Our research themes

Introduction to the project

In any inquiry, whether scientific or practical, we use concepts to frame questions about reality. An obvious way in which the inquiry can be successful is by yielding answers to the resulting questions. A far less obvious form of success has to do with asking the “right” questions, formulated using the “right” concepts.

It is clear that many great leaps in human insight and understanding have been associated with the forging of “better” concepts, which has enabled us to ask “better” questions: in physics, the differentiation of weight and mass; in mathematics, the Cantorian notion of “size” or number; in economics, the articulation of the present concept of money; in social science the concept of gender, as opposed to sex.

These are illustrations of how conceptual progress has been made in the past. Here are some questions of great contemporary relevance and promise:

• What should our concepts of e.g. a ‘combatant’, ‘mental illness’ or ‘privacy’ be? 
• Does the liar paradox show that our ordinary concept of truth is deficient? 
• What should our concept of marriage be? Should it cover same-sex couples or not?
• Is the customary division of the political landscape into a simple left-right spectrum an obstacle to clear thinking about the political life?

Our three main research themes are (i) the general theoretical framework, (ii) the theoretical cases, (iii) the practical/social applications.

Theoretical Framework

A theoretical framework will start by addressing two fundamental questions: In what ways can concepts be defective? And what ameliorative strategies are there? The  answers to these questions trigger a number of challenges, some of which are outlined below.

Varieties of conceptual deficiencies

We can, as an initial heuristic, divide the study of conceptual (or, more broadly, representational) deficiencies into two categories: practical and theoretical. In each of these categories there are rich critical traditions to draw on. One the practical side, the deficiencies include the following:

• Moral and social effects: Concepts can, according to some views, help sustain social injustice. One central thought is this: the way we organize social structure is sustained, in part, by the conceptual structure used for thinking and talking about them. So construed, our concepts should not be thought of as neutral devices for describing a social reality already there, but as partially constitutive of that reality. Relevant case studies include gender and race concepts, the concept of ‘marriage’, the history of the concept of ‘rape’ (whose legal definition once excluded forced intercourse within marriage), ‘mental illness’ and ‘combatant’. According to recent collaborative work between philosopher and psychologists (Leslie, forthc.), the use of certain categories of expressions – so-called 'generics' – lead people to over-generalise in ways that generate social prejudice
• Intrapersonal effects: Our concepts organize how we think of ourselves and how we conceive of what is possible for us. As a result, our conceptual repertoire has the capacity to restrict and degrade our potentials as human beings.
• Objectionable presuppositions: Some expressions, such as pejoratives, have contents which make the very use of them objectionable (given certain value systems.)

The theoretical deficiencies include the following:

• Lack of Semantic Foundation: Complete lack of semantic foundation results in what some philosophers call nonsense or meaninglessness.
• Superimposed concepts: These are cases where what ought to be distinct concepts are bundled together as a single concept in a way that leads to cognitive confusion.This observation was systematically discussed by Kant, who argues that much of the earlier philosophical tradition based their views on such equivocations.
• Inconsistency: On some views, concepts can be inconsistent. This was arguably Tarski’s own view of the concept of truth when he suggested that “colloquial language” is inconsistent (1936).  
• Non-naturalness: According to a contemporary tradition deriving in large part from Lewis, a conceptual structure can be deficient when it fails to ‘carve reality at the joints’.

The exhaustiveness of these lists as well as each of these (alleged) deficiencies will in the course of our project be subject to careful systematic and historical investigation.

Strategies for Conceptual Improvement  

What should we do when we discover that a concept we use is defective? As a working hypothesis we divide reactions into four broad categories:

• Abandonment: in some cases the right reaction is simply never to use the term again.  
• Amelioration: We can try to improve the concept by fixing its deficiencies. This is, for example, the motivation behind Carnapian explication: you start with a concept that is defective (in this case vague and indeterminate). It is also for example Sally Haslanger’s attitude towards race and gender concepts: central to her work are suggestions for how to improve these concepts for social and political reasons.
• Splitting: Another option is to split superimposed or conflated concepts into their components. This plays a central role in Kant's philosophy, but is also applicable to many of our formal concepts such as 'object', 'infinity', and 'negation'.
• Reconciliation: We might opt to live with the deficiency in cases where the cure is worse than the disease. Likely examples include vagueness (if it is ineliminable and a deficiency, as Frege and Carnap thought) and what Chalmers (2011) calls ‘bedrock’ concepts (if some of these are deficient).

Central research questions about the general theoretical framework

Each deficiency and ameliorative strategy is intrinsically interesting, but the goal of the project is to show that they are best approached systematically rather than in a piecemeal fashion. What is needed – and what is currently missing – is an overarching theoretical framework for thinking in a systematic and unified way about deficiencies and strategies for improvement. There might be several, competing such frameworks. In developing these, central challenges include the following:

• What is difference between amelioration and a change of topic?

This concern goes back to Strawson’s objection to Carnap’s notion of explication. In response to the idea that Carnapian explication is central to philosophy, Strawson says, “..to offer formal explanations of key terms of scientific theories to one who seeks philosophical illumination of essential concepts of non-scientific discourse, is to do something utterly irrelevant—is a sheer misunderstanding, …typical philosophical problems about the concepts used in non-scientific discourse cannot be solved by laying down the rules of exact and fruitful concepts in science. To do this last is not to solve the typical philosophical problem, but to change the subject.” Put somewhat differently: if we change both the extension and intension of a concept, isn’t it incoherent to think we still have ‘the same concept’? This we take to be a central challenge to the project of conceptual engineering.

           One of our working hypotheses is that answering this challenge requires an understanding of ‘sameness of topic’. We will explore the idea that this notion cuts across concepts with differing extensions – i.e. you can preserve topic even when you have substituted for, say marriage or truth a concept with a new extension. What counts as the pursuing the same topic is massively context sensitive – in the same way that same-saying is context sensitive.

           We will also pursue the thought that in some cases we want a change in topic. We don’t want to answer old questions because intellectual progress is made by a shift in meaning. An example concerns the disentangling of the concepts of weight and mass. A central question in this context is when old questions should be abandoned. We often think of progress as a matter of better answers to old questions, but sometimes progress is best ensured by asking (and answering) new questions.

• Holism and remote interlocking concepts

The legal notion of ‘negligence’ has ‘knowledge’ as parameter: so revising ‘know’ will have implications for our understanding of negligence. All of the concepts used as illustrations above are interlocked with other concepts in ways that are difficult to disentangle. A revision in ‘truth’, ‘freedom’, or in social terms gender or race, will have cascading effects on remote interlocking concepts. How should a revisionist react to the discovery of such connections?  

• The implementation Challenge

How does one implement conceptual change? At first glance, it will seem that this depends on whether one’s aim is large scale social revision, or a more restricted small-scale revision. Think of Large-scale revision as those that aim to revise or otherwise change the meaning of a natural-language term. This is massively difficult to achieve and strategies for doing it will vary a great deal. Since ordinary language meaning supervenes on a pattern of use in inscrutable ways, it is difficult to develop effective general strategies. We are not in a position to speculate on whether and how large scale revision might work and instead recognize the need for empirical studies of these matters. Small-scale linguistic revision are less challenging to implement. Here one could start in a particular context (theoretical, legal, medical, political, etc) with a restricted audience in mind, and for that particular purpose try to effect a revision. In such targeted contexts, changes can be implemented more easily and in more scrutable ways.  

• The Unification Challenge

This challenge is closely related to the previous one: Is there a fundamental distinction between conceptual revisions/innovations in the theoretical domain (e.g. within a science or a smaller scientific community) and in the practical (e.g. political, legal or social) domain? This question will be explored throughout the project. Our working hypothesis is that the general kinds of deficiencies are the same in both domains and the general strategies for amelioration are the same. However, implementation is significantly more challenging in the practical domain. So our hypothesis is that there is difference in how easy implementation is, but no fundamental structural difference.

A related unification-challenge can be articulated in terms of the norms involved in amelioration: Are these unified across different domains? Is it only instrumental normativity? Our working hypothesis is that the activity of ameliorating concepts can be appropriately assessed by any kind of norm and that hypothesis will be tested throughout the project.

• Why keep the lexical item when doing so is likely to generate verbal disputes?  

The two strategies sketched above - large and small-scale revision- face a similar challenge: why keep the same linguistic expression when you are changing the meaning? Wouldn’t it be easier simply to mark the distinction in meaning by a distinction in lexical item? (This is a version of the Change of topic challenge above). One of our working hypotheses is that answering this challenge requires understanding the communicative importance of lexical items themselves. We mentioned above that there can be a change in extension while we preserve topic. Keeping the lexical item is a way to flag that we are talking about the same topic. Second, someone using an expression, E, can do so for the lexical effects. Even if there’s a change of topic, the preservation of the lexical effects can be worth it for pragmatic reasons. One way to think of this: The positive effects of using that expression overrides the danger of verbal disputes. One goal of our work will be to develop notions of ‘lexical effects’ and ‘sameness of topic’ that can serve the theoretical roles just sketched.

• The nature of concepts  

The theoretical framework for conceptual engineering will have to incorporate an account  of what concepts are. There is a long tradition, both in philosophy and psychology, for thinking about the nature of concepts. Our work will draw on these traditions. However, we also expect that feedback can go in both directions: a theory of concepts will slowly emerge from a theory of conceptual engineering. It is indisputable that our representations of reality change over time and can be influenced by our linguistic decisions. Understanding that process can provide a foothold for a  theory of concepts. We want such a theory to be dynamic in a way that leaves room for conceptual engineering of the kind we explore with throughout the project. In short, one of our working hypotheses is that we can theorize about conceptual engineering with a minimum of initial assumptions about the metaphysics of concepts and that more substantive conceptions of concepts, will emerge from understanding conceptual engineering.

    That said, there are a number of traditional issues about concepts that will be addressed along the way and two of these are particularly important:  (i) Does conceptual engineering require that there be a clear-cut distinction between analytic truths and synthetic truths (or justification)? (ii) How does the difference between externalist and internalist frameworks affect the way we think about conceptual engineering?  

Formal concepts

A major part of our project will concern what may be called “formal concepts”. These are very abstract concepts of a loosely logico-mathematical character, which play a crucial role in structuring our all of our thinking and theorizing, including about the natural world. The chief examples of formal concepts that we will consider are: truth, object, infinity, collection (or set), and negation.

Our distinctive core hypothesis is that some closely related but different concepts have been conflated in ways that result in paradoxes or other pathologies. (This idea figures centrally also in the work of Kant.) Progress can be made by disentangling coherent successor concepts. This will involve carefully articulating “job descriptions” for the various successor concepts. Suppose we articulate two distinct “job descriptions”. One possible development is that we find two concepts which can do the two jobs, respectively. Another possible development is that only one of the “jobs” is found to be necessary, while the other can be abandoned. This makes it easier to find a concept that satisfies the necessary but stripped-down “job description”. Examples of both kinds of development will be given below.

Infinity

Loosely speaking, something is infinite if it is too large to be measured. But measured by what? With the 19th century mathematical revolution due to Cantor, two different answers became available: (i) measured by a natural number, or (ii) by one of Cantor’s “transfinite” numbers. The two different answers give rise to two different notions of infinity, which were superimposed until Cantor’s discoveries allowed them to be disentangled. Unfortunately, in subsequent theoretical developments, only one of these notions is put to active use, namely the one tied to answer (i).

We argue there are good reasons to retain the other notion as well, which has a lot in common with the ancient Aristotelian notion of potential infinity. This investigation was initiated in Linnebo’s ERC project (see his CV), but further progress can be made by exploring other aspects of the resulting view, such as connections with Dummett (1991)’s influential notion of indefinite extensibility, as well as the use of intuitionistic logic to reflect the thesis that the hierarchy of sets and numbers is merely potential in its existence, never actual. We will also seek inspiration from Kant, who anticipated many of the relevant ideas.  

Collection

The concept of set--or, more generally, collection--is central to mathematics and logic. Our hypothesis is again that two distinct ideas have been superimposed: (i) a “combinatorial” conception of a collection, which holds that a collection as constituted by its arbitrarily chosen elements; and (ii) an “intensional” conception, which holds that a collection as constituted by its conceptually articulated membership criterion. We believe that mathematical and philosophical progress can be made by disentangling these concepts. Instead of operating with a single “job description” for a concept, which no single concept of collection can satisfy, we can articulate two distinct “job descriptions”, each of which is satisfied by one of the mentioned concepts of collection.

In order explore and hopefully confirm this hypothesis, we need to:

• develop a good theory of intensional collections (a theory of properties)
• explore the use of intuitionistic logic for this purpose
• explore the phenomenon of nominalization and the relation between how properties figure as semantic values of predicates and as referents of singular terms

Furthermore, we distinguish two conceptions of generality which mirrors that between two conceptions of collection:

• a “combinatorial” conception, on which “All Fs are Gs” reduces to a conjunction of facts about each and every F to the effect that it is G. This validates classical logic.
• an “intensional” conception, on which truths of the form “All Fs are Gs” hold because it is in the essence or nature of Fs to be G. This likely validate no more than intuitionistic logic.

This distinction between two forms of generality is potentially important in connection with another central concern of our project, namely the analysis and significance of “generics”.

Truth

Our hypothesis is once again that two distinct notions of truth have been conflated and that progress can be made by separating them:

• a deflationary notion, on  which truth is merely a device for “disquotation”. (Thus, “snow is white” is true just in case snow is white.)
• a genuinely semantic or representational notion, on which a statement is true just in case it represents reality as it is. (The Tarskian approach to truth provides a good first approximation.)

Our hypothesis is that the deflationary notion of truth is in fact dispensable. This allows us to articulate a “job description” for a concept of truth from which deflationary requirements have been hived off. We believe the semantic concept of truth satisfies this stripped-down “job description surprisingly well.  

The concept of truth figures in the analysis of many other concepts (so-called “remote interlocking concepts”) This restricts our ability to fix or replace the concept of truth. We will explore whether the proposed emphasis on one of the constituents of the ordinary notion of truth is legitimate.

Further, we explore whether the notion of indefinite extensibility (from 5b) can be brought to bear on the analysis of truth and the semantic paradoxes. This may yield a powerful alternative to the “contextualism” about truth developed by T. Burge, C. Parsons, and others. We explore accounts of propositions understood as the fundamental bearers of truth. Our hypothesis is that, for any definite domain, we can find propositions that take us beyond this domain. However, when the domain is understood as indefinite, our hypothesis is that this move can be blocked.

Object

People have been conflating many different ideas under the heading of “object”, which has caused much confusion in metaphysics and the philosophy of science. The different ideas include:

• concreteness (that is, being located in space and time, and being causally efficacious)
• being a physical body, with spatiotemporal cohesiveness and natural boundaries
• a purely logical notion of object, subject only to the logical principles concerning identity
• validating some version of Leibniz’s principle of identity of indiscernibles
• capability of being “tracked” across different moments of time and possible worlds

We propose to explore the conception of ontology (the study of what there is) that results when the different ideas are disentangled and the procrustean bed of a single, demanding notion of object is abandoned. We believe this will shed light on:  

• old philosophical puzzles concerning the relation between objects from different categories (such as my mind and my body, or my cup and the particles that compose it).
• objects that aren’t part of the fundamental “furniture of reality”, such as my cup, abstract objects (such as numbers and sets), and social objects (contracts, marriages).

Negation

In the history of logic two concepts of negation have been distinguished: (i) a negation of a term or property; and (ii) a negation of a sentence or proposition. While (ii) is thought to have existential import, (ii) is not. Kant’s critical revision of metaphysical concepts shows how many purported insights into the nature of objects is really based on invalid inferences in which these two kinds of negations are conflated. Since much of our reasoning is based on indirect proofs with the use of negation, Kant’s critical engagement with such proofs is a promising starting point for the revival of the debate whether we need a renewed attention to the different functions of negation.

Social and legal concepts

Another part of our project concerns social and legal concepts. There is an enormously wide range of potential case-studies in this domain. To mention only a few good illustrations that are currently hotly debated: medical classifications (e.g. of mental illness), legal and political classifications e.g. of 'immigrant'/alien, 'accountability' or `legally sane' (which is particularly salient in recent Norwegian public debate around the trial of Breivik) 'marriage'. However, our initial set of case studies has been chosen so as to draw on expertise we already possess.

Combatant.

According to the law of armed conflict (LOAC) "the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants". But who belongs to the class of combatants? On the one hand we face the problem that there is a rise of armed conflicts in which people act like combatants but fail to match the legal definition of 'combatant' since they do not fights on behalf of a state's authority. On the other hand, there is a tendency in many western countries that services that used to be delivered by the millitary itself is outsourced to civilian contractors. Might some of these services make the employees into active participators og war and thus liable to warranted attack? Another question is whether all combatants ought to have the same rights whether they fight on the side of those how fight a just war or not. If not we might need to distinguish between 'just combatant and 'unjust combatents'. As these examples show, although there might be nothing wrong with LOAC as such, we still need to raise the question of what 'combatant' ought to mean. In its current form is this concept is suffering from vagueness and ambiguities. 

Private/Public sphere.

A central distinction in the area of ethics has been the distinction between the private and public spheres.The distinction is crucial e.g. in media ethics. Respect for people's privacy is a fundamental condition for ethically respectable journalism. Due to the development of social media the distinction as commonly understood has become problematic. Moreover, the option of using a private forum (say a private Facebook page) need not imply that information and views in a private forum is morally exempted from being used by journalists. However, our working hypothesis is that the public debate and ordinary speakers collapse a several senses of "private" in their reasoning. One goal of our work is to disentangle these and to help decide which one should be adopted for legal and other official purposes.