What is the role of attention in mental action? Is attention a mental action? Which kind of control do we exercise over mental actions? Can spontaneous mental processes be considered mental actions or are they only happening to the agent? These are just few of the questions that will be discussed in this workshop, which aims to reflect on the different ways in which attention can be involved in mental action. By considering the role of attention in different mental processes, we may gain insight into which of these should be classified as instances of mental agency versus mental happenings.
Time and Place: June 2, Oslo, Georg Morgenstiernes Hus 652.
It will be possible to attend the workshop on Zoom. Please contact Francesca Secco to receive the Zoom link.
Schedule:
9.30 - 9.40 Francesca Secco (UiO), "Welcome and Introduction"
9.45 – 11.00 Yair Levy (Tel Aviv), “Attention and Voluntariness in the Wandering Mind”
11.10 – 12.25 Antonia Peacocke (Stanford), “Mental Content and the Unity of Action”
12.30 – 13.30 Lunch
13.30 – 14.45 Francesca Secco (UiO), “Agential Pluralism”
14.55 – 16.10 Tom McClelland (Cambridge), “Mental Affordances and Mental Disorder”
16.10 – 16.30 Coffee break
16.30 – 17.45 Wayne Wu (Carnegie Mellon), “The Mechanics of Bias: Memory and Attention”
Abstracts:
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Yair Levy, “Attention and Voluntariness in the Wandering Mind”
Mind wandering has been a target of a burgeoning yet fast-expanding area of research. One foundational question concerns the nature of this phenomenon: What exactly happens when one's mind wanders? The definitions employed by psychologists and cognitive scientists are useful in various ways but fail to generalize sufficiently to capture the full range of cases. Here I aim to advance the debate by proposing a novel and fully general definition. Building on ideas I defend elsewhere about the nature of attention and mental action, I shall develop the suggestion that – stated roughly, in slogan form – mind wandering is the allocation of attention in a voluntarily passive fashion. I show how his definition helps to settle the hotly debated questions of whether mind wandering is active, and whether it can sometimes be intentional. I also contrast my definition with two prominent alternatives due to Irving and Metzinger, respectively. As I explain, both proposed definitions fail, but they do so in instructive ways which inform the construction of my own proposal.
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Antonia Peacocke, “Mental Content and the Unity of Action”
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Francesca Secco, “Agential Pluralism”
According to the “intentional action thesis”, all actions are intentional actions. This claim is based on the assumption that only intentional behaviours are deeply and intimately related to the agent and, hence, are worthy of being considered actions. By proposing “agential pluralism”, I challenge this claim. I argue that considering only intentional actions does not fully capture all behaviours which are deeply and intimately related to the agent. There are non-intentional processes, such as creative thinking, which are deeply and intimately related to the agent and which, I argue, should be considered actions too.
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Tom McClelland, “Mental Affordances and Mental Disorder”
The concept of affordances has been used to shed light on a variety of mental disorders. Conditions including optic ataxia and body dysmorphia have been characterised as irregularities in affordance perception. And conditions such as OCD, Utilization Behaviour and Anarchic Hand Sign have been characterised as irregularities in the preparatory signals triggered by affordances. Although the affordance literature focuses on affordances for bodily actions like walking, grabbing and eating, recent work has proposed that we are also sensitive to affordances for mental actions like attending, imagining and deliberating. I argue that the concept of mental affordances can also be used to shed light on various mental disorders. Specifically, I focus on how ADHD, Unilateral Neglect, Utilization Behaviour and OCD can be interpreted as irregularities in the processing of attentional affordances.
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Wayne Wu, “The Mechanics of Bias: Memory and Attention”
I will discuss the fundamental role played by memory in setting up *attunement*, a readiness to attend and its subsequent deployment in perception and cognition. The primary target will be to understand intention as a dynamic form of memory that sets up a specific form of attunement, namely vigilance. The account will also capture a broader hysteresis induces conflicting attunements and hence, conflicting attention. These ideas will be used to understand bias.
This workshop is funded by the Faculty of Humanities, IFIKK, and the GOODATTETION project (ERC Consolidator Grant 2020, grant agreement no. 101003208).