Finnur Dellsén

Professor - Institutt for filosofi, idé- og kunsthistorie og klassiske språk

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E-post finnur.dellsen@ifikk.uio.no

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Besøksadresse Blindernveien 31 Georg Morgenstiernes hus 0313 Oslo

Postadresse Postboks 1020 Blindern 0315 Oslo

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Samarbeid

Dellsén, Finnur; Firing, Tina; Lawler, Insa & Norton, James (2024). What Is Philosophical Progress? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. ISSN 0031-8205. doi: 10.1111/phpr.13067. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Dellsén, Finnur (2024). Probabilifying reflective equilibrium. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857. 203(2). doi: 10.1007/s11229-023-04466-y.
Dellsén, Finnur (2023). Skautun, skynsemi og samfélag. Hugur: tímarit um heimspeki. ISSN 1021-7215. 30(1), s. 49–53.
Dellsén, Finnur (2023). Fyrir hverja eru fræðin? Ritið. ISSN 1670-0139. 23(1), s. 187–204. doi: 10.33112/ritid.23.1.10.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2023). Interthematic Polarization. American Philosophical Quarterly. ISSN 0003-0481. 61(1), s. 45–58. doi: 10.5406/21521123.61.1.04.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf; Lawler, Insa & Norton, James (2023). Would Disagreement Undermine Progress? Journal of Philosophy. ISSN 0022-362X. 120(3). Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag
In recent years, several philosophers have argued that their discipline makes no progress (or not enough in comparison to the ‘hard sciences’). A key argument for this pessimistic position appeals to the purported fact that philosophers widely and systematically disagree on most major philosophical issues. In this paper, we take a step back from the debate about progress in philosophy specifically and consider the general question: How (if at all) would disagreement within a discipline undermine that discipline’s progress? We reconstruct two distinct arguments from disagreement to a lack of progress, and argue that each rests on underscrutinized assumptions about the nature of progress. We then provide independent motivation to reject those assumptions. The upshot of these considerations is that widespread expert disagreement within a discipline is compatible with progress in that discipline. Indeed, progress can occur even as such disagreement increases. However, disagreement can undermine our ability to tell which developments are progressive (and to what degree). We conclude that while disagreement can indeed be a threat to progress (in philosophy and elsewhere), the precise nature of the threat has not been appreciated.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2022). Scientific Progress without Justification. I Lawler, Insa; Khalifa, Kareem & Shech, Elay (Red.), Scientific Understanding and Representation: Modeling in the Physical Sciences. Routledge. ISSN 9781032054957.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2022). The Noetic Approach: Scientific Progress as Enabling Understanding. I Shan, Yafeng (Red.), New Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Progress. Routledge. ISSN 9780367760557. s. 62–81.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2022). Scientific Progress Without Problems: A Reply to McCoy. I Lawler, Insa; Khalifa, Kareem & Shech, Elay (Red.), Scientific Understanding and Representation: Modeling in the Physical Sciences. Routledge. ISSN 9781032054957. s. 392–398. doi: 10.4324/9781003202905-35.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2022). Scientific progress: By-whom or for-whom? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0039-3681. 97, s. 20–28. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.11.006. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2022). Excessive Testimony: When Less Is More. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. ISSN 0031-8205. doi: 10.1111/phpr.12928. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag
This paper identifies two distinct dimensions of what might be called testimonial strength: first, in the case of testimony from more than one speaker, testimony can be said to be stronger to the extent that a greater proportion of the speakers give identical testimony; second, in both single-speaker and multi-speaker testimony, testimony can be said to the stronger to the extent that each speaker expresses greater conviction in the relevant proposition. These two notions of testimonial strength have received scant attention in the philosophical literature so far, presumably because it has been thought that whatever lessons we learn from thinking about testimony as a binary phenomenon will apply mutatis mutandis to varying strengths of testimony. This paper shows that this will not work for either of the two aforementioned dimensions of testimonial strength, roughly because less testimony can provide more justification in a way that can only be explained by appealing to the (non-binary) strength of the testimony itself. The paper also argues that this result undermines some influential versions of non-reductionism about testimonial justification.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2022). An Epistemic Advantage of Accommodation over Prediction. Philosophers' Imprint. ISSN 1533-628X.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf & Baghramian, Maria (2021). Disagreement in Science. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857. 198, s. 6011–6021. doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02767-0.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2021). We Owe It to Others to Think for Ourselves. I Matheson, Jonathan & Lougheed, Kirk (Red.), Epistemic Autonomy. Routledge. ISSN 9780367433345.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2021). Consensus versus Unanimity: Which Carries More Weight? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0007-0882. doi: 10.1086/718273.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf; Lawler, Insa & Norton, James (2021). Thinking about Progress: From Science to Philosophy. Noûs. ISSN 0029-4624. 56(4), s. 814–840. doi: 10.1111/nous.12383. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2021). Understanding scientific progress: the noetic account. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857. doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03289-z. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2020). Að treysta sérfræðingum: Hvað, hvenær og hvers vegna? Ritið. ISSN 1670-0139. 20(3), s. 235–258.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2020). Gildi vísinda og gildin í vísindum – á tímum heimsfaraldurs. Skírnir. ISSN 0256-8446. 194, s. 251–274.
Beebe, James & Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2020). Scientific realism in the wild: An empirical study of seven sciences and history and philosophy of science. Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0031-8248. 87(2), s. 336–364. doi: 10.1086/707552.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2020). Explanatory Consolidation: From ‘Best’ to ‘Good Enough’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. ISSN 0031-8205. doi: 10.1111/phpr.12706.
Beebe, James & Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2020). Scientific Realism in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Seven Sciences and HPS. Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0031-8248. doi: 10.1086/707552. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2019). The Epistemic Impact of Theorizing: Generation Bias Implies Evaluation Bias. Philosophical Studies. ISSN 0031-8116. s. 1–18. doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01387-w.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2019). Rational Understanding: Toward a Probabilistic Epistemology of Acceptability. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857. s. 1–20. doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02224-7.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2019). Should Scientific Realists Embrace Theoretical Conservatism? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0039-3681. 76, s. 30–38. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.09.005.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2019). Beyond Explanation: Understanding as Dependency Modeling. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0007-0882. doi: 10.1093/bjps/axy058.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). The Epistemic Value of Expert Autonomy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. ISSN 0031-8205. s. 1–18. doi: 10.1111/phpr.12550.
Beebe, James; Baghramian, Maria; Drury, Luke & Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Divergent Perspectives on Expert Disagreement: Preliminary Evidence from Climate Science, Climate Policy, Astrophysics, and Public Opinion. Environmental Communication. ISSN 1752-4032. doi: 10.1080/17524032.2018.1504099.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Scientific Progress: Four Accounts. Philosophy Compass. ISSN 1747-9991. 13(11). doi: 10.1111/phc3.12525.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Scientific Progress, Understanding, and Knowledge: Reply to Park. Journal for General Philosophy of Science (JGPS). ISSN 0925-4560. s. 1–9. doi: 10.1007/s10838-018-9419-y.
Sharadin, Nathaniel & Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Promotion as Contrastive Increase in Expected Fit. Philosophical Studies. ISSN 0031-8116. s. 1–28. doi: 10.1007/s11098-018-1062-2.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2017). Frá skoðunum til trúnaðar og aftur til baka: Yfirlit um bayesíska þekkingarfræði. Hugur: tímarit um heimspeki. ISSN 1021-7215. 28, s. 146–162.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf & Sharadin, Nathaniel (2017). The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass. Journal of the American Philosophical Association. ISSN 2053-4477. doi: 10.1017/apa.2017.22.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2017). Certainty and Explanation in Descartes's Philosophy of Science. HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science. ISSN 2152-5188. doi: 10.1086/692013.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2017). Reconstructed Empiricism. Acta Analytica. ISSN 0353-5150. 32, s. 95–113. doi: 10.1007/s12136-016-0289-9.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2017). Understanding without Justification or Belief. Ratio. ISSN 0034-0006. 30(3), s. 239–254. doi: 10.1111/rati.12134.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2017). Realism and the Absence of Rivals. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857. 194(7), s. 2427–2446. doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1059-3.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2017). Reactionary Responses to the Bad Lot Objection. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0039-3681. 61, s. 32–40. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.005.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2017). Deductive Cogency, Understanding, and Acceptance. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857. doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1365-4.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2017). When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. ISSN 0004-8402. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2017.1298636.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2017). The Heuristic Conception of Inference to the Best Explanation. Philosophical Studies. ISSN 0031-8116. doi: 10.1007/s11098-017-0933-2.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2017). Abductively Robust Inference. Analysis. ISSN 0003-2638. 77(1), s. 20–29. doi: 10.1093/analys/anx049.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2016). Gagnrýnin og vísindaleg hugsun. Skírnir. ISSN 0256-8446. 190, s. 321–343.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2016). Hlutdrægni í vísindum: Vanákvörðun, tilleiðsluáhætta og tilurð kenninga. Ritið. ISSN 1670-0139. 16, s. 9–28.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2016). Explanatory Rivals and the Ultimate Argument. Theoria. ISSN 0040-5825. 82, s. 217–237. doi: 10.1111/theo.12084.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2016). There May Yet Be Non-Causal Explanations (of Particular Events). Journal for General Philosophy of Science (JGPS). ISSN 0925-4560. 47, s. 377–384. doi: 10.1007/s10838-016-9333-0.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2016). Scientific Progress: Knowledge versus Understanding. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0039-3681. 56, s. 72–83. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2016.01.003.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2015). Tvö viðhorf til vísindalegrar þekkingar – eða eitt? Ritið. ISSN 1670-0139. 15, s. 135–155.

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Dellsén, Finnur (2024). Abductive Reasoning in Science. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781009500524. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

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Hjortland, Ole Thomassen; Sundfør Sivertsen, Sveinung & Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2021). Nils Klim-samtalen 2019: Intervju med Finnur Dellsén, vinner av Nils Klim-prisen 2019. Norsk Filosofisk tidsskrift. ISSN 0029-1943.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2021). Are there really no such things as theories? Metascience. ISSN 0815-0796. 30, s. 17–21. doi: 10.1007/s11016-021-00613-8.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2019). Inngangur ritstjóra. Hugur: tímarit um heimspeki. ISSN 1021-7215.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2019). Why Trust a Scientist?
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2019). A Surprising Epistemic Advantage of Accommodation over Prediction.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2019). A Surprising Epistemic Advantage of Accommodation over Prediction.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Best Explanations: Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. ISSN 1538-1617.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Expanding the Empirical: Constructive Empiricism and Augmented Observation.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Inngangur ritstjóra. Hugur: tímarit um heimspeki. ISSN 1021-7215.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Afstæðishyggja, ágreiningur og amerísk heimspeki: Viðtal við Mariu Baghramian. Hugur: tímarit um heimspeki. ISSN 1021-7215.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Understanding in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: A Complicated Relationship. Metascience. ISSN 0815-0796.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Generation-Bias Implies Evaluation-Bias.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Generation-Bias Implies Evaluation-Bias.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Generation-Bias Implies Evaluation-Bias.
Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Rational Understanding.

Se alle arbeider i Cristin

Publisert 22. mai 2023 13:36 - Sist endret 22. mai 2023 13:36