attribute the correct communicative intention to the speaker (and thereby recover the correct proposition). Furthermore, I am sympathetic to the closely related view that speaker intentions play a meta-semantic role: they determine the value a context sensitive term (such as a demonstrative) receives in context.
In this talk I consider two problems for this simple view of communication and metasemantics. The first, the so called “meaning intention problem”, suggests that the objects of speaker meaning cannot be propositions. The second, the problem of confused intentions, suggests that speaker intentions do not straightforwardly fix the values of context sensitive terms in context.
I argue that we can respond to these problems by achieving a better understanding of the structure of intentions more generally. I provide independent arguments for a contrastivist view of intentions, and provide a framework for interpreting this contrastivist view. I argue that the meaning intention problem and the problem of confused intentions can be satisfactorily resolved in this framework.
Seminar with Derek Ball
Time and place: Nov. 14, 2017 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM 652, University of Oslo
Talk by Lars Christie:"Understanding the meaning of "participation""
Time and place: Nov. 7, 2017 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM, 652
Abstract
Following a recent United Nations Security Council resolution, Norwegian parliament has made “participation” in terrorist organizations a criminal offence. In my talk I illustrate the different meanings given to the term “participation” by Norwegian lawgiver and by judges and point out that they oscillate between defining participation subjectively (determined purely by the defendant's mental states) and objectively (determined by the consequences of the defendant’s actions). This vacillation makes for poor law, I argue, since it becomes unclear what exactly the law intends to criminalize, and because it risks criminalizing the same behavior under two different description (for instance when the courts treats "intentional material contribution" and "participation" as two separate offences).
I suggest that the understanding of participation that best matches our everyday usage has at least two independently necessary (and perhaps jointly sufficient) conditions: a participatory intention on behalf of the participant and acceptance or recognition on behalf of fellow participants. As such, there can be no genuine instances of unintentional participation in an organization, nor can there any genuine instances of unrecognized participation. Because participation necessarily refers to the mental states of others than the aspiring participant, I argue that the concept is an inappropriate basis for legal and moral responsibility.
Talk by Esa Diaz-Leon: "On the Conceptual Mismatch Argument: Descriptions, Disagreement, and Amelioration"
Time and place: Oct. 31, 2017 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM 652
Abstract: According to “conceptual mismatch” arguments, if there is a conceptual mismatch between the descriptions associated with an ordinary concept and some features of the alleged referent, then that entity cannot be the referent. In this paper I would like to examine the structure and prospects of conceptual mismatch arguments of this sort. I will argue that these arguments point to some crucial methodological questions, such as how much divergence between our descriptions and the nature of the referent can be allowed, and I will put forward a new answer to this question, in terms of an appeal to normative considerations, which can be very helpful and even indispensable in order to settle matters of reference.
Seminar with Derek Ball
Time and place: Oct. 24, 2017 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM 652, University of Oslo
Seminar with Derek Ball
Time and place: Oct. 17, 2017 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM 652, University of Oslo
Talk by Gil Sagi: Logic and Natural Language
Time and place: Oct. 10, 2017 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM 652
Most of the contemporary research in logic is carried out with respect to formal, mathematical, languages. Logic, however, is said to be concerned with correct reasoning, and it is natural language that we usually reason in. Can logic keep its promise in the realm where its motivation originates? On the one hand, we have formal semanticists who study the logic of natural language, assuming it exists. On the other hand, some philosophers have denied that there is a logical consequence relation in natural language. Do they mean the same thing by ``logic’’?
The aim of this talk is twofold. First, I shall try to make sense of the question of logic in natural language in an interesting way. To this end I will refer to the works of Frege, Tarski, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, Montague, Glanzberg, among others. Second, I will propose an answer. An attempted positive response will resolve the normative aspects of logic and the descriptive aspects of natural language using a model from Frege on the normativity of logic. However, my ultimate answer to the question as explicated will be negative. Finally, I will gesture at a positive outlook based on Carnapian voluntarism.
Preread seminar on Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever "Broken Language"
Time and place: Sep. 26, 2017 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM 652, University of Oslo
Christopher Menzel: IN DEFENSE OF THE POSSIBILISM-ACTUALISM DISTINCTION
Time and place: Sep. 20, 2017 2:15 PM – 4:00 PM, Seminarrom 203 GM
Talk by Christopher Menzel (Texas A&M University).
Abstract
In his important book Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Timothy Williamson claims that “there is a widespread feeling of dissatisfaction with the possibilism-actualism [P-A] distinction” and, indeed, that usage of the terms 'possibilism' and 'actualism' “has become badly confused”. To rectify the situation, Williamson introduces distinction between necessitism and contingentism that he argues is free of the confusions that allegedly plague the P-A distinction. this talk I begin by discussing some of the historical antecedents of what I call the subsistence conception of the P-A distinction. I then turn to Williamson's attack on the P-A distinction and examine in particular two arguments that he sketches that purport to show that problems will arise for any proposed definition of the distinction; find both arguments wanting. I will then discuss Williamson's preferred necessitism-contingentism distinction and argue that the subsistence conception of the P-A distinction can be faithfully reconstructed within Williamson's necessitist framework and, hence, is no more confused or unsatisfying than his distinction. However, Williamson's framework does point to a genuine shortcoming in the subsistence conception, namely, that, as typically formulated, cannot force Williamson into the possibilist category where he belongs, despite his commitment to the existence of such classical possibilia as Wittgenstein's merely possible children. I close by proposing a new definition of the P-A distinction in terms of essential properties that avoids this shortcoming.
Preread seminar on Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever "Broken Language"
Time and place: Sep. 19, 2017 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM 652, University of Oslo
Talk by Teresa Marques: What Metalinguistic Negotiations Can't Do
Time and place: Sep. 12, 2017 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM 652
Abstract
Philosophers of language and metaethicists are concerned with persistent normative and evaluative disagreements – how can we explain persistent intelligible disagreements in spite of agreement over the described facts? Tim Sundell recently argued that evaluative aesthetic and personal taste disputes could be explained as metalinguistic negotiations – conversations where interlocutors negotiate how best to use a word relative to a context. I argue here that metalinguistic negotiations are neither necessary nor sufficient for genuine evaluative and normative disputes to occur. A comprehensive account of value talk requires stronger metanormative commitments than metalinguistic negotiations afford.
Talk by Mark Pinder: What is a fruitful explicatum?
Time and place: Sep. 5, 2017 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM 652
Mini workshop: Seumas Miller, Michael Robillard and Mitt Regan
Time and place: Aug. 22, 2017 10:15 AM – 3:00 PM, GM 652
Seumas Miller: "Institutionalising the Natural Right to Self-Defence, Military and Police Use of Lethal Force"
Abstract
In the first section of this paper I argue that there is a natural (moral) right to self-defense, a legal (institutional and moral) right to self-defence and a political (institutional and moral) right to collective self-defense, but that these moral rights do not mirror one another since the natural right to self-defense does not depend on a necessity condition, and the necessity condition upon which the legal right to self-defense rests differs importantly from the necessity condition upon which the right to collective self-defense rests.? In the second section I use this conception of the right to self-defence to illuminate the varying institutional and moral rights of military combatants and police officers to use lethal force.
Mitt Regan and Michael Robillard: "Targeted Killing and Black Boxes"
Abstract
The US targeted killing program has attracted considerable attention as a highly visible component of the US counterterrorism effort. Much of the commentary has focused on the use of remotely-piloted aircraft, or drones, to conduct operations. Beyond the use of this technology, however, the program raises more fundamental questions about the criteria that are used to determine who is liable to lethal force and the extent to which these criteria are publicly available.
These questions arise by virtue of the increasing prominence of asymmetric conflicts between states and non-state actors who are not readily identifiable as combatants. One approach to this challenge is to attempt to define the types of behavior by non-state actors that constitute the equivalent of being a soldier in uniform who may be targeted at any time. In other words, the aim is to use conduct to define status. The relevant conduct is described in general terms, but states are loath to be more specific for fear that non-state adversaries may vary their behavior to avoid liability to harm. This raises the prospect, however, that individuals may lack notice about what conduct can subject them to lethal force, which is an important moral requirement for inflicting such harm.
Another approach is to eschew any effort to use conduct to define the status of non-state combatant, and to base targeting only on direct participation in hostilities. While this standard is not free from ambiguity, there is more of a consensus about what conduct satisfies it than what makes someone a non-state combatant. This standard, however, elides the fact that modern terrorism is conducted by organized armed groups and not simply unconnected individuals who engage in one-off acts of terror.
The controversy over drone strikes thus starkly illustrates the challenges that arise when we can no longer base targeting on the stipulation that someone in uniform constitutes a threat. Efforts to construct the status of non-state combatant pose difficulties that threaten to undermine the moral basis of targeting. Providing greater publicity about targeting criteria, or limiting liability to demonstrably hostile conduct, however, threaten to seriously undermine counterterrorism efforts. Seen through this lens, drone strikes raise fundamental issues about the nature of modern asymmetric conflict.
Talk Emily McWilliams
Time and place: June 29, 2017 4:15 PM – 6:00 PM, GM 652
Emily McWilliams (Harvard University).
Talk by Gabriel Rabin
Time and place: June 29, 2017 2:15 PM – 4:00 PM, GM 652
Gabriel Rabin (New York University).
Talk by Mark Richard: Stipulation
Time and place: June 22, 2017 2:15 PM – 4:00 PM, GM 652
Abstract
Positivists like Carnap thought that logical –and even set theoretic –truths were analytic because they were 'true by convention’. If so, it was assumed, they would be knowable a priori, and thus we would have an account of the certainty of logical and mathematical truth. I think many, perhaps most, philosophers think that Quine had a point when he argued (in ’Truth by Convention' and ‘Carnap and Logical Truth') that the notion of analyticity can't do the epistemological work the positivists had hoped it could. But I also think many, perhaps most, philosophers are convinced that Quine was wrong, when he argued in ’Two Dogmas' that the notion of analyticity was in one or another way empty. After all, it seems obvious that we can just stipulate that a novel phrase is to mean what some some other phrase means. Wouldn't that make some sentences involving the phrases analytic and thus a priori?
The thought here is that: (a) logical truth is analytic; (b) we have, in principle at least, stipulative control over what our words mean; (c) given (a) and (b) we are in position via stipulation to gain a priori knowledge. I have doubts about (b) and (c), and in this talk I’ll air them. I won't directly attack (a), though I observe that if what I say is correct, it probably provides ground for rejecting (a) as well.
Talk by Samia Hesni (MIT): "Leave-Taking and Illocutionary Frustration"
Time and place: June 21, 2017 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM 652
Abstract
This paper gives an argument against Rae Langton’s notion of illocutionary silencing, and proposes a new category of linguistic harm: that of illocutionary frustration. Specifically, I challenge Langton’s claim that silencing occurs when there is a lack of uptake of the speaker’s illocutionary act. I argue this by looking at two similar scenarios that Langton’s view treats differently, and argue that these scenarios actually warrant the same kind of analysis; Langton’s notion of silencing can’t capture the difference she wants it to capture. I propose instead that we should look to felicity conditions to explain the phenomenon allegedly captured by silencing. I then consider a case study of leave-taking (or, conversation ending) as an example of linguistic interaction that is best accommodated by my proposed view.
Talk by Katharina Felka: Slurs in indirect speech reports
Time and place: June 20, 2017 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM 652
Katharina Felka (University of Zurich).
Abstract
Slurs are expressions that degrade a certain group of people due to their membership in the group. In the literature there are two rival theories regarding the question of how exactly slurs derogate members of a certain group, semantic and pragmatic theories. According to semantic theories, slurs degrade due to their content, while according to pragmatic theories, derogation is a matter of what is conveyed with the utterance of a slur, rather than with its content. In my talk I will argue that the behaviour of slurs in indirect speech reports speaks in favour of a pragmatic theory of slurs.
Talk by Alexander Steinberg
Time and place: June 13, 2017 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM 652
Alexander Steinberg (University of Zurich).
Talk by Vera Flocke
Time and place: June 8, 2017 2:15 PM – 4:00 PM, GM 652
Vera Flocke (New York University).
Talk by Emily McWilliams
Time and place: June 1, 2017 2:15 PM – 4:00 PM, GM 652
Emily McWilliams (Harvard University).
Talk by Matt McKeever: "A Semantic Problem For Stage Theory"
Time and place: May 24, 2017 2:15 PM – 4:00 PM, GM 652
Matt McKeever (University of St Andrews) will give the talk: "A Semantic Problem For Stage Theory"
Abstract
Stage theory, a theory about the metaphysics of persistence defended by--inter alia--Katherine Hawley and Ted Sider, crucially involves some semantic claims. I assess these claims in the light of contemporary semantic theory and in particular the theory of tense, and show that they are untenable, and that therefore stage theory is false.
Talk by Christoph Kelp
Time and place: May 18, 2017 2:15 PM – 4:00 PM, GM 652
Christoph Kelp (University of Glasgow).
Preread seminar for workshop on Descartes, Modality and Conceivability
Time and place: May 16, 2017 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM 652
In preparation for the workshop, there's also a pre-read seminar next Tues 16th ( 10.15am -12 in GM652), which I will lead. The reading is from Jim Conant's fascinating (but long!) essay 'The search for Logically Alien Thought: Descartes, Kant, Frege and the Tractatus'.
This provides the background for the workshop exchange between Moore and Conant, especially the intro and first section (pp.115-125), which I will focus on in the seminar. I very much recommend reading the rest, however, especially to those interested in Frege and (early) Wittgenstein on the nature of logic. It's also a great paper if you'd like a relatively bite-size narrative--contestable of course--connecting certain instrumental assumptions of 20th century conceptual/linguistic engineers with those of earlier figures.
The focus of the Moore-Conant workshop exchange is the relations between necessity, possibility and human concepts, in Cartesian epistemology and elsewhere. Conant's earlier paper focuses on logical-conceptual limits but the central themes are much the same. In place of an abstract, a couple of excerpts from Conant's LAT paper:
- What is the status of the laws of logic, the most basic laws of thought?
- Wherein does their necessity lie?
- In what sense does the negation of a basic law of logic represent an impossibility
The Scholastics were forced to think hard about these questions since they believed in the existence of an omnipotent God for whom all things are possible. If God is omnipotent does that mean that He has the power to abrogate the laws of logic?
The Scholastics, on the whole, were quite reluctant to draw this conclusion. But does that then mean that God is not all-powerful, that there is a limit to his power, that there is something he cannot do? …. Posed here in a theological guise is a version of a question that has continued to haunt philosophy up until the present: do the laws of logic impose a limit which we run up against in our thinking?
If so, what kind of a limit is this? Do their negations represent something that we cannot do or that cannot be? If so, what sort of "cannot" is this? (p116)
…certain classic papers of Putnam and Quine offer perhaps the closest thing to be found in twentieth century philosophy to an attempt to rehabilitate Descartes...In a move which is characteristic of much of contemporary naturalistic thought (both in and out of the academy), science is substituted for God.
Cartesianism in the philosophy of logic, freed of its theological trappings, becomes the view that it would be hubris for us to assert of the ongoing activity of scientific inquiry that it will be forever bound by the laws of classical logic-those principles which happen to be most fundamental to our present conceptual scheme.
The contrast is now no longer, as in Descartes, between the finite powers of man and the omnipotence of God, but rather between the finite limits of present scientific thought and the infinite possibilities latent in the future of science as such. (pp.123-4)
Talk by Patrick Greenough: Plastic Meaning and Reality Engineering
Time and place: May 11, 2017 2:15 PM – 4:00 PM, Gm 652
Patrick Greenough (University of St Andrews)
Abstract
On the one hand, the way we report disagreements (and agreements) tends to suggest that the meaning of the terms used is constant across the dispute—even if this dispute is temporally distant. On the other hand, we speak as if our terms can change their meaning. Moreover, reflection on a use-theory of meaning, plus how we use various terms over time, also seems to show that our terms can change in meaning. Call that The Meaning-Constancy Puzzle. Without an adequate response to this puzzle, what may be termed Semantic Engineering, whereby we engineer better meanings for defective terms, is dead in the water. In the first part of this talk, I look at (the virtues and vices of) five responses to the puzzle: Contextualism, Speech-Act Pluralism, Temporal Externalism, The Coarse Topic View, and the Plastic Meaning View. All these responses, bar Temporal Externalism, allow for meaning change in one form or another. In the second part of this talk, I explore The Plastic Meaning View in more detail. In particular, I assess whether it allows us to make sense of two things: plastic kinds and, what may be termed, Reality Engineering. If I have time, I will look at how The Plastic Meaning View can accommodate a causal-historical theory of reference, and thereby allow that this theory be properly integrated with a use-theory of meaning.
One-day workshop on Bradley J. Strawser’s forthcoming book "The Bounds of Defense: Killing, Moral Responsibility, and War
Time and place: Mar. 28, 2017 9:30 AM – 2:00 PM, GM 652
On behalf of ConceptLab, we have the pleasure to invite you to a one-day workshop on Bradley J. Strawser’s forthcoming book "The Bounds of Defense: Killing, Moral Responsibility, and War”.
The workshop is divided into four sections with four respondents. Each respondent will provide a 15 min comment, followed by a 30 min plenary discussion. To receive the full book manuscript, please register your attendance to Lina Tosterud. The chapters which will receive primary attention are chapters 1 -3 (mainly before lunch) and chapters 6-7 (mainly after lunch).
Program
- Intro by Bradley J. Strawser ( Naval Postgraduate School)
- Comments by Lars Christie "The moral status of non-culpable threateners" (UiO/Oxford University)
- Comments by Andreas Carlsson " Moral Responsibility, Ignorance, and War" (UiO)
- Comments Susanne Burri "The Evidence-Relative View of Liability" (London School of Economics)
- Comments Michael Robillard TBA(Oxford University)
About the book
In The Bounds of Defense, Bradley J. Strawser examines a set of related moral issues in war: when it is permissible to kill in defense of others; what moral responsibility would be required to be liable for such defensive killing; how that permission can extend to whole groups of people; and lastly what values undergird the permissibility of that defense, such as individual autonomy.
Strawser argues for a rights-based account of permissible defensive harm, and an “evidence-relative” basis for holding one liable to harm. His view is that in order to be properly responsible for an unjust harm, one must act wrongly according to the evidence available. If one acts justly according to the available evidence, and does not fail to properly attend to that evidence, then they are not liable to defensive harm—even if they are mistaken and actually pose a threat of unjust harm themselves.
Extending this view, Strawser explores how such a rights-based model can make sense of the wide-spread destructive harms of war. He endorses a revisionist approach to just war theory, according to which all soldiers can be held individually morally responsible for the cause their side fights for, and argues in its defense; and he also shows how his evidence-relative account supports revisionist just war theory by better grounding it in the real world of modern warfare. Lastly, he offers a new proposal for how targeting in war could better align with respect for the rights of individual persons, and demonstrates how revisionist just war theory—and any rights-respecting just war account more broadly—could conceivably work in practical ways.
Bios
- Bradley J, Strawser an Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. He is also a Research Associate at Oxford University’s Institute for Ethics, Law, and Armed Conflict (ELAC) in Oxford, UK.
- Andreas Brekke Carlsson is a researcher at ConceptLab, UiO and the Secretary The Norwegian Ethics Council of the Defense Sector (Etisk råd for forsvarssektoren)
- Susanne Burri is an Assistant Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Her primary research interests include the ethics of war, the philosophy of death, and moral decision-making under risk and uncertainty.
- Lars Christie is a researcher at ConceptLab, UiO and a postdoctoral research fellow at Oxford Institute of Ethics and Law in Armed Conflict (ELAC). Prior to earning his PhD he worked for the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, serving as a diplomat in Islamabad and Jerusalem.
- Michael Robillard is a postdoctoral research fellow at Oxford's Uehiro Center for Practical Ethics as part of the European Research Council Advanced Grant on collective responsibility and global terrorism. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Connecticut in 2016. Prior to that, he was a resident research fellow at the Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership at the United States Naval Academy. Michael’s past research has focused on the overlap between normative theories of exploitation and present-day military recruitment. He has also written on the ethics of autonomous weapons as well war and its relation to future generations. Michael is an Iraq War veteran, United States Military Academy graduate, and former Airborne Ranger.
Joost Jacob Vecht: Partial Mastery of Mathematics
Time and place: Mar. 7, 2017 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM 652
Abstract
I aim to develop a theory of partial mastery of a mathematical concept, and to establish how and when we attribute partial mastery to someone.This is not done from any established metaphysical theory, but from an investigation of partial mastery attribution in historical practice.Starting from a case study of Newton, Leibniz and Cauchy, I argue that the frequent re-interpretation of historical mathematicians offers an argument for an attributive, projective theory of concepts, and against more Fregean theories of grasping fixed concepts.
Andrew Peet: Knowledge Yielding Communication
Time and place: Feb. 14, 2017 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM 652
Abstract
An understanding of the communicative preconditions for the acquisition of testimonial knowledge ('knowledge yielding communication') is essential for a complete epistemology of testimony. It is also crucial for a proper assessment of a number of (both normative and descriptive) projects in the philosophy of mind and language. Yet the existing approaches, in so far as they can be treated as accounts of knowledge yielding communication, are inadequate. I will outline the inadequacies of the current approaches and develop an alternative: an anti-luck view of knowledge yielding communication.
Herman Cappelen "Fixing Language: Conceptual Engineering and the Limits of Revision"
Time and place: Feb. 7, 2017 10:15 AM – 11:45 AM, GM 652
Forth of four read ahead sessions of Herman Cappelen's book manuscript: Fixing Language: Conceptual Engineering and the Limits of Revision .Manuscript available on request.
This fourth Meeting is on Part IV.
Herman Cappelen "Fixing Language: Conceptual Engineering and the Limits of Revision"
Time and place: Jan. 31, 2017 10:15 AM – 11:45 AM, GM 652
Third of four read ahead sessions of Herman Cappelen's book manuscript: Fixing Language: Conceptual Engineering and the Limits of Revision. Manuscript available on request.
This third Meeting is on Part III.
Herman Cappelen "Fixing Language: Conceptual Engineering and the Limits of Revision"
Time and place: Jan. 20, 2017 10:15 AM – 11:45 AM, GM 652
Second of four read ahead sessions of Herman Cappelen's book manuscript: Fixing Language: Conceptual Engineering and the Limits of Revision. Manuscript available on request.
This second Meeting is on Part II.
Herman Cappelen "Fixing Language: Conceptual Engineering and the Limits of Revision"
Time and place: Jan. 17, 2017 10:15 AM – 11:45 AM, GM 652
First of four read ahead sessions of Herman Cappelen's book manuscript: Fixing Language: Conceptual Engineering and the Limits of Revision. Manuscript available on request.
This first Meeting is on Part I.
2016
The Invention of Practical Concepts and its Limits
"Conceptual Loss in Philosophical Thinking" by visiting speaker Katrin Flickschuh
Time and place: Dec. 13, 2016 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM652
Abstract
In his book, 'Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation' Jonathan Lear explores the experience of conceptual loss undergone by the Crow Indians as a result of their enforced move from a nomadic life style onto settled reservations conditions. In consequence of that move, the Crow lost their nomadic practises and concepts -- according to Lear, they lost their world. Lear diagnoses conceptual loss as a 'permanent human possibility'. My interest is in the possibility of conceptual loss in political and philosophical thinking. Can we 'lose' our philosophical concepts, and if so, what 'happens' when we do? I shall explore this question on the basis of the role of conceptual loss in modern African philosophical thinking and how loss of concepts in that context should impact our understanding of our own philosophical thinking.
Herman Cappelen "Fixing Language: Conceptual Engineering and the Limits of Revision"
Time and place: Dec. 6, 2016 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, Room 652 in Georg Morgenstiernes hus
This is a read ahead session: we will discuss Chapters 4-8 of Cappelen’s book manuscript: Fixing Language: Conceptual Engineering and the Limits of Revision.
Talk by Anna Smajdor: What is infertility?
Time and place: Nov. 22, 2016 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, Room 652 in Georg Morgenstiernes hus
Abstract
Some years ago, it was claimed that the development of a particular new reproductive technology would ‘end infertility’. For an ethicist, it might seem that the task is simply to consider whether this is a desirable goal or not. However, there is prior work to be done here, since before ascertaining the ethical status of ending infertility, we must first establish what it is that we mean when we use the term. In this paper I will look at the various ways in which infertility can be understood and the ways in which it might be ended. When analysing the concept of infertility, one unavoidably runs up against additional connected concepts, such as fertility and reproduction, as well as problems arising from the ways that these concepts relate to one another in determining what constitutes medical need in this context. If we are to evaluate claims about the ‘end of infertility’ and to accept the implicit mandate for the pursuit of scientific avenues of research that will bring this about, it is important to be able to think clearly about the concepts with which we are working. I will show that the concept of infertility is itself unstable and this instability has infected a number of related concepts, which combine to leave reproductive medicine enmeshed in a tangle of confused and inconsistent policies and practices.
Talk by Dragana Bozin
Time and place: Nov. 15, 2016 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, Room 652 in Georg Morgenstiernes hus
Talk by Michael Morreau: Reverse engineering concepts: lessons from natural language
Time and place: Nov. 1, 2016 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, Room 652 in Georg Morgenstiernes hus
Abstract
Many expressions of natural languages are interpreted differently by different people. Familiar steps can be taken to avoid equivocation. Members of a selection panel can for example coordinate interpretations of expressions such as ’excellent’, ’good’ and ’poor’ before exchanging opinions among themselves about which job candidates fall into these categories. In fact, though, diverse interpretations of evaluative language and the resulting partly verbal differences of opinion can be highly productive, enabling properly constituted groups of evaluators to arrive at finer-grained rankings and better choices and decisions. Indeed, groups of of low ability individuals with different standards for awarding scores and grades can outperform less diverse groups with higher individual ability. The talk explores a mechanism by which this can occur and draws some surprising consequences for the design of committees and panels.
Talk by Nils Roll-Hansen: "Fremskritt i empirisk vitenskap: Pasteurs eksperimenter om “spontan generasjon”".
Time and place: Oct. 25, 2016 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, OBS: Room 452 in Georg Morgenstiernes hus.
Talk by Delia Belleri: "Two species of merely verbal disputes"
Time and place: Oct. 11, 2016 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM 652, University of Oslo
Talk by Delia Belleri (University of Hamburg/University of Vienna).
Abstract
The primary aim of this paper is that of distinguishing two typologies of merely verbal disputes, taking a characterization recently proposed by Carrie Jenkins as a point of departure. I will distinguish between faultless and faulty merely verbal disputes. Faulty merely verbal disputes are likely to evolve into metalinguistic disputes, where a further distinction could be traced between futile and non-futile metalinguistic issues. The secondary aim of the paper is that of drawing some considerations concerning the debate between deflationism and antideflationism on ontological disputes. The deflationist should argue that ontological disputes are either merely verbal and faultless, or merely verbal and faulty, but capable to yield only a futile metalinguistic dispute. By resisting to both these strategies, I will develop a new argument against the version of deflationism defended by Eli Hirsch.
Talk by Brian Epstein: Biko on Black vs. Non-white
Time and place: Sep. 6, 2016 10:15 AM – 12:00 PM, GM, room 652
Abstract
This paper examines Steve Biko’s distinction between black and non-white as a project in conceptual engineering. I explore the difference between descriptive and ameliorative conceptual analysis, and show how Biko’s distinction illuminates these approaches to concepts. I also work to clarify the relations among social kinds, our concepts, and words in our language to help explain what ameliorative conceptual analysis can accomplish, and consider some notable differences between Biko’s proposal and other recent ameliorative analyses.
Talk by Brian Epstein: A Framework for Social Ontology
Time and place: Sep. 5, 2016 12:15 PM – 2:00 PM, Georg Morgenstiernes hus, 6th floor, room 652
Abstract
This paper sets out an organizing framework for the field of social ontology—the study of the nature of the social world. The subject matter of social ontology is clarified, in particular the difference between it and the study of causal relations and the explanation of social phenomena. Two different inquiries are defined and explained: the study of the grounding of social facts, and the study of how social categories are “anchored” or set up. The distinction between these inquiries is used to clarify prominent programs in social theory, particularly theories of practice and varieties of individualism.
Talk by Sam Roberts
Time and place: June 3, 2016 2:15 PM – 3:30 PM, Georg Morgenstiernes hus: Seminarrom 203
Peter Fritz
Time: May 19, 2016 12:15 PM – 1:45 PM
Patrick Greenough: Is 'knows' incoherent?
"Is 'knows' incoherent?" by Visiting Speaker Patrick Greenough (St Andrews)
Time: May 10, 2016 10:15 AM – 11:45 AM
Knut Skarsaune
Time: Apr. 26, 2016
Non-Combatant Liability in War
Time: Apr. 12, 2016
- "Non-Combatant Liability in War" by Helen Frowe
- "Method in the morality of war" by Seth Lazar
Carnapian explication as an ameliorative project
Time: Mar. 15, 2016 10:15 AM – 11:45 AM
"Carnapian explication as an ameliorative project: logic and social change" by Visiting Speaker Catarina Dutilh Novaes (University of Groningen).
Gettier and the method of explication
Time: Mar. 1, 2016 10:15 AM – 11:45 AM
- "Gettier and the method of explication: a 60 year old solution to a 50 year old problem" by Erik J. Olsson
- "Explication Defended" by Patrick Maher (Herman Cappelen)
Dual-Character Concepts, Generics and Gender
Time: Feb. 16, 2016 10:15 AM – 11:45 AM
- "Hilary Clinton is the only man in the Obama Administration": Dual-Character Concepts, Generics and Gender by Sarah-Jane Leslie
- "Definitional Generics" by Manfred Krifka (Rachel Sterken)
Generics and Conceptual Engineering
Rachel Sterken.
Time: Feb. 4, 2016 12:15 PM – 1:45 PM
What is conceptual engineering?
Cappelen, Linnebo, and Serck-Hanssen.
Time: Jan. 19, 2016 10:15 AM – 11:45 AM